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When L&zaro Cdrdenas became president of Mexico 
in December 1934, a large part of Mexico's economy was 
under the control of foreign investors who successfully 
had fought off all attempts by previous Mexican govern­
ments to apply the constitutional principles which had 
come out of the Mexican Revolution and which would have 
infringed on that control. C&rdenas had joined the 
Revolution at the age of eighteen, had been a revolu­
tionary general at twenty-five, and temporary governor 
of his home state of Michoacdn at the same age. Only 
thirty-nine when he was elected president, Cdrdenas was 
ready to fight politically for the same ideals for 
which he had fought militarily during the Revolution.
The Cdrdenas Doctrine, although formalized by 
the Socialist Front of Lawyers of Mexico only after 
Cdrdenas already had served four years of his term, 
was from the beginning the central doctrine of the C&r- 
denas administration. Based on precedents such as the 
Calvo Clause, the C&rdenas Doctrine held that the terms 
"citizenship" and "nationality" could be applied only 
to specific territorial limits, and that no foreigner 
in Mexico could use his citizenship of another nation
v
as justification for turning to his own government in 
disputes with Mexico. CArdenas insisted that all per­
sons residing in Mexico consider themselves the same as 
Mexican nationals, with no more nor fewer rights under 
the law.
The application of the principles of the CArdenas 
Doctrine was the cause for CArdenas and his government's 
being labeled radical in many parts. Some even accused 
him and his government of being communist when as early 
as 1936 Mexico began giving aid to the Spanish Republican 
government. The other major help given to the Spanish 
Republicans came from the Soviet Union, thus making 
Mexico guilty by association in the minds of many. But 
when Mexico started giving asylum to Spanish refugees, 
no stipulation was made as to the political beliefs of 
those seeking asylum. Mexico only insisted on adher­
ence to the principles of what was to become the CAr- 
denas Doctrine.
If the case of Spain served to confuse the issue, 
the grant of asylum to Leon Trotsky in 1937 should have 
indicated that CArdenas was not under any kind of in­
fluence from the Soviet Union. Not only was his de­
fiance of that nation in granting the asylum of tre­
mendous importance, but his refusal to renew relations 
with the U.S.S.R. during his term wsb further evidence 
that he was pursuing an independent course.
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In international impact, however, these cases were 
minor compared with the most outstanding example of the 
application of the CArdenas Doctrine— the expropriation 
of British and American-owned oil properties on March 18, 
1938. The United States recognized the right of Mexico 
to expropriate the properties, hut demanded immediate 
and adequate compensation. Great Britain demanded the 
return of the properties, and the dispute reached the 
point where Mexico broke relations and did not renew 
them until after CArdenas left office.
CArdenas remained a key figure in Mexican politics 
after leaving office, and his outspoken attitude, es­
pecially on economic independence, sometimes irritated 
other powers such as the United States. The Cuban- 
United States' conflict of the 1960*3 provided CArde­
nas with one more opportunity to attack economic im­
perialism before he died on October 19, 1970.
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INTRODUCTION
Entire books have been written about Mexican- 
United States foreign policy, or even one incident in 
the relations between these two countries. It is not, 
therefore, the intention of this work to cover all of 
Mexico's foreign policy in the 20th Century. Neither 
will an attempt be made to write a complete political 
biography of the man who some feel was the most domi­
nant individual in Mexican politics in this century up 
to the present. Rather, the acts and the wordB of the 
man— L&zaro Cirdenas— will be used as a point of refer­
ence to show the various courses taken by Mexico in its 
relations with foreign governments in this century. Of 
primary interest must be the so-called Cdrdenas Doctrine, 
discussed in detail in the second chapter. The appli­
cation of this doctrine in both domestic and foreign 
policy under his administration made Cdrdenas well- 
known in the field of international relations, if not 
particularly well-liked by some of the powers which 
felt their interests suffered because of his actions.
Mexico's proximity to the United States (one of 
those countries which felt the effect of the C&rdenas 
Doctrine) has both aided and hindered the progress of 
Mexico throughout the two centuries of independent
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relations. Nevertheless, one cannot dispute the tre- 
mendous influence of the United States on Mexico, and 
the propensity for more dialogue between Mexico and the 
United States than between Mexico and other nations.
Because of this close relationship, and especial­
ly because the CArdenas government was the first Mexi­
can government in the 20th Century to begin attacking 
some of the commercial privileges enjoyed by U.S. com­
mercial interests under previous Mexican governments, 
two full chapters have been devoted to Mexican rela­
tions with the United States. In addition, in some of 
the other chapters, reference of necessity has been madfe 
to Mexican-United States' relations as they affected 
Mexico's relations with a third country. A good ex­
ample of this relationship was the Spanish Civil War, 
when Mexico was supplying munitions to the Spanish Re­
publican government while the United States wanted to 
be sure that none of those munitions were of American 
manufacture.
In the chapter dealing with Spain, the author has 
outlined a brief history of the relations between Mexi­
co and Spain, since those two countries were bound so 
closely through the Spanish empire. There have been 
times when the relationship was one of greatest friend­
ship, while at other times there have been no diplomat­
ic ties at all. It was during the years of CArdenas 
that Mexico exhibited exceptionally strong ties with
ix
Spain, stronger than any ties between Spain and other 
former colonies. CArdenas committed the Mexican nation 
to a policy of brotherhood with Spain, and the policy 
he pursued still colors the relations, or lack of dip­
lomatic ties, between the two countries. For this rea­
son, the largest part of Chapter III deals with the 
civil war years, CArdenas* reasoning in the policy he 
followed, and the effects of that policy.
A relationship completely different from that of 
Mexico and Spain has been that of Mexico and the Soviet 
Union. An astute student might point out that there 
were no relations between Mexico and the U.S.S.R. dur­
ing the years of CArdenas, and of course this observa­
tion is correct. Nevertheless, there was something of 
a negative relationship between the two countries 
throughout the entire period of CArdenas1 presidency. 
This negative relationship affected not only the two 
countries involved, but other countries as well. The 
very presence of Leon Trotsky in Mexico was enough to 
have world-wide impact. Innumerable newspaper and 
magazine articles were written in the United States 
about the ex-Soviet leader. Some of the articles were 
in praise of Mexico for its liberal attitude, while yet 
others blasted CArdenas for his leftist tendencies.
Trotsky's presence had more than an international 
effect on Mexico. Internally, groups of Mexicans argued
over his influence on Mexican policy in general. His 
articles in some of the major daily newspapers kept 
his residence in Mexico before the public for much of 
the time he was there. His death probably caused lit­
tle real grief among Mexicans in general, but it served 
as a platform for CArdenas to denounce those respon­
sible.
Pressure put on CArdenas from friends of the 
Soviet Union to revive diplomatic relations also color­
ed his administration, and made the lack of official 
ties perhaps more important than if there had been of­
ficial relations. All these factors together, plus the 
refusal to deal with the Soviet Union by CArdenas on 
any but his own terms, made Mexico's unofficial re­
lations with the Soviet Union an important factor in 
her external relations with the rest of the world.
Perhaps the single most important event in the 
history of 20th Century relations between Mexico and 
the United States occurred during the CArdenas years. 
This event was the oil expropriations of March 1938, 
an act which many Mexicans see as the beginning of 
economic independence for Mexico. For Mexico, the ex­
propriation was not just an act of independence, but in 
reality a test (although not intended for that) for the 
Good Neighbor policy of the United States. In this most 
far-reaching application of the CArdenas Doctrine, the
xi
reaction of the United States was almost as important 
as the act of expropriation itself in terms of setting 
a precedent for future relations.
The question of oil was not the only issue between 
the two neighbors during the CArdenas years. Almost as 
soon as he took office CArdenas signed a decree which 
he felt should keep the United States' fishing fleet 
out of what he considered Mexico's territorial waters. 
There were too many other important matters for discus­
sion during these years to give much attention to this
%
question, especially since Mexico was ill-equipped to 
try to do anything to enforce the law. But the decree 
CArdenas signed ultimately was the basis for an agree­
ment between Mexico and the United States, and there­
fore was another important piece of foreign policy 
legislation credited to CArdenas.
One other important issue between these two 
countries was related very closely to the oil question, 
although this relationship was denied by the United 
States. When the United States Treasury announced it 
would stop buying Mexican silver and this announcement 
came within a few days of the oil expropriations, then 
Mexico could only assume it was in retaliation. The 
U.S. 8ilver-purchasing policy fluctuated during the 
next few years and at times caused serious difficul­
ties in the Mexican economy.
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Sometimes in the United States it is forgotten 
that Mexico's foreign relations include other nations 
of the world also. Even in Mexico the special rela­
tionship with the United States is always visible in 
the form of numerous newspaper articles in all the major 
dailies almost everyday. But the deeds and words of 
Ldzaro Cdrdenas are very useful in pointing out the 
other foreign relations of Mexico, such as with Spain 
and the Soviet Union. In addition, Guatemala and Mexi­
co have had some stormy relations in this century, but 
because of the lack of any controversial intercourse 
directly bearing on Cdrdenas' years as president, 
Guatemala has not been treated in a separate chapter.
But there was one other nation with which Cdrde- 
nas dealt during his years as president that merits 
attention. Too often the issue of the oil expropria­
tions is treated as a single subject; nevertheless, the 
attitude of Great Britain toward Mexico was so differ­
ent from that of the United States that one should look 
at the oil question from the two different viewpoints.
While the United States never questioned Mexico's 
rights to enforce the C&rdenas Doctrine or to expropriate 
the properties, Great Britain was adamant in claiming 
that the only solution was a return of the oil proper­
ties. This narrow attitude led to an embargo on Mexi­
can oil, and shortly after the expropriations, to a
xiii
break in diplomatic ties..between the two nations.
Not one single point of the conflicts between 
the CArdenas government and other nations discussed, 
was settled fully during his term of office. The oil 
question with the United States was not settled until 
the year after he left office, and the same issue with 
Great Britain dragged on into the late 1940's. The 
following administration also renewed ties with the 
Soviet Union (as well as with Great Britain), but the 
denial of CArdenas to recognize the Franco regime in 
Spain has been carried forward as Mexican policy to 
the present day.
Cardenas did not completely fade from the scene 
in 1940 when his term ended. Nevertheless, it would 
be erroneous to overstate his importance in the years 
immediately after he left office in the realm of 
foreign affairs. Although he returned to military 
office for a time, his actions affected very little 
the foreign affairs of Mexico.
CArdenas the elder statesman of Mexico will be 
discussed in the next to last chapter, but because he 
was not very active in foreign affairs in the years 
following his term as president, most of this dis­
cussion will be centered around his political atti­
tude, especially as it pertained to the Cuban-United 
States' conflict in the early 1960's. During the
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earlier years, CArdenas himself had not attracted much 
international attention. But because of the situation 
in Cuba, he again focused the spotlight on Mexico, per­
haps forcing the Mexican government into making policy 
statements.
These policy statements were nothing really new, 
but again showed Mexico's basic foreign policy of self- 
determination and non-intervention in the affairs of 
other countries. But it was the U.S.-Cuban confronta­
tion and CArdenas' defense of Cuba which focused atten­
tion once again on these principles. There may be de­
bate over whether CArdenas by this time was being used 
by the communists or not, but CArdenas' assertions were 
merely his old idea of economic independence of all 
nations.
To portray current foreign relations of practical­
ly any nation one is often hard-pressed to find sources, 
and Mexico proved to be no exception. Although some 
of CArdenas* papers are available in the Mexican ar­
chives, they proved to be singularly inadequate for a 
complete picture. Fortunately, there are several books 
now in print which quote speeches, and the first three 
volumes of CArdenas1 Works have been published.
The United States National Archives and the print­
ed series of the diplomatic papers in the Foreign Rela­
tions of the United States were both excellent sources
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for information not just on the United States and Mexi­
co, "but Mexican relations with other countries as well.
Since these sources were somewhat limited, how­
ever in dealing with Mexican relations with other 
countries, there was only one other readily available 
source for the history of 20th century Mexico. This 
source consisted of both newspapers and magazines pub­
lished in Mexico during the period of the C&rdenas 
years. Although these proved to be excellent sources, 
one problem is faced: newspapers often show extreme
bias. This meant that for each article read and quot­
ed, other newspapers were researched to try to assure 
accuracy. It was found that the large dailieB such 
as Excelsior, Novedades and El Universal, which carried 
translated articles from the wire press services, were 
likely to be the most accuratei The official organ of 
the government, El Nacional. was relied upon to carry 
the party line. It was fortunate that El Nacional 
published entire quoted texts of both official Mexi­
can documents and also notes from other countries as 
well. In this respect, this newspaper served the same 
purpose as the NY Times for some current documents of 
U.S. foreign policy. Because of this policy of print­
ing entire documents, El Nacional was not used to pro­
ject Mexican public opinion, but as a primary source 
for important foreign policy.
xv i
Some former high-ranking officials who served the 
Mexican government before, during and after the years of 
Cdrdenas were extremely helpful in filling the gaps 
which existed after the major portion of research in 
printed sources had been completed. Ambassador Luis 
Quintanilla, former ambassador to the Soviet Union and 
also to the Organization of American States, was es­
pecially helpful. Not only did he grant the author 
interviews, but arranged others. One of these which 
was extremely valuable was with Jestis Silva Herzog, who 
not only was the ambassador to the Soviet Union when 
relations between Mexico and that country were broken, 
but who also was directly involved with the C&rdenas 
government in the newly-nationalized petroleum Industry.
Sources such as these, although minor in the 
amount of material used, were extremely valuable in 
giving human interest accounts of C&rdenas and making 
him more than just an object of research.
xvii
CHAPTER I
LAZARO CARDENAS THE REVOLUTIONARY
When LAzaro CArdenas was born on May 21, 1893 (in 
Jiquilpan, MichoacAn), Mexico was still under the dic­
tatorship of Porfirio Diaz, a state which was to last 
until the Mexican Revolution which began in 1910. Lit­
tle in his background suggested that CArdenas would be­
come not only a leading military figure in that revolu­
tion, but the political leader to carry forth many of 
the social, economic and political ideas which came out 
of the revolutionary struggle.
The parents of LAzaro were DAmasco CArdenas and 
Pelicitas del Rio. Unlike most of the family relatives, 
they did not own agricultural land, but DAmasco com­
bined a career of making soap, working in the local 
industry dedicated to weaving shawls, and practicing 
folk medicine. LAzaro began school at the age of six 
in 1901, but as the family was poor, he had to begin 
working at an early age in 1909* his first position 
being in the Office of Fiscal Administration of Ji­
quilpan. The few pesos he earned there were not suf­
ficient, and by the time he was fifteen he held another 
position also, that of typographer's apprentice in a
1
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local printing shop. After the death of his father and 
the failure of the printing business, he took a posi­
tion as a local jailer. Here CArdenas first learned 
to sympathize with, then to love, the Mexican* Indian.1
The Mexican Revolution had started several years 
earlier, and when CArdenas was eighteen he announced he 
was going to join the revolutionary cause. He traveled 
from Jiquilpan in 1913 to Buenavista to join the forces 
of General Guillermo Garcia Aragdn. When he arrived at 
the revolutionary camp, CArdenas was asked by the gener­
al to copy a written order. After reading what he had
written, Garcia Aragdn made CArdenas a second captain
2in charge of his official correspondence. Thus, at 
the age of eighteen, with no military experience, CAr­
denas began a career as a revolutionary military of­
ficer. His experiences as a jailer in Jiquilpan and 
his later travels through many parts of Mexico as a 
revolutionary officer enabled him to identify with the 
common man, a trait which later made him one of Mexico's
1Por early background on CArdenas, see Carlos Al- 
vear Acevedo, LAzaro CArdenas, el hombre y el mito, se- 
gunda edicidn TR?5cTco*i 13TTEorlaT-7u^7™™T9^75Tr̂ T™TO; 
LAzaro CArdenas, Obras; I-Apuntes. 1913-1940. Torao I 
(MAxico: Universidad Nacional Aux&noma de MAxico, 1972),
p. 6; and Roberto Blanco Moheno, Tata LAzaro. Vida, obra 
y muerte de CArdenas, Miigica y Carrillo hierto (Mexico: 
fentorlaroiaM,' '1972j,1pp/'afrzs:-----------
2CArdenas, Obras, Tomo I, p. 20.
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most popular presidents. He might not even fully have 
understood the underlying reasons for the revolution at 
the time, hut later he tried to be faithful to the ideals 
set forth after most of the fighting was finished.
Although the name of CArdenas is not as promi­
nent as the names of some of the other revolutionary 
officers, his rise through the ranks was extremely rap­
id. In 1913 he was promoted to lieutenant colonel un­
der the orders of General Federico Morales, and in the 
same year he joined the constitutionalist cause, head­
ed by Carranza. In May 1920, at the age of only twenty- 
five, he became a brigadier general, and had definitely 
tied himself to General Plutarco Elias Calles, who, 
along with Alvaro Obregdn, was to become one of the 
strong men of Mexico after the ending of the military 
phase of the revolution. Serving in various military 
posts between 1920 and 1928, with promotions to brigade 
general in 1924 and in 1928 to divisional general, CAr­
denas also began getting political experience in 1920.
In that year he was appointed as temporary governor of 
his home state of Michoac&n at the time when Fascual 
Ortiz Rubio, a future president, left that post to be­
come Secretary of Communications. CArdenas retained 
this temporary post until September of the same year, 
when he once again returned to strictly military
4
•*duties.
Prom November 1921 to February 1923, CArdenas 
served as the commander of the Column of Sonora, and 
also as the Chief of Operations in the Isthmus of 
TehuAntepec. Prom March to May 1923, CArdenas had the 
distinction of being the commander of the first mili­
tary concentration camp in Irapuato, and afterward be­
came the head of the 20th Operational Headquarters of 
MichoacAn. During the Adolfo de la Huerta uprising, 
he again commanded troops and was wounded and taken 
prisoner. When his capturers learned that General 
Obregdn had been victorious in OcotlAn, they not only 
released Cardenas, but put themselves under his com-
In 1925, CArdenas became Chief of Operations in 
Huastecas, and while there founded the first School 
for Sons of the Military. After having seved in this 
area for two years, CArdenas in 1927 accepted the nomi­
nation as candidate for governor of MichoacAn in his 
own right. On September 15, 1928, while still a mili­
tary officer, Cardenas took office as governor. Three
^Alberto Bremauntz, Material histdrico de Obregdn 
a CArdenas (MAxico: Avelar Hnos. Impresores, S.A.,
rrrmjB.
mand.̂
1973}, pp. 155-56; and Agustin Rodriguez 
contemnorAneo (1867-1940)-CArdenas en su 
Ochoa, MAxico 
historia
^■Rodriguez Ochoa, MAxico contemporAneo, p. 142.
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years later, Governor CArdenas served notice on foreign 
oil companies when he nullified contracts dating back 
as far as 1905 for the exploitation of land within the 
state. CArdenas explained that the "representatives" 
of the people at the time the contracts were signed 
really had been working for the foreign companies,
cthus making the contracts illegal.
The oil companies still had several years before 
their major confrontation with CArdenas, but it was ob­
vious his political star was rising when he was named 
Secretary of Government in August 1931. He only re­
mained in the office a few months, however, as in 
October he resigned to return as governor to MichoacAn,^ 
where on September 25, 1932 he married Amalia SolArzano. 
The parents of the bride refused to attend the ceremony
7because it was civil rather than religious.' In his 
defiance of his bride's parents could be seen the fu­
ture defiance of his government toward the Catholic 
church. It appears that CArdenas was not irreligious 
at the time, but rather probably felt that the church 
had been a factor in holding back the development of 
the country. Later, especially in the case of education,
5Ibid., pp. 146, 152.
6Ibid., pp. 152-53.
7'CArdenas, Obras, Tomo I, p. 206.
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Cdrdenas had to face the wrath of the church not only 
in Mexico but even in the United States as he was ac­
cused of trying to tear down the moral fibre of the 
Mexican people.
The church issue, however, still was not a major 
problem for CArdenas in 1933 when he accepted a cabinet 
post as the Secretary of War and Navy. He stayed in 
this position only a few months as on May 15, 1933, 
C&rdenas submitted his resignation in order to devote 
full time to his pre-candidacy campaign for the presi­
dency.8
When Calles, who still was the strongest man
politically in Mexico, was first approached on the
subject of CArdenas' candidacy for 1934, he objected.
His objections were not based on any dislike for CAr-
denas, but rather because he felt he still was too
young. Finally Calles gave in to avoid any conflict
within what had become known as the "Revolutionary
qFamily," and also to placate the military. Had Calles
8Ibid., pp. 213, 224-25.
^Alvear Acevedo, LAzaro C&rdenas. p. 93. A num­
ber of high-ranking military leaders, including General 
Abelardo Rodriguez, already had decided in favor of 
CArdenas. Added to these military figures were some 
of the more powerful civilians such as TomAs Garrido 
Canabal. To have refused their wishes, Calles would have had to run the risk of dividing the Family.
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known that within a few months of the time he took of­
fice C&rcLenas would feel it necessary to turn against 
him, he undoubtedly would not have been so anxious to 
placate the military and avoid "family" squabbles.
C&rdenas became president of Mexico at the end 
of 1934» and probably many Mexicans were surprised to 
see him finish out the six-year term for which he had 
been elected. Since the fall of Porfirio Diaz, Mexican 
presidents had come and gone in rapid succession. Only 
Obregdn (1920-24) and Calles (1924-28) had been able to 
complete full terms, and they had served before the 
term was set at six years. In the period between 
1928 and 1934, three presidents had served: Emilio
Portes Gil, one year; Pascual Ortiz Rubio, two and one- 
half years; and Abelardo Rodriguez, two years.All 
three of these presidents have been labeled by historians 
as more or less puppets for Calles.
C&rdenas succeeded in retaining the presidency 
because, in spite of his earlier friendly relations 
with Calles, he insisted on being his own president.
To the credit of Cdrdenas, when his time came to step 
down, he did so without trying to interfere with the 
new president. Ambassador Luis Quintanilla, a close 
personal friend and public servant under Cardenas and
■^Rodriguez Ochoa. Mexico contempordneo, pp. 147-
154.
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other administrations, says that Cardenas tried in no 
way to influence Avila Camacho to govern according to 
the policies established in the previous six years.^ 
Prank Brandenburg, on the other hand, states that 
Cdrdenas continued as head of the "Revolutionary Fami­
ly" during the reign of Camacho, and shared the posi­
tion as Family head during parts of the administrations
12of both Miguel Alemdn and Adolfo Ruiz CortineB. In 
spite of this claim of shared leadership, it would seem 
from the conservative swing of the Avila Camacho regime 
that Cdrdenas did in effect refrain from exerting strong 
control over the policies of his successor. As will 
be seen below, Cardenas was strongly in favor of so­
cialist education, yet within a few months of leaving
0office, he saw Avila Camacho completely change the 
system.
There is no denial, however, that Cdrdenas re­
mained an important figure in Mexican affairs even af­
ter leaving office. He was a divisional general at 
the age of thirty-three and president of his country 
at thirty-nine. When he left the presidency he was
^Personal interview. Cecilia S. Tyler with Dr. 
Luis Quintanilla, Mexico City, January 16, 1974. Per­
sonal files.
12Frank Brandenburg, The Making of Modern Mexico 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., l̂ bA),
p. 6.
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only forty-five, an age at which most politicians have 
not yet reached the peak of their careers. Therefore, 
Cardenas had a number of years left in which to serve 
his country, even if he did not try to impose his will 
on those presidents who followed him.
Only one year after leaving office the opportunity 
arose for him to serve again. When the United States 
entered the Second World War, it became obvious that 
Mexico would be tied to the United States. C&rdenas 
was urged to become Commander of the Pacific Military 
Region, a post he accepted at the end of 1941. In 
July of the next year he was elevated to the post of 
Secretary of National Defense, a position he occupied 
until the end of the war. Finally, he was able to leave 
official public service and began working in the rural 
areas to better the lives of the peasants. J Since 
his days as jailer in Jiquilpan he had sympathized 
with the natives, and had tried as president to better 
their living standards. Now he was able to dedicate 
himself full time to the task.
In July 1947 Cdrdenas was named Executive Commit­
tee Member of the Commission of Tepalcatepec, giving 
him an official position from which to work among the 
peasants. During the next eleven years he worked in
13Rodriguez Ochoa, Mexico contempordneo, pp. 244-
45.
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this position, building roads, dams, schools, hospitals 
and helping to develop both industry and agriculture 
within the region. In 1958 he resigned, but in 1961 
he was named by President Adolfo L6pez Mateos to a simi­
lar position on the Commission of Rio BalBas.*4 This 
was his last official position with the government of 
Mexico, and probably it was more of a political move 
on the part of L6pez Mateos to get Cdrdenas out of the 
spotlight in which he put himself because of his stand 
on the Cuban-United States conflict in 1961.
On October 19, 1970, Cardenas died and is now
buried in the Monument to the Revolution alongside Ma- 
dero, Carranza and Calles.^ C&rdenas might have felt 
uncomfortable being buried next to Calles, but never­
theless the Monument has to be a fit final resting place 
for the general from Michoacdn who left home at the age 
of eighteen to become a revolutionary, then carried the 
Revolutionary ideals with him into the presidency.
The Ideals of the Mexican Revolution
So true did Cfirdenas try to be to what he inter­
preted as the ideals established by the Mexican Revolu­
tion that it might be said that the Revolution reached 
its peak in the years of his administration, then began
14Ibid., pp. 246-47 
15Ibid., p. 266.
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a retrogression.^ However, the Mexican Revolution is 
supposedly a continuing process, and the policies of
Cdrdenas have been likened to some extent to the pre-
17sent policies of President Luis Echeverrla.
One problem encountered in talking about the 
Mexican Revolution and the revolutionary policies of 
such leaders as C&rdenas and Echeverrla 1b the diffi­
culty in trying to define just what it was and the 
goals of those who made the revolution. Victor Alba
claims that the Mexican Revolution breaks all the known
18molds of a revolution, especially the Marxist one.
Although there definitely was a large proletariat in 
Mexico, it was not a unified one knowledgeable of its 
existence as a force capable of throwing out a ruling 
class. Neither was there anything such as Lenin'b van­
guard to lead the struggle. Rather there already was a 
dictatorship (albeit not of the proletariat!) which may 
have remained in power several years longer had not Ma- 
dero, himself a member of the upper class, suggested the
16Personal interviews. Author with former ambas­
sadors Luis Quintanilla and Jestis Silva Herzog, Mexico 
City, July 1972. L.S.U. Archives.
17'Personal interview. Cecilia S. Tyler with Dr.
Luis Quintanilla.
18Victor Alba, Las ideas sociales contempor&neas 
en Mdxico (Mdxico/Buenos Aires: Pondo de Cultura Bco-
ndmica, i960), p. 207.
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possibility of toppling the regime of Diaz.
Perhaps the only real characteristic the Mexican 
Revolution had in common with other social upheavals was 
the desire on the part of some of the leaders to improve
the daily living conditions of the great mass of Mexican
19peasants. It would be hard to say that even this goal 
was characteristic, and obviously those who did desire 
to improve the living standard of the masses met with 
nothing but failure both during the violent years of 
the revolution and for a number of years afterward.
There are some who see no revolutionary impact 
in the years 1910-1917, or any other period of Mexican 
history; therefore, to them the Mexican Revolution is 
not a revolution at all. Their argument is based on 
the theory that a revolution must bring about some kind 
of radical change, and that there is nothing revolution­
ary or radical in Mexico in putting new leaders into
20office by rebellion. There is truth in this obser­
vation as leaders in Mexico often decided by force who 
would be the president, or dictator. The violent part 
of the Mexican Revolution really did little to change 
the situation until with the administration of Ldzaro
19Manuel Gonzalez Ramirez, La revolucidn social de 
Mexico (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura ficonimica, l£6o;,p. 59.
20T. Esauivel Obregdn, "Mexican Problems," in 
Foreign Affairs. Vol. I (March 15, 1923), pp. 126-27.
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Cdrdenas Mexico began systematic changes in the presi­
dency every six years.
Whether calling the Mexican Revolution a non­
revolution because it failed to bring about radical 
changes in the manner of selecting officials or whether 
it was even a political or a social phenomenon perhaps 
is not really paramount in defining it. But one con­
sideration and one tangible culmination of the revolu­
tion was the Constitution of 1917r and there certainly 
were some revolutionary (at least for the time) parts 
to that document. It was in the area of constitutional 
enforcement that Cdrdenas stood out from his predeces­
sors as he used it to further the revolutionary goals 
of his government. Those who came before him seemed 
either to ignore the constitution or to bend it to suit 
their own ends. One of the outstanding examples of 
this practical disdain for constitutionality is the 
exploitation of the riches of Mexico allowed by all 
governments before Cdrdenas. When he came to power on 
the other hand, Cdrdenas used the revolutionary por­
tions of the constitution to the fullest extent to ob­
tain what he thought were the revolutionary objectives 
of the Nation.
We should at least point out, however, that Sov­
iet historians do not look on this document as being 
truly revolutionary. On the contrary, in spite of ad­
mitting that it does represent an ideology that Is
14
revolutionary, the Soviets believe it voices protection 
for the poor masses of Mexico while in reality it is 
nothing more than a document designed to support the
interests of the urban middle class at the expense of
21the proletariat. Cdrdenas obviously believed dif­
ferently as he used the articles discussed below to al­
low the laboring class and the peasants to participate 
in the Mexican government.
In relation to both social and economic programs,
the constitution is said to borrow from Western-Buro-
22pean socialist theories, and at the same time is a 
highly flexible document which can be used by presi­
dents (as it was by Cdrdenas) for revolutionary goals
21of the government. ' In spite of the Soviet accusation 
that it is not a revolutionary document, it has been 
viewed thusly on a number of occasions, especially dur­
ing the Cdrdenas years. The Cdrdenas government was 
accused of being anti-religious and communistic, among
21J. Gregory Oswald, nLa revolucidn en la historio- 
grafia sovietica," in Historia mexicana. Vol. XII 
(enero-marzo, 1963), p. 354.
22Tomme Clark Call, The Mexican Venture: Prom 
Political to Industrial Revolution in Mexico (New Yorks 
Oxford university Press, 1̂ 53), pp. 16-17.
21'Anita Brenner, The Wind that Swept Mexico: The 
History of the Mexican Revolution. 1910-1942. third 
edition (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1943), p. 51.
i
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other things; yet his policies, as will be seen, were 
based normally on strict constitutional interpretation.
Most criticism that the government of Cdrdenas 
was anti-religious and communistic stem from the wide­
spread use of four of the constitutional articles to 
further the six-year plan established by the Partido 
Nacional Revolucionario (PNR). The first of these 
articles was Article 3 which deals with education. The 
Cdrdenas government felt so strongly about the State's 
responsibility in the field of education that his ad­
ministration passed an amendment making the article 
even stronger in relation to the church's position. Es­
sentially, the clergy were prohibited from giving pri­
mary or secondary school education for laborers and 
peasants,^ and naturally the church both in Mexico 
and abroad resented the strong application of the anti­
clerical constitutional legislation.
Although the church objected to the application 
of Article 3, Cardenas was able to weather the storm of 
protests and even improved the government's relatione 
with the church over those of Calles and the church.
But it was Article 27 which caused so much friction 
that at times it seemed that the government might fall.
^Felipe Telia Ramirez, editor, leyes fundamentales 
de Mdxico. 1808-1964. segunda edicidn, revisada y puesta 
ai dia (Mexico: Editorial Porrua, S.A., 1964), pp.
818-819.
This article establishes the nation as the sole original 
owner of all the lands and subsoil minerals. In addi­
tion, it provides for expropriations should the govern­
ment establish the public need as long as an indemnity 
for the expropriated property is paid. It not only 
states that only Mexicans by birth or naturalization 
could obtain property, but Article 27 also prohibited 
religious institutions from acquiring, possessing, or 
administering real property or holding mortgages on
2 Rsuch property. J Various Mexican governments before 
Cdrdenas had difficulties with the church over the ar­
ticle, yet never had applied with any force the provi­
sions pertaining to private enterprise.
The wording of the article is very clear and in­
vestors coming into Mexico should have been aware of 
the Hrevolutionary" content of the article long before 
Cdrdenas applied it to the foreign oil properties. But 
governments from the time of Porfirio Diaz had encourag­
ed foreign capital and perhaps many of the investors 
believed that when the new constitution was promulgated 
in 1917 that Article 27 would never be made retroactive. 
The various Petroleum Laws had negated the same pro­
visions in the 1857 document, and the oil companies 
seemed not to believe that Cdrdenas would use the new 
constitution against them, especially since other
25Ibid., pp. 825-828.
17
"revolutionary1 governments since 1917 had accommodated
26themselves to overlooking certain provisions.
Although Article 27 displeased both the church 
and the foreign capitalists, it was Article 123# the Lab­
or Magna Carta, which was considered extremely revolu­
tionary for its time. Besides establishing a maximum 
working day of eight hours and prohibiting child labor, 
this article made strikes legal and required, at least 
by law, that equal wages be paid to employes regardless 
of their sex or nationality.^ In the case of the C&r- 
denas administration, full use was made of this article 
to bring laborers into the government as a very potent 
force. Cdrdenas allowed strikes to the point that it 
seemed again that perhaps his own government was in dan­
ger because of his policies.
Article 123 could be considered a major break­
through for organized labor in Latin America, but the 
inclusion of the article in the 1917 constitution did
26On December 26, 1926, Calles promulgated the 
Regulatory Law of Article 27# and tried to limit the 
concessions of the oil companies. But the Supreme Court 
(and diplomatic pressure) aided the companies in tem­
porarily keeping these concessions. For more background 
see Antonio Gdmez Robledo, The Bucarell Agreements and 
International Law, trans. by Dr. Salomon ae la Selva 
^Mexico ftity: Rational University of Mexico, 1940);and
Government of Mexico, The True Facts about the Expro­
priations of the Oil Companies' Property in Mexico 
{Mexico City: Government of Mexico, 1940).
27Tefla Ramirez, Leyes fundamentales de Mexico, pp. 870-872. ---- -------------------
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not guarantee the Mexican workers that they no longer 
would be exploited, regardless of the idealistic in­
tent of the members of the Querdtaro Convention which 
included it in the new constitution. In fact, it_was 
the very exploitation of the workers by the oil com­
panies of the United States and Great Britain which 
finally forced Cdrdenas to act in 1938, thus thrusting 
Mexico into an international defense of what for him 
were Cdrdenas1 domestic policies.
Perhaps even more radical in immediate effect than 
the above three articles was Article 130. It prohibit­
ed Congress from enacting any laws either establishing 
or denying any religion, and at the same time made mar­
riage a civil contract, a law still in effect today.
In addition, the clergy were prohibited from criticiz­
ing in either public or private meetings the laws or
28authorities of the country. Cdrdenas had taken ad­
vantage of this article when he insisted on being mar­
ried in a civil ceremony in 1932.
Regardless of the origins of the revolutionary 
process in Mexico leading up to the Constitution of 1917 
or the process it has followed since, these four arti­
cles and other parts of the constitution provided the 
opportunity in Mexico for true social reform. Unfor­
tunately, the individuals who emerged as the early
28Ibid., pp. 875-877.
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leaders in Mexico could not measure up to the intel­
lectual stature of leaders of other revolutions. Where­
as many of the Russian leaders who helped form the gov­
ernment of the Soviet Union after the Russian Revolu­
tion were educated men who had read and understood the
pre-revolutionary intellectuals, in Mexico some of the
29lesser-educated generals assumed power. These were 
military men who understood battlefield strategy, but 
often failed to understand the social intent of the new 
constitution. Even when they understood perfectly, they 
apparently chose to interpret the new document in their 
own best interests.
The first of the revolutionary generals to assume 
power and to use the constitution in an attempt to bet­
ter the lives of the common Mexican was Ldzaro Cdrdenas. 
Even before the famous confrontation with the oil com­
panies in 1938, Cdrdenas had begun to assert Mexican 
independence from the powerful foreigners with money 
invested in so many aspects of Mexican life.
By the latter part of 1937 Cdrdenas had expro­
priated over 52,000 acres in the Yaqui Valley of the 
northwestern state of Sonora alone. Although most of 
the land in this region previously was held by Americans, 
Cdrdenas was not picking on the United States, or even 
on foreigners in general. Most of the land expropriated
29̂Francis McCullagh. Red Mexico (New York: Louis
Carrier and Company, 1928), p. 118.
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in the Laguna region in northern Mexico was British- 
owed, but in the Yucatdn his administration also took
xnland away from some of the large Mexican landholders.
Cdrdenas thus in the first three years of his ad­
ministration had begun applying the revolutionary ideals 
of such individuals as Emiliano Zapato. A revolutionary 
from the age of eighteen, Cdrdenas continued his revolu­
tionary acts when he became president. For Cdrdenas, 
foreign and domestic policy merged into one, and the 
result was the revolutionary six-year plan for the PNR, 
a party he changed and molded to suit his own ideals.
•'Charles A. Thomson, "Agrarian Reform in Mexico," 
in Mexico and the United States, editor, S.D. Myers, Jr. 




THE CARDENAS DOCTRINE AND MEXICAN FOREIGN POLICY
Although the constitution was approved in 1917, 
in the years following it really was not applied. Few 
of the social reforms were enacted as Carranza, Obre- 
g6n and Calles continued to run the government found­
ed on their own personal power rather than on the con­
stitution.1 Therefore, for the first quarter century 
after the beginning of the revolution, there was lit­
tle change in the system of Mexican government. Strong 
men such as Porfirio Diaz ran the government before the 
revolution, and strong men still were in control after­
wards .
Before Cdrdena^ then, the presidents of Mexico 
were more concerned with trying to consolidate politi­
cal power than with anything else. Finally Cdrdenas 
turned Mexico toward the road to social and political 
change and economic growth. In so doing, he was not 
content to copy growth models of industrial and capi­
talistic societies, but tended to use a more communal
1Arnaldo Cdrdova, La formacldn del poder politico 
en Mdxicp (Mexico: Ediciones Era, 1^7^), pp. 22-̂ 3.
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form of organization in order to join rural life and
pindustrialization. Because he refused to copy the 
political and economic molds of countries such as the 
United States, his regime quickly was labeled as radical.
The Cdrdenas Doctrine
One of the major reasons Cdrdenas and his ad­
ministration were called radical is found in the use 
of what came to be called the Cdrdenas Doctrine. The 
"doctrine" did not assume a legal, technical stature 
until the Socialist Front of Lawyers of Mexico took 
part of a speech made by Cdrdenas in September 1938 
and molded the doctrine in legal language, but the 
ideals of the doctrine were used by Cdrdenas in both 
domestic and foreign policy matters much earlier.
Cdrdenas was still a divisional general in the 
early 1930's when he began indicating that only eco­
nomic independence would free the country from a form 
of capitalism which brough no benefit to Mexico and
xeven became a threat during difficult periods of time. 
This attitude, which prevailed throughout his life, be­
came the basis for the Cdrdenas Doctrine, a doctrine
Raymond Vernon, El dilema del desarrollo econdm- 
ico de Mdxico (Mdxico: Editorial Biana, 197^), PP# 88-
w . -------------
^Analtol Shulgovski, Mdxico en la encrucijada de 
su hlstoria, segunda edicidn (Mtxico: Ediciones de
Cultura Popular, S.A., 1972), pp. 125-26.
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which took on international significance when he had to 
defend himself and his government against such countries 
as Great Britain and the United States. Cdrdenas was 
not the first man in Latin America, however, to take up 
the issue of economic independence, and therefore he had 
precedents on which to establish the Cdrdenas Doctrine.
Carlos Calvo, an Argentine, in the 19th century 
evolved the idea that foreigners should have no more 
nor fewer rights than those given to native investors, 
and in general the Cdrdenas Doctrine follows the same 
reasoning. In giving Cdrdenas a precedentr the Calvo 
Doctrine states that any foreigner must forego an ap­
peal for any diplomatic protection from his own govern­
ment in cases of dispute, but rather must turn to local 
courts to resolve disagreements. Calvo based this ar­
gument on the premises that sovereign states, being 
equal, have the right of non-interference of any kind 
by other states, and that foreigners may not have more 
rights than native citizens and therefore do not have
4.the right of redress to their own governments.
Although this doctrine was formulated in the 19th 
century, it failed to become established as a part of 
international law (perhaps because of the opposition of
^Donald R. Shea, The Calvo Clause: A Problem of
Inter-American and International lav and Diplomacy 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955),
P- 19.
5the United States). Nevertheless, from the doctrine 
has come the Calvo Clause, which binds the foreign in­
vestor to using the local courts for any dispute aris­
ing from his contractural relationship with the host 
nation. The Clause differed from the original Calvo 
Doctrine in that the Clause stipulates that each in­
dividual gives his willing consent to waive his right 
to seek diplomatic protection of his own government in 
cases of contractural disputes, whereas the Calvo Doc­
trine was a unilateral enforcement.^
In addition to the Calvo Clause, the first Pan- 
american Conference in 1889 also gave Cdrdenas a pre­
cedent. At that conference a declaration was approved 
which established equality, before the law of nationals 
and foreigners in one country. The declaration stated 
that a State was not expected to treat foreigners any 
differently from nationals,^ and the policy of the Cdr- 
denas government nationalized the idea into the Carde­
nas Doctrine.
In September 1938, Cdrdenas denied as a fiction 
the idea of extraterritoriality. He claimed that any
5Ibid., p. 27.
6Ibid., p. 28.
7Salvador Mendoza, La doctrina Cdrdenas: Texto.
antecedentes, comentarios (Mexico: fidiciones Soias.
1939). pp. 55-33.-------
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organization formed under the laws of one country but 
actually controlled by citizens of another could not 
claim protection of the foreign government. For Cdrde­
nas, "citizenship" and "nationality" only had meaning 
within a particular territory, and these conditions 
must be given up when one removes himself from that ter­
ritory and goes to another either to invest, engage in 
commercial activities or simply to reside. Once inside 
that foreign territory, the person (or organization) 
must adapt himself to all rights and obligations of the
Qnationals of the host country.
In explaining the general idea of this doctrine 
to the United States, the Mexican Foreign Minister used 
the example of expropriated lands taken from both na­
tionals and foreigners. He emphasized that Mexico 
could not pay its own nationals to the exclusion of 
foreigners or vice versa. In getting at the heart of 
the doctrine, he stated that any foreigner moving to 
another country must accept both the benefits granted 
as well as the risks, just as nationals. The Mexican 
government believed that all, including the foreigner
in Mexico for investment purposes, must work for the
9benefit of the entire nation.
8Ibid., pp. 28-29.
Û.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of 
the United States. Diplomatic Papers, 1958, Vol. V, 
pp. 68S-83 (Hereafter abbreviated as Fkt)S).
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In the legal interpretation of the doctrine by 
the Socialist Front of Lawyers of Mexico, the person 
who goes to a new country must think of that country 
as his own. He must re-educate his mind to think of 
himself as a part of his new society and to accept its 
moral and social customs.
In keeping with his life-long doctrine of economic 
independence and political sovereignty, Cdrdenas stres­
sed that the sovereignty of a country is in danger as 
long as foreigners bring with them their nationality 
and citizenship. Only with the elimination of these 
ideas and the negation of the possibility of turning 
to native countries for protection do foreign invest­
ors cease being a danger to the host government,^ ac­
cording to the Cdrdenas Doctrine. Cdrdenas consider­
ed not only that the foreign-owned oil companies were 
extracting illegally the riches of Mexico, but that 
their attitudes directly endangered the sovereignty 
of the country.
As an indication of the feeling of danger Cdrdenas 
had in dealing with the oil companies, it is possible 
to look at the attempts at settlement after the expro­
priations in 1938. Mexico always refused to listen to 
any idea which included the direction of the companies
10Mendoza, La doctrina Cdrdenas, p. 59. 
11Ibid., pp. 60-61.
27
by foreigners. Sub-secretary of Foreign Relations Ra- 
m6n Beteta indicated in 1939 that Mexico could not ap­
point a foreigner as director of an administrative 
agency or have a board composed of a majority of
foreigners. He also emphasized the political impos-
12sibility of returning the properties. Clearly the 
reason for the impossibility was that Mexicans believ­
ed in the idea of the Cdrdenas Doctrine, and Cdrdenas 
would have committed political suicide if he had chang­
ed his policy.
That policy was not new in principle, but simply 
meant that for the first time the provisions of the 
Mexican Constitution would be applied strictly. Arti­
cle 27 basically states that only Mexicans by birth or 
naturalization and Mexican organizations may acquire 
land and concessions to exploit resources. The arti­
cle adds that foreigners may be granted those same 
rights as long as they consider themselves under the 
same law as Mexicans, foregoing any right to call for 
help from their own governments. In simple terms this 
article states that any foreigner who abrogates this
agreement is subject to losing to the Nation whatever
13property rights he had acquired. y When the oil com­
panies refused to consider themselves as bound by
12FRUS, 1939, Vol. V, p. 681.
13'Tefia Ramirez, Leyes fundamentalea. pp. 825-828.
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Mexican laws, Cdrdenas applied the principles of the 
constitution and the Cdrdenas Doctrine to them.
Although the issue with the oil companies un­
doubtedly was the most spectacular application of the 
Cdrdenas Doctrine, there were others as well. Even 
before this issue exploded, the United States and Mexi­
co were involved in discussing adequate compensation for 
agrarian claims. In warning of the legal difficulties 
involved in settling these claims. Ambassador Josephus 
Daniels pointed out that the State Department should 
hesitate to start any discussion over the rights of 
the Mexican government to enforce its laws on foreign­
ers living in Mexico. He said that it would only lead 
to embarrassment and endanger the United States* posi­
tion in other matters. At the time, in 1935, the 
State Department indicated it would not be able to 
overlook the principles of international law which 
called for adequate compensation.*^- Mexico already 
had begun to apply the principles of the Cdrdenas Doc­
trine (although they were not specifically defined for 
another three years), and the United States, just as in 
the case of the Calvo Doctrine, had rejected those prin­
ciples. Fortunately, by the time the problems became 
more acute between the two countries, the attitude of
U FRUS. 1935, Vol. IV, pp. 759-60.
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Daniels had begun to prevail, and the rights of Mexico 
under the Cdrdenas Doctrine were not really brought in­
to question.
But neither Daniels nor the United States could 
convince the British government of the sovereign rights 
of Mexico regarding foreign investors. In rejecting 
the Cdrdenas Doctrine, the British Legation in Mexico 
indicated that the British government never had felt 
bound by the Calvo Clause in cases where it believed 
intervention necessary for the protection of British 
nationals. The argument was that there was no way a 
government could insist that foreign enterprise be in­
corporated under local law, then use that incorporation
15as a justification for insisting on non-intervention. J
In discussing the Mexican problem with Under 
Secretary of State Sumner Welles, the British Ambas­
sador to the United States said that his government 
felt the expropriations were unjustified and carried 
out for political reasons not even in the best inter­
ests of the Mexican public. For these reasons, his 
government wanted the return of the properties, and 
added he believed the United States felt the same.
15-'Josephus Daniels to U.S. Secretary of State, 
April 21, 1938, copy of note from British Minister to 
Mexican Foreign Office, Doc. 812.6363/3575, General 
State Department Records, Record Group 59, U.S. National 
Archives, Washington, D.C. (Hereinafter cited as RG 59).
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Separating the United States from the British rejection 
of the Cardenas Doctrine, Welles corrected him and em­
phasized that the United States did not question the 
legitimacy of the expropriations nor did it undertake 
to judge what would be the best interests of the Mexi­
can people.^ For this attitude, the relationship be­
tween the United States and Mexico was decidedly dif­
ferent from that of Great Britain and Mexico during 
the oil dispute.
Both the United States and Great Britain had had 
prior warning of what might happen when President Cdr­
denas signed the Law of Expropriation on November 23»
1936. Almost immediately the United States State 
Department insisted that Daniels talk with Mexican 
officials to indicate U.S. displeasure over the law.
But Daniels warned that the Mexican constitution con-
17tained the same provisions as the Expropriation Law. 
Again Daniels showed he recognized the right of Mexi­
co to make such laws as the government deemed neces­
sary without outside intervention.
Nevertheless, Daniels did discuss the issue with 
Cdrdenas, who explained that Mexico had not had such a
16Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles and 
British Ambassador Sir Ronald Lindsey, memorandum of 
conversation, April 1, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/3325* Ibid.
17FRUS, 1936, Vol. V, pp. 725, 728.
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law and needed one to make sure that all assets in the 
country were productive. He assured Daniels that the 
law would not be used against any enterprise providing 
a useful service to Mexico, but he wanted to be prepar­
ed against a business which might shut down and para- 
lize a segment of the economy. Cdrdenas said he recog­
nized the value of American investment in Mexico and 
would not do anything to hinder this investment. He
even agreed that his government would not take over
1 8the oil fields since it would be too impractical.
Two years later it still was impractical, but Cdrdenas 
felt compelled to use the Expropriation Law to take 
over the recalcitrant oil companies, which obviously 
no longer were providing a useful service to Mexico in 
the opinion of Cdrdenas.
Article 19 of the law provided for compensation 
for any expropriated property, while Article 20 said 
that the expropriating authority would determine the 
manner and terms of compensation, provided that a ten- 
year limit be set. The law was designed to replace a
similar one of November 3, 1903 in order to be more in
19line with Article 27 of the constitution. Once the 
law was declared constitutional, the companies should
18Ibid., pp. 710-11. 
19Ibid., pp. 719-20.
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have realized that they had no legal argument, yet they 
still turned to their own governments for help.
But CArdenas already had established in his own 
mind the basic principles of the Cardenas Doctrine. Af­
ter years of polemics he announced that Mexico's right 
to use the Expropriation Law was no longer subject to 
debate, nor was there any use of discussions designed
to allow the companies to take part in the management
20of the oil industry. According to CArdenas, their 
participation would have amounted to foreign interven­
tion, and his goal of complete economic independence 
for Mexico would have been destroyed by such action.
Mexican Foreign Policy under CArdenas
Just as Cardenas pursued a policy of Independence 
from foreign intervention, so did he generally attempt 
to follow the Latin American tradition of strict non­
intervention and neutrality with regards to other 
countries. In the case of Spain, CArdenas shifted the 
policy to fit the needs of the moment, but on the whole 
his foreign policy was much more defensive than aggres­
sive. Foreign policy-making became very much involved 
with domestic issues such as the oil dispute, and CAr­
denas would not have been very well known outside Mexi­
co had not his doctrine been applied to domestic issues
?QIbid.. 1940, Vol. V, p. 976.
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in which countries such as the United States, Great 
Britain and even the Soviet Union had interests. For 
the most part, Cardenas considered such issues as oil 
and grants of asylum to be completely domestic issues 
in which the great powers had no right to intervene. 
Mexico's policy regarding problems in other countries 
generally was one of neutrality, and Cdrdenas prefer­
red that all nations follow that same policy.
Neutrality had been one of the cornerstones of 
Mexican foreign policy long before Cdrdenas became 
president. On April 26, 1898, Mexico declared itself 
neutral in the face of the Spanish-American War, and 
even established sanctions against anyone who failed 
to keep to the strict law of neutrality. Earlier, in 
June 1890, Mexico also declared neutrality in the in­
ternational conflict in Central America, brought on by 
political problems in El Salvador. The same course was 
followed during the civil war in Chile in 1891 and in 
Guatemala in 1906. The Russo-Japanese War in 1904 
brought the same response. When World War I broke out,
Isidro Fabela, as Minister of Foreign Relations, de-
21clared Mexico neutral on September 25, 1914. Cdrdenas
21Isidro Fabela, Neutralidad. Estudio histdrico, 
.lurldlco y politico. La Sociedad de las foaclones y el 
continente americano ante la guerra de 1939-1940 iM&xi- 
col kiblioteca de Estudios Internacionales, 194-0), pp. 143-49.
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followed the long tradition, and in September 1939 de­
clared neutrality for Mexico in response to the conflict
opin Europe.
Since Mexico under Cardenas never became involved 
in armed conflict, most of his government’s foreign 
policy statements were made before the League of Nations, 
to which Mexico belonged, ouite possibly to the chagrin 
of the United States, whose refusal to .join the League 
often has been termed the cause of the failure of that 
body.
Prom the actions of Mexico within the League it 
would seem that the Cdrdenas government did everything 
possible to make it work. In 1934, the Italian- 
Ethiopian conflict forced the League of Nations to 
act. The Coordinating Committee, of which Mexico was 
a member, declared a prohibition against exporting arms, 
munitions an̂  other war supplies, and established eco­
nomic sanctions against Italy. C&rdenas immediately 
proclaimed local decrees adhering to the sanctions, but
the lack of general adherance among other League mem-
23bers finally led to the lifting of the sanctions.
There were some who believed that such weak action 
by the League made it useless for Mexico to continue as
22Ibid., p. 217. 
23Ibid., pp. 255-257
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a member. In May 1936 a number of Mexican senators vis­
ited CArdenas to ask him to remove Mexico from the Lea­
gue. But Cardenas believed that joining the League 
had been a brilliant idea, especially since it advanced 
Mexico's international position to the point of resent­
ment by the United States.. In addition, CArdenas be­
lieved it gave Mexico a European tribunal in which to
O Adefend its interests against "neighbors." Those 
neighbors were not named, but the identity easily could 
have been guessed.
CArdenas also used the League to voice Mexican 
protests of aggression of one country against another.
True to this policy of denouncing violent aggression, 
Mexico protested the Japanese attack against China in
p c1937. ' Then when Germany annexed Austria on March 13,
1938, Mexico denounced the action and said it repre­
sented a grave attack against the Pact of the League 
and International Law. The act of handing over power 
by the Austrian authorities did not alter matters, as 
for the Mexican government these authorities no longer 
represented the Austrian people. Mexico warned the 
League that if it did not fulfill its obligations in 
such cases, then even more serious problems would face
^CArdenas, Obras, Tomo I, p, 350.
^Fabela, Neutralidad, pp. 259-60.
i
36
2 6the world. The German action in Austria and elsewhere 
so offended CArdenas that his government refused several 
trade offers from Germany, although finally Mexico did 
have to sell some of its oil to that country in order 
to survive economically.
Although trying to stick to a policy of neutrality, 
CArdenas seems to have been so concerned over the German 
aggression that he agreed with the United States to ex­
change ideas on a pacific solution to the European pro­
blem. At the same time, in August 1939* CArdenas,
through his Minister of Foreign Relations, refused a
27decoration offered him by the German government. He 
does not indicate exactly why the Germans wanted to give 
him the medal, but his reasoning for refusing is ap­
parent.
More of this same reasoning was applied in May 
1940 when the German commercial attache talked with 
the Mexican Secretary of the Treasury and offered to 
make the cancellation of the oil debts owed by Mexico 
to Great Britain one of the terms for peace since the 
German government was sure of victory. CArdenas told
26Secretarfa de Relaciones Exteriores, Memoria 
de la Secretaria de Relaclones Exteriores, septiembre 
1937 - agosio 1938, fltomo 1 (MAxico: b.A.P.P., 1938), 
pp. 213-14. (Hereinafter abbreviated MSRE).
^CArdenas, Obras, Tomo I, p. 429.
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his minister to refuse the offer since Germany's expan-
28sion campaign was in contradiction to Mexican ideals. 
Mexico still was having difficulties in marketing her 
oil and had not renewed relations with Great Britain, 
but Cardenas was not willing to compromise his govern­
ment with the Germans.
Germany should have been sure where Cardenas stood 
bv this time. Although the German army invaded and did 
away with the Polish State in September 1939, the CArde­
nas government continued to recognize Poland first 
through the charge and later in 1940 the Polish minister,
while still maintaining strict neutrality in the Euro-
29pean conflict.
In suite of this attitude, the British neverthe­
less were concerned about the foreign policy of CArde­
nas because of the oil expropriations. It was evident 
that the British were worried because of possible pre­
cedents caused by the seizures. Colombia and Venezuela 
we-re believed to be ready to follow suit if Mexico were 
allowed to retain the oil properties, and this action 
would be to the detriment of the United Kingdom. The
28Ibid.. p. 439.
^Fabela, Neutralldad. p. 272.
50Herschel V. Johnson, London dispatch, to U.S. 
Secretary of State, March 24, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/3301,
L/HI, RG 59.
foreign policv of Great Britain toward Mexico over this 
issue was colored by the worsening world situation, and 
the settlement, might have come ouicker and without as 
many hard feelings had the situation been different.
For the United States, the situation was slightly 
different, and the pressure felt by Great Britain was 
not felt in Washington. For one thing, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt was in the White House and his Good Neighbor 
policy would have been completely destroyed had he tak­
en a hard stand against Cardenas. Another very import­
ant reason is that the United States did not have to 
worry about the flow of petroleum into a military mech­
anism to the same extent as the British.
The United States also had foreseen the possibili­
ty of difficulties over the oil situation long before 
Cardenas expropriated the properties. In March 1935, 
Ambassador Josephus Daniels had been told by the Secre­
tary of State that there might be problems and that he 
did not want to see the State Department put into a 
position where it would have to make official protests 
against the Mexican government. He suggested informal 
contacts with Mexican officials to make them cognizant 
of the disagreeable consequences which could result.^ 
This suggestion plainly shows that at the time the State
31FRUS, 1935, Vol. IV. pp. 764-65.
Department had not come around to a strictly legalistic 
attitude over the question. Bv the time the issue did 
come to a head, fortunately the United States had back­
ed off from any official policy of economic intervention 
on behalf of the companies.
Because of the new "hands-off" policy of the State 
Department, CArdenas could tell Daniels in December 1938 
that he felt nothing but friendship for the United 
States. Cardenas even agreed there would be no prob­
lem in allowing the oil companies to work the proper­
ties as long as it was understood Mexico would maintain 
ownership. When questioned about oil contracts to Ger­
many, Cardenas said they were only temporary and that 
Mexicans along the border had been ordered to assure 
American businessmen that Mexico preferred to trade 
with the United States. In further expressing his de­
sire to cooperate with the United States, CArdenas said 
he had told the Mexican delegate to the Panamerican
32Conference in Lima to work closely with the Americans. 
This did not mean that CArdenas told his delegate to 
follow anything the Americans wanted to do. He already 
had shown he planned to follow an independent course.
One example of this independent course of action 
was the CArdenas policy toward Spain. In explaining
32J Josephus Daniels, dispatch, to U.S. Secretary of 
State, December 10, 1938, Doc. 812.001-CArdenas, LAzaro/ 
144 1H, RG 59.
Mexico's apparent divergence from neutrality in the case 
of Spain, Cardenas stated that the League Covenant which 
Mexico had signed in 1931 made clear distinctions between 
States which were being attacked, to which all moral and 
material support should be given, and those States do­
ing the attacking, in which case economic and other 
sanctions were to be applied. In the case of Spain, 
C&rdenas believed that the rebels clearly were being
supported by outside elements, which constituted ex-
33ternal aggression against Spain. '
In explicating this policy to the League of Na­
tions, Isidro Pabela cited the Pact of the League of 
Nations and the Havana Convention of March 29, 1928.
He said that Article 10 of the Pact called for action 
against external aggression, and that in the case of 
Spain this aggression was evident. Article III of the 
Havana Convention prohibited the shipment of war sup­
plies except to a legitimate government in the case 
where the rebels' belligerency had not been recognized. 
Pabela claimed this to be the case with Franco, and 
therefore Mexico was within the limits of the Havana
3 AConvention.
In other cases, Mexican policy was not quite so
^Fabela, Neutralidad, pp. 261-62.
^ MSRE. septiembre 1936 - agosto 1937, Tomo I, 
pp. 31-3T,
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clearly defined. In 1936 Cardenas stated that in the 
cases of Bolivia, Paraguay and Nicaragua, his govern­
ment would continue to follow the policy of not break­
ing off diplomatic relations simply because of internal 
changes. In Bolivia, President Luis Tejada Sorzano was 
deposed and replaced by a mixed junta which amounted to 
a dictatorship. In Paraguay, the military had been un­
happy with the government's handling of peace negotia­
tions (after the Chaco War) and proclaimed a dictator­
ship.^^
In the case of Nicaragua, however, Cardenas re­
ceived a note in June 1936 asking for help against the 
rebellion of General Anastasio Somoza, who had been 
named Chief of the National Guard in accordance with 
the wishes of the American forces which had been in 
Nicaragua. Cdrdenas offered the good offices of Mexi­
co to invite the United States, Guatemala, Costa Rica, 
El Salvador and others to try to resolve the conflict, 
but told his Foreign Minister to withdraw Mexico's 
diplomatic representative to Nicaragua if the rebel­
lion succeeded. The minister was recalled and C&rdenas 
indicated that although Mexico would not interfere in 
another nation's affairs, it could not maintain rela­
tions with a government which had been established by
^Alvear Acevedo, L&zaro C&rdenas, pp. 488-89.
36a military coup. CArdenas indicated more than once
during his term of office that Mexico would not recog-
37nize armed conquest, yet his policy on the surface 
was not always completely uniform. In referring to 
his country's policy of not breaking relations because 
of internal changes within another country, CArdenas 
was following the foreign policy established by the 
former minister of Foreign Relations, Genaro Estrada, 
who said that if Mexico broke relations for such a 
reason then that would constitute intervention in the 
other country's internal affairs.
In the cases of Paraguay and Bolivia, Cardenas 
followed strictly the Estrada Doctrine, while in Spain 
and Nicaragua he did break relations. CArdenas point­
ed out that in Spain external forces were aiding the 
rebels. As for Nicaragua, the idea that Somoza was 
placed in his position as Chief of the National Guard 
easily could have been interpreted by CArdenas as out­
side intervention causing the eventual overthrow of the 
established regime. Thus, although his policy seemed 
to vary, it can be seen that through the eyes of CAr- 
denas, he followed a policy true to Mexican tradition.
3^CArdenas, Obras, Tomo I. pp. 351-52. Also see 
Paquete No. 12-1, Exp. 111/1372. the CArdenas Papers, 
Archivo General de la Nacidn, Mexico City (Hereinafter 
abbreviated AGN)
37FRUS, 1940, Vol. V, p. 1028.
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Toward a Workers * Democracy
Although he remained true to Mexican tradition in 
following foreign policy, CArdenas made a number of 
changes in the domestic sphere. Normally in a work on 
foreign policy these changes might not be important, 
but in the case of Mexico, foreign and domestic mat­
ters were so interwoven in the CArdenas years that it 
is necessary to take a brief look at some of the changes 
made domestically in order to explain fully the foreign 
policy.
The Psrtido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) was form­
ed in 1929 under Calles, and was the instrument by which 
CArdenas ascended to the presidency. On December 19, 
1937, however, CArdenas informed the nation of his plans 
to change the PNR. He believed the doctrine of the PNR 
caused discontent among the workers, who he feared 
might leave the party. His main objective, therefore, 
was to change the party so that laborers would be at­
tracted into its r a n k s . I t  was transformed on 
March 30, 1938 into the Partido de la Revolucidn Mexl- 
cana (PRM) with the announced goal of preparing for a 
workers’ democracy with an aim toward socialism and in-
% Qeluding equal rights for women.  ̂ This aim for a
^®Shulgovski, MAxico en la encrucijada, pp. 132- 
1.33. ------------------ ---
^Bremauntz, Material hlstArico. p. 190.
44
workers' democracy (along with the application of the 
CArdenas Doctrine) was another reason CArdenas and his 
government were called "radical" outside Mexico.
CArdenas' idea was to divide political groups to 
the point where no one group ever again could control 
the government. He played labor against the military, 
farm workers against laborers, and to counteract all 
sectors, he established a popular sector which contain­
ed 250,000 civil servants and professional men.*® In 
effect, he changed the idea of geographical represen­
tation to one of functional representation, i.e., the 
representation within the party by sectors of the eco­
nomy.*1 Without allowing any single individual or 
group to approach the power of the Executive office, 
CArdenas was able to build up a broad base of support 
which would serve him well when he had to confront some 
of the world powers. One only has to look at the trans­
fer of executive power at regular six-year intervals 
from CArdenas to Luis Echeverrla to see that CArdenas 
was an Important element in instituting the new politi­
cal system for which the Mexican Revolution was fought.
The PRM was definitely a part of the evolution of
*°Vernon, El dilema del deaarrollo. p.. 88.
*1Daniel Cosio Villegas, El siatema politico 
mexlcano: las noslbilidadea.de cambla (MAxico:Edi­
torial Joaquin Mortiz, S.A., 1972), p. 53.
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that new political system, as Cardenas began changing 
some of the goals of government. The old PNR stressed 
support of large industry as long as it was not to the 
detriment of the workers. At the same time, small in­
dustry was given support in order to compete with large
industry, especially that controlled by foreigners, and
42products of national manufacture were favored.
CArdenas could not argue with support of small in­
dustry and advantages to products of national manufact­
ure over those imported as indirectly they could be con­
sidered as part of the CArdenas Doctrine. But in con­
trast to the PNR, the PRM indicated its desire to na­
tionalize large industry as a requisite for.Mexican
4‘15economic independence. '
In addition to the foreign oil expropriations, the 
CArdenas government passed a number of laws from 1935 
to 1938 designed to protect Mexican industry. These 
laws often provided such protection as prohibitively 
high tariffs on any product which might compete with 
national production. In spite of predictions that the 
Mexican economy would fall into chaos with the decline 
of foreign investments, the CArdenas government proved
42Daniel Moreno, Los nartidoa politicos del Mexi­
co contemnorAneo. 3» edlcldn (Mexico:Editorial AmArica, 
1973), pp. 130-31.
43Bremauntz. Material hlstdrlco. p. 190.
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differently. In 1936 there were 69 petroleum and 213 
mining companies of U.S. origin. By 1943* there were 
only five petroleum and 108 mining companies with large 
U.S. investment. Yet, in spite of the decline in U.S. 
investment, Mexican national production continued to 
climb, although there was a decline in petroleum the 
first few years after the expropriation. Taking 1929 
as a base year and 100 as the base figure, Mexican na­
tional production grew in the following proportions:
1934: 111.9; 1935: 126; 1936: 137.1; 1938: 153.4; 1939: 
151.4; and 1940: 154.4.** Undoubtedly, the decline in 
1939 was due to the problems in 1938 with oil production 
but as can be seen, the decline was reversed in 1940.
Throughout his presidency, Cdrdenas attempted to 
better the condition of the laboring class and to achieve 
economic and political independence for Mexico. In bo 
doing, his domestic policies often were directed against 
foreigners who for so long had controlled much of the 
Mexican economy. When those foreigners turned to their 
own nations in disputes with the Mexican government, 
the C&rdenas Doctrine was applied to them.
**Shulgovski, Mexico en la encruci.lada. pp. 169-
71.
CHAPTER III
MEXICAN RELATIONS WITH SPAIN: THE SPANISH CIVIL VAR
In writing about Mexico and Spain in the 20th 
century, one must constantly keep in mind that 300 years 
of colonial rule and more than one hundred years of in­
dependence have made this relationship through the 
years extremely unusual. Just as important, this re­
lationship has not been a typical one between Spain 
and her former colonies. Even as a colony Mexico had a 
special relationship with Spain. The diplomatic re­
lationship between the two countries in the past cen­
tury and a half has also been atypical. At times Mexi­
co has held out the close hand of friendship and at 
other times she has turned her back completely on 
Spain. But these changes certainly have not been typi­
cal of a solid Latin American bloc. To the contrary, 
Mexico often has acted alone among the former colonies 
in her attitude toward Spain.
Because of this uniqueness, and because of the long 
years of sometimes stormy, sometimes friendly, rela-* 
tions, it is important to get an overall picture of 
the general diplomatic relations between Spain and Mexi­
co before focusing on the major foreign relations of
47
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the CArdenas years with Spain.
It would be well to divide, completely arbitrarily, 
the history of relations in general between the two 
countries into four unequal, but sufficiently diBtinct, 
periods. The first of these periods would be that era 
before independence for Mexico, including the almost 
twelve stormy years after the Grito de Dolores in 1810 
up to General Agustfn de Iturbide's short-lived monarchy 
in 1822 after independence. The second period is one 
of some diversity, but is linked at one end by the con­
clusion of the Mexican War of Independence and at the 
other by the intervention of the Tripartite powers (Eng­
land, France and Spain) in 1861. Although the inter­
vention spanned parts of seven years, the interest here 
is focused only on those first few months when Spain 
was an active partner.
The third epoch starts taking shape in the early 
I860'8 and continues through the Spanish civil war un­
til General Francisco Franco's takeover of the Spanish 
government and the end of the civil war in 1939. Fin­
ally, the fourth period reflects the attitudes of the 
two countries toward one another after the end of the 
civil war.
looking at these four periods, one might say that 
history has revolved full circle for Mexico and Spain.
From the break in "relations" because of the Mexican 
War for Independence, through a period of wary, cautious
49
watchfulness and finally overt intervention, to a warm 
and deep friendship based on culture and common origins, 
and once again to a full break and opposition by Mexico 
to Franco1s regime.
Background
The War for Independence did not end the attempts 
at Spanish intervention into Mexican affairs. Within 
just a few years the Mexican government was complaining 
that the Spanish troops stationed at the fortress of 
iSan Juan de Ulua at Veracruz represented a threat of 
invasion of the Mexican territory.^ In 1826 when ships 
arrived in Cuba and Puerto Rico, President Guadalupe 
Victoria warned the Mexican Congress that Spain would 
continue to try to re-invade Mexico and that chances 
of a peaceful friendship with the former mother coun-
ptry were remote. The Spaniards continued to increase 
their forces on the island of Cuba, and Mexico con­
tinued keeping an eye out for the invasion.'*
After an attempted invasion in 1829, which ended
^Archivo Histdrico Diplom&tJco Mdxicano, Vol. 
XXXIX, Un siglo de relaciones intemacionales de Mdxico 
(Mexico: Publicaciones de la Secretarla de Relaciones




in failure for the Spanish troops, the Mexican govern­
ment expected still another invasion.* Although this 
invasion failed to take place, it was not until the 
death of Ferdinand VII in 1833 that the policy of Spain 
toward her former colonies could begin changing, and 
even then the change was not a smooth one.** A treaty 
of peace and friendship was signed on December 28,
1836, but diplomatic relations were not established un­
til 1839.^ Shortly after his arrival in Mexico, the 
Spanish minister assured the Mexicans that the rela-
7tions would be strengthened to benefit both nations.
One of the first problems of the new minister was 
to negotiate a treaty of commerce, but he recognized 
that the .jealousy of England and France would make it
difficult to draw up a treaty advantageous only to
8Spain. England and France often had complained during 
the early colonial period about not being able to trade 
with the Spanish colonies, and both countries had at 
times run high risks to engage in illegal trade. The
*Ibid.. p. 32.
^Relaciones diPloro&ticas hisnano-mexicanas (1839- 
1898). Serie I, Despachos generales, Vol. II, 1841- 
1&43 (Mexico: El Colegio de Mexico, 1952), p. xi.
6Ibid.
7AHDM, Vol. XXXIX, p. 48.
Q
Relaciones diplom&ticas. Vol. I, p. 130.
Spanish tried to better comercial relations, but Mexico, 
possibly still snarting from some of the offensive po­
licies during the period of the empire, continued to 
place obstacles in the way.9
Commercial problems continued to plague Spain and 
Mexico in the early years of their diplomatic relation­
ship, but with the arrival of Pedro Pascual Oliver in 
August 1841 as the new minister, the mood of the rela­
tions changed and the two countries tried to forget the 
past.10
During the next decade there were a number of 
controversies, however, the most serious of which be­
came the question of the payment of claims. This is­
sue became the most serious diplomatic question, and 
the situation became so grave in 1856-57 that there was 
a temporary break in relations. The problem seemed to 
be resolved in 1859 when Mexico accepted Spanish de­
mands and signed the Mon-Almonte Convention.11 By 
this time Mexico was in the.throes of a civil war, and 
when Benito Judres emerged victorious, he was bitter 
against the Spanish minister. Judrez announced
9Ibid.. Vol. II, pp. 14-15.
1QIbid.. p. xx.
11Carl H. Bock, Prelude to Tragedy (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966), pp. 38, 39.
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that his government was forced to discharge the Spanish 
minister for the support he had given to the enemies
IPof the Republic during the civil war.
Matters became even worse as the question of claims 
continued to be a source of irritation between the two 
countries. Spain soon tired in her attempts to get 
Mexico to settle the claims, and began looking toward 
an alliance with England and Prance to intervene in 
the American Republic and take what the debtors felt 
they deserved. Spain and England never had in mind 
the same goals as did France, and both countries soon 
backed out and left Prance in her attempt to establish 
a monarchy in Mexico.
Spain was the first of the three countries to take 
action, and in December 1861 sent troops off the coast 
of Veracrus, claiming she was acting in accord with 
England and Prance to try to settle the claims. The 
Spanish denied they had any intention of actively in­
tervening in Mexican internal affairs.^ Subsequent 
events proved that either Spain was being sincere in 
wanting to take only the amount she felt was due, or
12AHDM, Vol. XXXIX, p. 94.
15AHDM, Vol. XXX, Comentarios de Francisco Zaroo 
sobre la intervencldn francesa (1861-1865) (Mdxico: 
PUblicaciones de la Secretariate Relaciones Exteriores, 
1929), p. 51.
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that after the events unfolded, she decided that the 
business was too risky to continue.
In.any case, Veracruz was evacuated by the Mexicans 
on the morning of December 13th,14 and the Spanish 
troops occupied the customs house there until May 11, 
1862.^ General Juan Prim was sent as the Spanish 
Commissioner, and is credited by the Mexicans for his 
diplomacy and insight into the problem.Mexico al­
so pointed out, however, that Spain need not have join­
ed the triple alliance in order to have worked out
17her difficulties with Mexico. ' In spite of auch ar­
guments, Mexico saw the need for relations with Spain,
and began indicating a willingness to re-establish re-
1 8  I Qlations. This step was taken in 1871, y and Spanish
and Mexican relations were normalized for the rest of
the 19th century.
It is interesting to note that from this period
14Ibld.. p. 54.
15̂ Manuel Payno, Cuentas. gastos. acreedores. v 
. f d e l  tlempo de la fotfnfngljn frM c«g,
iypeglo iMfexlco:Imprenta de Ignacio Cumplldo,
16AHH!, Vol. XXXIX, p. xviii.
17Ibid.. Vol. XXX, p. 112.





to the tine when Spain again began complaining about 
the property losses of her citizens— this time as a re­
sult of the Mexican Revolution— that little is said 
in the Mexican "State of the Union" address regarding 
affairs with Spain. Up until this time, there had been 
practically always some mention either of difficulties 
or improvement in the relationships. Now Mexico seem­
ed to turn her attention to closer affairs, such as 
with Guatemala and the United States. One explanation 
could be that Spain was having problems at this time 
with other nations (e.g.. the war with the United 
States). By the time Spain recovered, it was time for 
the Mexican Revolution, and the beginning of 20th cen­
tury relations between Spain and Mexico.
After the Mexican Revolution began, there were 
several years of rebellion and bloodshed, and some of 
the European powers felt that the United States should 
intervene to protect life and property of the European 
nations. Spain was one of these countries, and the 
Spanish minister at Mexico City claimed that a number 
of Spaniards had been killed in the northern provinces 
of Mexico, and the number likely would increase if some­
thing were not done. He stated that the fault waB with 
the United States, and he held the American government 
responsible for the death of Spanish subjects because of
i
90of failure to suppress the disorder.
Matters remained unsettled in Mexico until 1916, 
when the power struggle was settled sufficiently for the 
Mexicans to begin drafting a new constitution. By 
1921, the Spanish government recognized the Obregdn 
regime, and expected the Mexican government to appoint 
a minister to Spain. In instituting agrarian reform, 
the Mexicans did expropriate some property from Span­
iards in 1922, but the major problem remained the settle­
ment of claims from the revolutionary period. The two 
governments finally signed a claims convention in 1926 
and a special Hlspano-Mexican commission was formed 
specifically to consider those claims of Spanish sub­
jects who had suffered some kind of loss during the
21Mexican revolutionary period.
In spite of the losses incurred by Spanish citi­
zens, relations at this time were friendly. The rela­
tionship was such that the Spanish delegate to the Lea­
gue of Nations even sponsored Mexico's entry into the 
22League. But matters were becoming unsettled in Mad­
rid, and the period of the 1930's was a turning point
90New York Times. October 30, 1913, p. 1.
21Ibid., April 28, 1921, p. 3: March 15. 1922, 
p. 2; August 12, 1926, p. 3.
22Salvador de Madariaga, Spain: A Modern History 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1^58), p. 38.
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for the Spanish nation. Before the decade was over,
Spain suffered a civil war, and Mexican-Spanish rela­
tions took an unforeseen twist.
Mexico remained loyal to the Republicans in Spain, 
and alone among the Latin American countries showed true 
feelings of kinship with the Spaniards during the years 
of the civil war. This bond of friendship took the 
form of moral support, material aid, and the opening 
of the doors of Mexico to refugees who left Spain for­
ever. In relation to the refugees, the C&rdenas govern­
ment was able to apply the Cdrdenas Doctrine in the op­
posite manner in which it was applied to the American 
and British oil companies. In the case of the oil com­
panies, the owners Were forced against their will to 
adhere to the idea that they must be treated the same 
as Mexican nationals. Sometimes Mexican citizens had to 
be reminded in the case of the refugees that once ac­
cepted by the country, they were to be treated in the 
same manner as nationals.
The Spanish Civil War
Throughout the period of the civil war, and even 
after Franco gained complete control of the Spanish 
government, Mexico refused to recognize the Insurgents 
led by Franco. Mexico backed the Spanish Republican 
government’s claim of intervention on the part of Ger­
many and Italy on the side of the Insurgents, and also
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backed the government *s claim that It was the duly- 
elected government of the people. Mexico saw the civil 
war as an international struggle with the Spanish Re­
public as the victim of external aggression.
Once the civil war had started, Mexico took as 
active a part as possible in supporting the Republican 
government. Mexican diplomats and consular officials 
even were allowed to act as intermediaries in the pur­
chase of war materiel. The Mexican minister in France 
was authorized to buy armaments and airplanes which
France was disposed to sell and which the Spanish gov-
2‘3ernment had asked Mexico to buy. '
President Cdrdenas announced to the Mexican Con­
gress in early September 1936 that the Spanish govern­
ment had requested that Mexico sell war materiel, and 
that Mexico had complied with the request by sending 
20,000 rifles and 20,000,000 cartridges of national
pimanufacture.
At the same time Mexico was preparing the shipment 
to Spain, the Minister of Foreign Relations of Uruguay 
sent a cablegram to his counterpart in Mexico request­
ing the opinion of Mexico in the matter of Spain, so
^C&rdenas, Obras. Tomo I, p. 354.
2*E1 Universal. September 2, 1936, p. 9.
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that the American republics could coordinate their ef-t
forts. The Mexican government replied that it could not
take part in any mediation over matters pertaining to
Spain as that would be intervention.2** This answer
shows that Mexico under Cdrdenas exhibited an extremely
flexible foreign policy, interpreting what it termed
intervention to suit the desires of Mexico. The selling
of arms, and even the sending of Mexican volunteers, was
not considered Intervention, but the coordination of
policy with the other Latin nations would have been.
In discussing just why the sale of arms to Spain
was not a form of intervention, the Mexican government
used the excuse that the Republican government was a
legally constituted government having friendly relations 
26with Mexico. Nevertheless, the distinction is very 
hazy, and Cdrdenas seems purposedly to have used a 
vague foreign policy to commit Mexico to action which 
he thought proper.
Cirdenas even went further by sending a letter to 
President Roosevelt in the United States asking that 
country to use its influence with the European powers 
to put an end to the intervention by foreign elements
25PRDS, 1936, Vol. II, p. 495. The United States 
also turned down the proposal to participate in any 
mediation.
2**E1 Naclonal. September 3, 1936, Part II, p. 1.
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in Spain. He felt that an intervention by the United 
States would have shortened the rebellion, and warned
of the haughty attitude that would be assumed by Italy
27and Germany if the rebels won.
The United States did not seem to be worried 
about Germany and Italy at the time, however. U.S. 
policy ranged from a mere urging in the beginning of 
the civil war that U.S. companies not involve them­
selves in arms shipments to Spain to a total embargo 
on such shipments in 1937. When the Spanish ambassador 
approached the State Department right after the opening 
of hostilities in 1936, he was told that no U.S. firm 
could export arms without an export license, and that 
no one had made an application for exports to Spain
since the beginning of the civil war (although there
2 8were rumors of illegal shipments). While the State 
Department was telling the Spanish ambassador this 
story, it was Informing its missions abroad that it 
recognized that the U.S. Neutrality Law did not apply in 
the case of Spain since that law applied only to war 
between nations.29 Still the United States was trying
2^Cdrdenas, Obras. Tomo I, p. 370. After the reb­
els indeed had been victorious, even Cdrdenas was forced 
to turn to Germany and Italy for oil markets.
28FRUS, 1936, Vol. II, pp. 558-59.
29Ibid., p. 471.
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to stick to a policy of official non-intervention.
In August 1936 a representative of the Glenn L.
Martin Company approaohed the State Department and said 
that the Spanish government wanted to purchase eight 
planes from his company. He wanted to know what the 
opinion of the State Department would be since it 
would be November before he could deliver the planes.
The State Department admitted that the Neutrality Law 
did not apply in this case, but that the sale of arms 
would not be in conformity with the spirit of official 
U.S. government policy.31
In spite of this attitude, in December of that
year the State Department granted two export licenses
for a shipment of planes and engines for a total of 
$2,777*000. The Department explained that the Con­
gressional resolution providing an embargo on war sup­
plies still applied only to wars between nations. None 
of the provisions was applicable in the case of Spain
and the Department of State was forced to grant the
32license against its will.
In 1937, the U.S. government began taking steps to 





policy. On January 6, 1937, the Congress passed a joint 
resolution forbidding the sale of arms to either side in 
the Spanish conflict. This resolution was followed 
by the Neutrality Act of May 1, 1937, which eliminated 
the loophole in the former Neutrality Acts and set 
forth the provision that the president could proclaim 
as illegal the shipment of arms to a single country 
wherein there was a civil war.'**
But the blocking of legal loopholes at home did 
not mean that the United States stopped having troubles 
abroad in regard to arms shipments. In fact, it was 
just the beginning of problems with Mexico over the 
issue.
In 1936, before the passage of the 1937 U.S. 
Neutrality Act, President C&rdenas spoke to the Mexi- 
can ambassador in the United States about the possibili­
ty of Mexico's buying U.S. arms for transshipment to 
Spain. CArdenas was informed by the State Department 
that Spain was represented in Washington and should 
approach the United States government directly on the 
matter of huying supplies. The U.S. Neutrality Act at
^Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the 
American People. third edition iNew iork: Appleton-
bentury-Grofts, Inc., 1946), p. 741.
Thomas Brockway, Basic Documents in United 
States Foreign Policy (Princetons D. Van ttos’fcrand Co.,
I n c '. ;  1 9 5 7 7 7 p p . "1 1 5 - 1 4 .
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that time did not apply, but the Spanish ambassador was 
hesitant to approach the State Department directly. In 
September, the Spanish ambassador to Mexico re-approched 
C&rdenas on the subject and Cdrdenas agreed to query 
the State Department again.33
In answer to Cdrdenas* query, the Secretary of 
State and other U.S. officials stated that the United 
States had taken a definite stand against shipment of 
arms to Spain, and planned to continue that policy, in 
spite of friendly relations with Mexico.3*V Mexican 
Foreign Minister Hay assured U.S.‘officials that muni­
tions being sent to Spain from Mexico were of national 
manufacture and contained nothing purchased from the 
United States. Indicating Mexico's reasoning for sup­
plying arms to Spain, Hay said that his government was 
doing exactly what the United States once had done in 
Mexico by allowing a recognized government to purchase 
arms.3  ̂ It seemed at this time that the two governments 
understood each other and would continue friendly rela­
tions in spite of the difference in policy.
35FRUS, 1936, Vol. II, p. 530.
36Ibid., p. 531.
3^Ibid., pp. 505-06. During the Mexican Revolu­
tion the United States had followed such a policy, giving Mexico a perfect excuse during the Spanish civil war for
supplying arms to the legally constituted government.
Nevertheless, by the winter of 1936, the State 
Department was instructing its officers in Mexico to in­
form the proper Mexican authorities of U.S. suspicions 
that American planes were being exported to Spain via 
Mexico in violation of U.S. law.-*8 Since at this time 
there was some confusion over just what constituted 
i tarns of U.S. manufacture, Avila Camacho, then Secre­
tary of War, inquired of Cdrdenas if Mexican-made air­
planes with U.S. instruments could be shipped to Spain. 
Cdrdenas stated that he respected Roosevelt's policies 
and would not do anything before checking with the U.S. 
He did not, however, state any objection to shipment 
of U.S. planes obtained through private sources.^
C&rdenas seemed perfectly willing to cooperate 
with the U.S. government when his Ministry of Communica­
tions was accused of issuing accidental destruction cer­
tificates for some U.S.-made planes for which the Minis­
try then supplied Mexican licenses.*0 When Cdrdenas 
was informed of these charges, he Indicated only an 
awareness that planes were being sent from the United 
States to Mexico and then on to Spain. He said that 
he had assumed that the United States was aware of the
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possibility of this happening, and he had not interfered 
up to this point in private affairs. He then assured 
the United States that no further authorization would 
be made for shipments.4* Apparently Cdrdenas did try 
to keep this personal pledge, but subsequent events 
seem to prove that some of his subordinates were not 
so scrupulous and attentive to U.S. policy.
Thus, in 1937 Mexico apparently had agreed that she 
would not serve as an intermediary in shipping materiel 
to Spain inle8S the third government involved gave full 
consent. Because of this policy, Mexico agreed not to 
ship any planes of U.S. manufacture to Spain even though 
the acquisitions were made privately.42 But within a 
few days, press reports indicated that the Mexican 
government had changed its mind and would allow ship­
ment of U.S.-made planes. When approached on this sub­
ject, Cdrdenas denied any reversal of policy, and even 
pointed out that Mexico had a number of old U.S. planes 
which he would like to dispose of, but had not because 
of U.S. policy.  ̂ Although this statement probably was 
true, it should be noted that the planes to which he 
referred were obsolete, so that Cdrdenas would have felt
41Ibid., p. 626.
42Ibid., 1937, Vol. I, p. 564.
45Ibid., pp. 567-68.
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guilty in trying to pawn them off on a country at war.
The United States believed C&rdenas, and even
indicated this belief to its officials in Europe.44
But in spite of this belief, the American consul in
Veracruz confirmed that planes of U.S. manufacture
were being loaded for shipment to Spain. When Mexican
officials were asked to confirm this report, they denied
all knowledge of any planes being shipped to Spain.
They claimed that C&rdenas had given the order that no
U.S. planes could be loaded for transshipment.4** The
Spanish ambassador to Mexico also confirmed this order.
He indicated that he had indeed acquired eighteen
planes of U.S. origin, but that he had not been able
to obtain an export license since C&rdenas had made the
promise to the U.S. that he would not ship the planes.4**
Months of discussion followed as to whether Mexico was
shipping the planes or not, but when Sub-secretary
of Foreign Relations Ramdn Beteta assured U.S. officials
on December 21, 1937, that American planes definitely
4.7were not being shipped, this seemed to end the issue. 






attitude, however. Mexico often complained that the 
theory of non-intervention as proposed by England and 
seconded by Prance (and backed by the arms embargo of 
the United States) was the main reason the Mexican 
government had to continue giving aid to Spain.
The Mexican delegate to the League of Nations, 
Isidro Pabela, handed the League a note explaining Mexi­
co's position in March 1937. The note stated that the 
very universal nature of the League gave Mexico the 
authority to involve itself in matters affecting col­
lective security. Mexico complained that the policy of 
non-intervention prolonged the conflict by denying the 
legitimate Spanish government arms. The C&rdenas gov­
ernment believed that a clear distinction had to be made
in cases such as Spain between the rebelling forces and
4-8the legitimate government which deserved League help.
The Mexican note was considered a fatal blow to 
the League's plan to extend the pact of non-intervention 
to non-European nations. The action in the League dur­
ing these days seemed to show that in view of Italy's 
aid to Franco the whole policy of non-intervention was 
bankrupt. Mexico sent notes to a number of countries 
explaining her stand.49 One such note was sent to the
4**E1 Universal. March 31» 1937, Sect. II, p. 3.
49Ibld.t April 1, 1937, Sect. II, p. 2.
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United States saying that Mexico must reaffirm her in­
tention of supporting the legitimate government of 
Spain, since the non-intervention policy had failed to 
deter aid from outside to the rebel forces. Mexico 
agreed to act together with other nations as long as
the integrity of the Spanish government were respect- 
50ed. Mexico had acted alone among the American nations 
but now was willing to seek mediation. Nevertheless, 
the note made clear the Mexican position against the 
policy of non-intervention to the detriment of the 
Republican government in Spain.
Since the other nations couldn't seem to agree on 
any kind of accord in relation to the Spanish question, 
Mexico continued sending aid to the beleagured govern­
ment. But the aid could not be called free. C&rdenas 
denied a report which said that Mexico had given war 
and food supplies to Spain free of charge. He stated 
that Spain had paid for all war supplies.-51 In his 
1937 annual message to the congress, C&rdenas indicat­
ed that Mexico had sold $8,200,078.21 worth of supplies 
to S p a i n . I n  light of the problems the Mexican Trea­
sury was having, the amount of supplies sold to Spain
50Ibid., April 2, 1937, Sect. II, p. 3.
^■Cdrdenas, Obras, Tomo I, p. 372.
*2E1 Universal. September 2, 1937, p. 13.
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was a big booBt to the Mexican economy, and can explain 
in part the readiness of the Cdrdenas government to 
supply aid to the Republicans.
The need for additional funds was not the whole 
explanation, however. Zn addition to material aid, 
there were even some Mexican participants in the war. 
Mexico freely allowed her citizens to take an active 
part in the fighting.  ̂ This action also seemed to be 
in violation of Mexico's own idea of non-intervention, 
and a quarter of a century later, another Mexican ad- 
ministration refused to allow citizens to go to Cuba 
to participate in the fighting there.
There never were very many Mexicans fighting in 
Spain, and they were not the only foreigners there. As 
the Loyalist situation in Spain began to deteriorate 
(in late 1937), rumors circulated that the Spanish 
government had signed a contract with Mexico to or­
ganize and train an army to send to the aid of the 
Loyalists.*** Even had Cdrdenas been in favor of such 
a plan, there is serious doubt that the Mexican govern­
ment could have justified such action. No army ever
*^Lois Elwyn Smith "Mexico and the Spanish Re­
publicans," in Pnlversity of California Publications in 
Political Science. Vol. IV Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1955), pp. 190-96.
^Excelsior, February 6, 1938, p. 1.
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was sent from Mexico, and even if there had been such 
plans, the decision a year later to withdraw all in­
ternational forces fro* the conflict would have put 
an end to the Mexican "army."
Flans were underway in early January 1939 to with­
draw all international fighting units from Spain, and 
this decision had a special significance for Mexico.
The Cdrdenas government decided to grant asylum, for 
humanitarian reasons, to any foreign soldier who could 
not return to his home.^ The invitation offers good 
insight into Cdrdenas, who often has been accused of 
extreme xenophobia. This accusation is normally based 
on his application of the C&rdenas Doctrine to foreign 
capital located in Mexico. But what is often ignored 
was the open door policy of his administration in 
dealing with political exiles.
In the case of the International Brigades, however,
C&rdenas met with one of his few defeats, for criticism
was very strong against this decision to invite the
56foreigners to reside in Mexico. Because of this 
strong criticism, on January 29, 1939 permission for
^Paquete 570, Exp. 546.6/200, The Cdrdenas 
Papers, Archivo General de la Nacidn, Mexico, D.F.,
Mexico (Hereinafter abbreviated AGN).
^See such documents as ibid., 2414, 5200, 5787,
5615 and 5512 for examples of the criticism forcing 
Cdrdenas to reconsider his decision.
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the admission of the members of the International Brig­
ades was officially withdrawn.^ This decision was 
probably a combination of the pressure of public opinion 
and the realisation by Cdrdenas that he had enough 
political problems without importing more.
The "Alliance11 of Mexico and the Soviet Union
Although Mexico and the Soviet Union did not have 
diplomatic ties during the years of the civil war, they 
were considered allies of a sort because of the support 
both countries gave to Spain. Criticism of Cdrdenas' 
idea of allowing the International Brigades to reside 
in Mexico undoubtedly was based in part on the reason­
ing of some that the unofficial alliance of Mexico 
and the Soviet Union would be strengthened even more if 
members of the Brigades moved to Mexico.
In explaining this strange relationship between 
the two countries, it has been pointed out that at least 
in the case of the Spanish civil war the U.S.S.R. was 
pursuing a sympathetic policy, and that the workers'
unions and popular front in Spain in any case rejected
58any type of communist dictatorship.' One thing they
did not reject was the aid given.by the Soviet Union
^ E1 Naclonal. January 29, 1939, p. 1.
**8Ibid., November 3, 1936, Sect. II, pp. 1, 3.
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during the civil conflict.
Originally the Soviet Union agreed with England 
and Prance to a policy of non-intervention. But in 
early October 1936, the Soviet Union sent an official 
declaration to the committee of Non-Intervention say­
ing that because of the numerous violations of the 
non-intervention pact, the U.S.S.R. could no longer 
be a part of the committee and felt released from the
cqagreements.  ̂ Prom this time the Soviet Union con­
tinued to accuse Germany, Portugal and Italy of inter­
vening in the affairs of Spain. At the same time the 
announcement was made that clothes and food were being 
collected to be sent to Spain and that 26 million rubles 
already had been collected toward this purpose.^® So 
the Soviet Union joined Mexico in openly supporting 
the Spanish Republican government.
In addition to this unofficial relationship, Mexi­
co and the Soviet Union shared a somewhat more official 
one in the League of Nations. Maxim Litvinof of the 
Soviet Union and Isidro Fabela of Mexico together sup­
ported Loyalist Spain's demands that the League recog­
nize the German-Italian aggression. The unified sup­
port of these two countries was negated by the offer 
England and Prance made to Italy to negotiate over the
^ Ibid., October 8, 1936, p. 2.
6°Ibid., October 12, 1936, p. 2.
withdrawal of troops.^1 The "alliance" with Mexico had 
cost the Soviet Union nothing. For Mexico, the support 
role shared with the Soviet Union gave Cdrdenas' op­
ponents more reason to brand his government as radical. 
Neither the aid given by Mexico nor that given by the 
Soviet Union was enough, however, as Franco and his In­
surgents won the victory in Spain.
As soon as the civil war ended in March 1939, and 
Franco was in control of the government, Mexico suspend­
ed relations with Spain, including all commercial 
62ties. For a time after Franco's takeover, there were 
rumors that Mexico would recognize Franco's Spain, es­
pecially as he was the supreme authority in the country. 
One Mexican newspaper, Novedades. took the position 
that Franco should be recognized inasmuch as this recog­
nition would simply be an application of the Estrada 
Doctrine,^ the guideline which Mexico uses in her 
policy of granting recognition to other governments.
^ El Universal. September 27, 1937, Sect. II, p.
4. later in Mexico there was a denial that the Soviet 
Union under Stalin really gave much aid to Spain. It 
even was claimed that Stalin was responsible for allow­
ing the Spanish Republic to die. At the same time, it 
was admitted that Mexico had been able to give too lit­
tle to do any good. See Siempre?. April 26, 1961, p. 20
62Smith, "Mexico and the Spanish Republicans,"
p. 206.
^Novedades, April 3t 1939, p. 4.
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Mexico was accused by the new Spanish regime of 
being unfaithful to this basic doctrine, while the Mexi­
can government proclaimed it was acting in harmony with 
the doctrine. According to Mexican officials, the Es­
trada Doctrine simply rejected the principle of formal 
recognition, but did not automatically guarantee the 
establishment of relations with any regime which might 
come to p o w e r . O n e  Mexican official, in trying to 
explain the lack of the application of the doctrine to 
Spain, pointed out that for one thing, Mexico's repre­
sentation already had ceased at the time the Republic 
fell. He also added that Estrada contended that Mexico 
reserved the right, in the case of a revolutionary move­
ment, to maintain or not maintain its representation
without making any statements about the legitimacy of
65the new regime.
Other Latin American governments went the opposite 
direction from Mexico, while at the same time using the 
very doctrine which had originated in Mexico. As early 
as November 1936, the Nicaraguan government had in effect
recognised Franco's regime and had used the Estrada
66Doctrine as the basis for such action. It can be seen
^Smith, "Mexico and the Spanish Republicans," 
p. 203.
**̂E1 Naclonal. July 3, 1939, p. 2.
66FRUS, 1936, Vol. II, p. 576.
therefore, that the Estrada Doctrine was another part 
of Mexican foreign policy which could be used as Mexi­
co saw fit.
In this case, for Mexico, there had ceased to be
a government in Spain with which to continue relations.
The Mexican Ministry of Foreign Relations announced in
January 1939 that the relations of Mexico with Spain
would continue wherever the legitimate government of
67Manuel Azafia might be. Mexico continued to resist 
pressure to establish relations with Franco's new gov­
ernment, at that time founded on the Traditional 
Spanish Falange.
Perhaps part of the reason for the Mexican hesi­
tancy to deal with Franco and the Falangists could be 
found in their description of the new national and in­
ternational program for Spain. The Falange openly ad­
mitted that it felt Spain should have an empire and 
should be one of the world's leaders. Sounding some­
what ominous, they also referred to the cultural and 
economic unification with the countries of Latin
America. The platform ended on a militaristic note,
68insisting on the supremacy of Spanish armed forces.
^Smith, "Mexico and the Spanish Republicans," 
p. 198.
68H. Rutledge Southworth, "The Spanish Phalanx and 
Latin America," in Foreign Affairs. Vol. XVIII (Octo­
ber, 1939), p. 150.
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Regardless of the ominous sound of this program, 
Mexico alone among the former Spanish colonies failed 
to recognize Franco, probably because of the stubborn 
will of the man at the head of the Mexican government, 
LAzaro CArdenas. CArdenas had commited his government 
to support of the Spanish Republicans, and he refused 
to back down once that government was defeated.
The Question of the Refugees
Mexico had not been able to save the Spanish 
Republican government, but both during and after the 
civil war Mexico did what she could to save the Spanish 
people (those who wanted to be saved) from Franco. As 
early as October 1936 the Mexican government replied 
to a request from the Argentines by declaring that 
Mexico would recognize the right of political asylum
cqof Spanish refugees. 7 In December 1936, the Mexican
ambassador to Spain promised political asylum regard-
70less of political belief of the refugees. Within a
few months refugees began arriving in Mexico under
the general asylum given all who fought Franco. Many
71intellectuals accepted the invitation of asylum, and
^ E1 Universal. October 25, 1936, p. 2. 
^ E1 Nacional. December 8, 1936, p. 2. 
^Ibid., November 28, 1938, p. 3.
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they ultimately proved to be of great benefit to Mexi­
co, as the refugees contributed to the culture of their 
new country in many different ways.
High officials of the Spanish Republican govern­
ment also were invited to reside in Mexico. In Feb­
ruary 1939, even before the fall of Madrid, official 
sources in Lisbon indicated that General Josd Miaja 
was in Valencia awaiting transportation, having decid­
ed to accept the hospitality of C&rdenas. The same 
report said that former head of government Juan Negrin
had left Madrid and was waiting in Valencia for an air-
72plane to take him abroad.
Among others to decide to make a new start in 
Mexico was Diego Martinez Barrio, who had been presi­
dent of the Spanish Cortds (and who later became presi- 
dent of the Republican government-in-exile)  ̂and the 
ex-president of 'the University of Madrid, Joed Gir- 
al.74 Part of the Spanish Cortds decided to come to 
Mexico,73 and for a time the entire body was discus­
sing the possibility of transferring the operation of 
the Cortds of the Spanish Republic to Mexico. There
72Ibid., February 28, 1939, p. 2.
73Ibid., May 31, 1939, p. 2.
74Ibid., June 2, 1939, p. 1.
75Ibid., June 20, 1939, p. 2.
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was a difference of opinion on this matter, however, 
and the transfer was not effected.^
Although most of these refugees were cordially 
welcomed, Mexico did have to change her original plans 
for accepting all refugees. On March 31, 1939, the 
Servicio de Emlgracidn para Republicanos Espaftoles 
(SERE) was set up and the Committee assisted by repre­
sentatives of the Mexican government. Mexico, however, 
was not in a financial position to do as much as she 
might have wanted, and SERE largely depended on funds 
belonging to the Spanish Republican government-in- 
exile. A first shipment of 1,700 Spaniards under this 
organisation departed France for Mexico on May 24, 1939
on board a ship chartered by the British National Joint
77Committee for Spanish Relief. 1 The selection was 
strongly influenced by the communists, however, and 
this influence led to a cooling off by the Mexicans.
Even from the beginning of the flow of refugees 
there were opponents to the C&rdenas invitation to the 
Spaniards. The Mexican government explained that the 
refugees were paying their own expenses and even brought 
extra money into the Mexican economy. The only thing 
the government was doing was opening its doors to anyone
^6E1 Popular. July 2, 1939, p. 2 
^Madariaga, Spain, p. 584.
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who needed help In relocating from his original home- 
78land.' To those who opposed his policy, CArdenas 
merely said that there was no justification against 
the admission of Spaniards into Mexico because the 
country needed additional population, and that the 
refugees were coming as workers, not as political 
actionaries. He also assured the nation that no Mexi-
7 Qcan workers would be displaced by the refugees.
In spite of this assurance, there were those who 
were concerned that Mexican workers would lose their 
jobs because of the influx. One workers' syndicate
even wrote the president a letter citing examples of
80Mexican workers who already had been displaced. Al­
though there were a few such complaints, the major 
cause for discontent with the refugees was not because 
of labor, but because of political activities.
The first complaints against these political 
activities began almost as soon as the refugees arrived. 
Although the Mexican government had tried to make it 
clear that it would allow none of the refugees to en­
gage in disrupting activities on behalf of the Spanish 
Republican government, nevertheless, not all the
78E1 Naclonal. April 6, 1939» p. 1.
79Ibid., July 27, 1939, p. 1.
80Paquete 570, Exp. 546.6/200, Doc. 33443,. AGN.
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refugees adhered to this provision. In addition, making 
the matter worse, there were complaints that only com­
munists were being accepted in France for transship-
81ment to Mexico. * In August 1939, the president of 
the Democratic Institutional Union of Mexico even ask­
ed that CArdenas apply Article 33 of the constitution
82to any groups which Intervened in Mexican politics.
In spite of such complaints, CArdenas himself
never had any regrets about his decision to allow the
8?Spanish refugees to enter Mexico. ** He believed that 
Mexico needed more immigrants, and that because of 
cultural and historical ties, there could be no bet­
ter choice than the Spanish refugees. Mexico might 
possibly have regretted to some extent her hospitality, 
even if CArdenas did not, when some of the refugees 
did attempt to engage in political activity. But 
there is no doubt that Mexico benefited in many ways 
from the immigration. Not only did the refugees add 
to the culture of the country, but they also contri­
buted greatly to the educational process, both aca­
demic and vocational.
A 1940 presidential decree authorized agricultural
81Ibid., Doc. 31539.
82Ibid., Doc. 32107.
^Personal interview. Author with Jesds Silva 
Herzog.
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lands to be turned over to some u. the refugees In re­
turn for their services as teacher of modern methods 
of agriculture to Mexican communal farmers.8* Cdrde- 
nas realized the value these individuals could con­
tribute to Mexico, and therefore, although his action 
in allowing them to come to Mexico was humanitarian, 
it also had its material benefits. Because of the 
cultural and educational benefits contributed by the 
refugees, and the amount of money put into the Mexican 
Treasury through purchases of arms during the civil 
war, Mexico actually gained from the support given to 
the Spanish Republicans.
Recognizing the value of the refugees, Mexico
continued after the civil war was over to try to help
as many as possible. In July 1940 it was learned that
Mexico had asked the German and Italian governments
for help on behalf of some Spanish refugees who had
8*5been trapped in areas of occupied Prance. J By the 
next month, France and Mexico had signed an agreement 
whereby the 250,000 refugees in Prance since the end of 
the Spanish civil war could migrate to Mexico. Prance 
insisted that Mexico adhere to three conditions. The 
first of these was a guarantee by Mexico that the Mexican
8*New York Tiroes, February 2, 1940, p. 3. 
85Ibid., July 2, 1940, p. 3.
government would pay not only all transportation ex­
penses, but the upkeep of all the refugees from the 
date of the agreement (August 29, 1940) until the time 
of departure. The second point in the agreement was 
that Mexico would accept any and all refugees without 
consideration of political or religious beliefs. Fin­
ally, France, which had recognized Franco's regime, in­
sisted on the right to turn over to Spain any criminal 
among the group should the Spanish government so de­
sire.8**
There were complaints from one group in the 
United States (the Group of Communist Workers of the 
United States) that Mexico was not observing the sec­
ond point of the agreement. The argument was that 
there was a group of Mexican officials in France in­
terrogating the refugees and that certain groups, such 
as anarchists, socialists and communists were being 
denied admission into Mexico. The letter to President 
CArdenas charged that he would be responsible for the 
death of any refugee who was refused entrance into 
Mexico.8  ̂ With all he had done for the refugees, and 
with the record clear that he had allowed many to enter
86Ibid., August 30, 1940, p. 1.
8^Group of Communist Workers of the United States, 
letter, to President CArdenas, Paquete 570, Exp. 546.6/ 
200, Doc. 33417, AGN.
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Mexico without concern for their political beliefs, 
Cdrdenas could Ignore such Isolated complaints with 
a clear conscience.
Current "Relations1
The Mexican governments which followed C&rdenas
continued the policy which he started toward Franco's
Spain. In August 1945, Mexico even extended official
recognition to the Spanish Republican government-in-
exile. Not only was Mexico the first nation to grant
this recognition, but she was taking a step frowned on
by many of the nations of the world at a time when
Franco was applying pressure for recognition of his 
88regime. In December 1946, Mexican president Miguel 
Alemdn stated that Mexico would continue to have re­
lations with the Spanish government-in-exile, but that 
Mexico's relations would always be governed by the at­
titude and desires of the Spanish people.8  ̂ Like Cfir- 
denas before him, Alemdn was Interpreting Mexico's 
flexible foreign policy concerning recognition in 
light of what he felt was best for Mexico.
In 1946 also, Franco's government came under fire
88Smith, "Mexico and the Spanish Republicans,"
p. 287.
8^Alfonso Junco, M6jlco y los refugiados (Mexico: 
Editorial Jus, 1959), p. 74.
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in the United Nations• With the United States and 
Great Britain opposing the move, Poland and several 
other nations, including Mexico, attempted to keep 
Franco isolated from the family of nations. Backed 
by Mexico, France and the Netherlands, Poland claimed 
that Franco's regime was placed in power against the 
will of the Spanish people by Germany and Italy, and 
that Franco had been allied with those two nations dur­
ing the war. Charging that France had to close her bor­
ders because of the danger from Spain, the declaratir-
also accused Franco of allowing former nazi scientists
goto engage in dangerous activities within Spain.
The New York Times, in covering these debates, 
felt that perhaps both the United States and Great 
Britain actually would like to see Franco replaced.
The problem seemed to be in just how to get rid of him 
and with what kind of regime he would be replaced. In 
spite of this alleged desire on the part of the United 
States and Great Britain, and in spite of the election 
of Dr. Castillo N&jera of Mexico as president of the 
United Nations Security Council which was debating the 
issue, the Security Council refused, by a 7-4 vote on 
June 24, 1946, to order the other members of the United
^°New York Times. April 12, p. 1; April 18, 
1946, p.T:
Nations to break diplomatic relations with Spain.
Attempts both in Mexico and Spain continued 
through the years in an effort to re-establish rela­
tions, and from time to time news articles appeared 
stating that Franco was making another attempt to gain 
recognition or that someone in Mexico was making inform­
al moves in that direction.
Franco sent a representative to Mexico, and al­
though the Mexican government refused to give him any 
kind of diplomatic recognition, he still was more im­
portant than the representatives of the government- 
in-exile, and handled many of the non-diplomatic af­
fairs between the two countries. Even the Mexican
Inewspapers often have come out in favor of renewal of
relations, claiming that it is folly to maintain the
same stubborn attitude that has kept the two nations
apart. Many Mexicans seem to have the attitude that if
the Mexican government can reconcile itself to having
diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union, then certainly
qpMexico should recognize Spain.
It does seem strange that beginning with C&rdenas 
the Estrada Doctrine has been used against Spain. The
91Ibid., April 18, 1946, p. 1; June 25, 1946,
p. 1.
Q?J Sydney Gruson, in ibid.. October 31# 1954,
p. 27
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doctrine in essence has made it easy for Mexico to 
recognize all kinds of regimes, as it indicates that 
the Mexican government should not sit in judgment of 
administrations which come to power. The doctrine has 
been convenient for Mexico, allowing her to recognize 
regimes not popular with other western nations, for 
example, the Castro regime in Cuba. Yet with the one 
country with which Mexico had more common original ties 
than any other, this very doctrine has been used in a 
negative manner.
ThuB the relationship between Mexico and Spain has 
come fill circle since the time of the Mexican War for 
Independence, with the full break from the old country 
at that time, and the lack of any formal diplomatic 
relations now. During the period of the civil war, the 
relations of Mexico with what had been the legitimate 
government of Spain had been as close as they had been 
since the early days of empire. C&rdenas1 support of 
the Spanish Republican government has affected Mexico 
even down to the present, especially with so many of 
the former Spanish refugees now firmly rooted in Mexico.
Cdrdenas usually has been venerated for the 
policies he pursued while in office, but he has re­
ceived considerable criticism for his part in handling 
the Spanish question. Although his supporters have al­
ways claimed that he was the great benefactor of the
86
indigenous population, his opponents have used the Cdr- 
denas policy during the Spanish civil war to claim that 
he really did nothing for the Mexican Indians, his only 
concern being the protection of the Spanish refugees.  ̂
In light of all the known cases where C&rdenas 
tried to help his fellow Mexicans, this denunciation 
seems to hold little value. In the Mexican archives 
among the Cdrdenas papers are literally thousands of 
documents showing the concern he had for the individual 
Mexican. But as can be seen in his granting of politi­
cal asylum to individuals of greatly differing views, 
Cdrdenas also granted his hospitality to foreigners, 
holding the Cdrdenas Doctrine for those cases where 
the foreigners abused that hospitality.
^Todo. November 23, 1950, p. 9.
CHAPTER IV
MEXICO AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM
Before any analysis can be made of the relation­
ship be.tween Mexico and the Soviet Union, it is neces­
sary to realize that the Soviet power elites in the 
1920's were attempting to consolidate their own posi­
tions, and were much more concerned with matters di­
rectly affecting the Soviet Union than with Latin Ameri­
ca. Thus we find little real importance given to the 
region of Latin America, although certainly communists 
were active in the area. The situation has been summed 
up as follows:
In the theses presented by Lenin to 
the Second Communist International, there 
is hardly any reference to Latin Ameri­
ca. . . .  In Moscow, as can be seen, a 
movement in Morocco . . . was considered, 
more important than one in . . . Mexico.
In May 1902, a treaty of commerce and friendship
Victor Alba, Historia del comunismoen America 
latina (Mexico: Ediciones Occidentales, 1^54), pp. 47-
Fossibly one reason for the lack of interest was 
simply because the U.S.S.R. had diplomatic relations 
only with Uruguay among the Latin nations. See also 
Robert J. Alexander, Communism in Latin America (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1*357J, p. 33.
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phad been signed between Mexico and tsarist Russia, but 
after the 1917 revolution even this relationship was 
broken and remained dormant until 1924. The Mexican 
Revolution had begun in 1910 and Mexico also had more 
immediate problems. By 1917 Mexico had already ratified 
its new "radical" constitution.
Within a few years early communist such as the 
Indian, Manhendra Nath Roy, began surfacing in Mexico. 
Then in 1921, a Japanese named Sen Katayama was named to 
the Executive Committee of the Communist International 
(ECCI) while in Moscow. One year later he was in Mexico 
and is given credit by some as having formed the Com­
munist Party of Mexico (CPM).^ One fact seems to be 
clear about communist activity in Mexico in the early 
1920's: foreigners such as these were in key positions
and generally were the organizers of the movements. Lit­
tle evidence seems to exist that Mexican nationals play­
ed much part in early activities.
This condition was to change rapidly, for in the 
1920's a number of well-known artists such as Diego 
Rivera, Jos£ Clemente Orozco and David A. Siqueiros^-
2AHDM, Vol. XXXIX, p. 217.
^Alba, Historla del comunismo, pp. 30-31, 23.
^These individuals were all leaders of the. Mexi­
can fresco school, whose works interpreted through art 
the ideas of the Mexican Revolution. See Howard P.
Cline. Mexico (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963)»
p. 130.
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associated themselves with the communists and took over 
leading positions. Although Mexicans were now leading 
the party, it is evident that direction came from the 
Soviet Union by way of the Comintern. In 1928, Dmitri 
Manuilsky addressed a conference of Latin American com­
munists in Moscow and left no doubt in their minds that 
Stalin's policy and the strategy of the Communist Inter­
national were one and the same, with the defense of the 
Soviet Union as a primary objective.
By now the Soviet Union had become interested in 
Latin American countries and desired to establish ties 
with some of them. Relations were established with Mexi­
co in August 1924.^ It is interesting to note that in 
a report on foreign relations, the Soviets mentioned 
the establishment of relations, but implied that the
importance was in now having a political baBe in the
7country neighboring on the United States. Later state­
ments made when the two countries broke relations also 
indicated that the Soviet Union had attached little 
significance to Mexico itself at that time.
^Alexander, Communism in Latin America, pp. 322, 
43-44. Manuilsky held key positions in the ECCI during these years, including that of permanent Comintern rep­
resentative with the German Communist party.
6AHDM, Vol. XXXIX, p. 379.
^Pravda, March 6, 1925, p. 5.
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Mexico was significant enough to be made a sub- 
Secretariat for the Comintern, but soon was considered 
to have a reactionary, fascist government. In January 
1930, the ECCI issued a manifesto from Buenos Aires, de­
nouncing the fascist regime in Mexico and calling for 
collections from the Latin American parties for the 
‘•victims'* of reaction in Mexico,and for demonstrations
Oof protest. Demonstrations soon broke out in various
capitals in both North and Sonth America, and Mexico
held the Soviets to blame for the action, claiming that
they were interfering in Mexican Internal affairs by
adirecting the attacks. The Mexican government then 
began a campaign of persecution of communist agitators 
in Mexico City.^® The Soviets stated that their govern­
ment could not be held responsible for attacks in the 
11press or for anything done by the Comintern, which 
was considered by the U.S.S.R. as an autonomous organi­
sation led by members of the various Communist parties
oIbid., January 15» 1930, p. 1. There was repres­
sion in Mexico, but the single party was not yet the in­
stitutionalized party it became later. The government 
of CArdenas was more reminiscent of the corporate state 
than the series of governments in the late 1920's.
9AHDM, Vol. XXXIX, pp. 420-21.
^°La Prensa (Buenos Aires), January 17, 1930, p. 11.
*^?or an example of anti-Mexican opinion in the 
Soviet press during this time, see Pravda. June 26,
1929, p. 1.
12throughout the world. Mexico continued to insist that 
the propaganda was being directed by the Soviets, and 
decided to break relations in late January 1930. The 
news of the rupture first appeared in the Western press, 
which reported that Soviet officials were caught by sur­
prise. The Mexican ambassador, Jestis Silva Herzog, ear­
lier had protested to Soviet officials about the propa­
ganda and demonstrations, but when he departed for a 
vacation in Berlin, Soviet authorities supposedly were
I*unaware that relations even were in danger. J Silva 
Herzog, although no planning to return to the Soviet 
Union himself, also was not aware of the break in re­
lations until during intermission at the opera with 
the Mexican ambassador to Germany he received a tele­
gram informing him of the rupture.1^
Pravda reported the break by quoting Mexican 
Foreign Minister Gsnaro Estrada, who in essence said
1 9Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR, Dokumenty 
Vneshnel Politiki. Tom XII (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo i>oliti-
cheskoi Literatury, 1967), p. 573. Subsequent references 
will be cited as DTP, followed by volume number. In 
the Pstrograd Pravda. on August 5, 1920, the close rela- 
tionship or the soviet Union and the Comintern had been 
clearly defined and Lenin himself indicated the subor­
dination of the press to the Central Committee. See Com­
munist Perspective (Washington, D.C.: ?), pp. 488,651.
^ La Prensa (Buenos Aires), January 24, 1930, 
p. 11; January Z5, 1930, p. 11.
■^Personal interview. Author with Jestis Silva 
Herzog. L.S.U. Archives.
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that any communist activity anywhere in the world had to
1*5be directed by the Soviet government, and this meant 
that recent demonstrations were the works of Soviet- 
directed communists. Izvestia immediately published 
reports blaming the United States for the break, claim­
ing that U.S. capital controlled Mexico.^
In explaining the break to his congress, Mexican 
president Fascual Ortiz Rubio spoke of Mexican rights 
in denying to foreign elements the power to intervene
in internal affairs, and added that it was this inter-
17vention which forced Mexico to sever relations. There 
is little evidence that any real attempt on either side 
was made to renew relations until Cfirdenas became presi­
dent.
Although Cdrdenas did not renew relations with the 
U.S.S.R., there was considerable communist activity in 
Mexico during his regime. Neither Cdrdenas nor his 
closest advisers were even Marxists, but the communists 
had more opportunity to act in Mexico during his time
^Pravda, January 27, 1930, p. 1.
16Izvestia. January 27, 1930, p. 1. U.S. capital 
did have considerable influence in Mexico at this time. 
U.S. and British companies practically controlled the 
economy, leading to the eventual confrontation with 
Cdrdenas.
17AHTM, Vol. XXXIX, pp. 420-21
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1 ftthan anywhere else in Latin America,
Communist Influences on the C&rdenas Administration
The C&rdenas Government of Mexico is 
probably the most radical government in the
world today, with the exception of that in
the Soviet Union.-*-9
The above quotation was taken from the Richmond 
(Va.) Times-Dlspatch in 1938, and expressed an opinion 
widely-held by many U.S. officials, businessmen, news­
papers and the public in general. Apparently there
were four major reasons why many Americans began seeing 
"red" in Mexico in the years 1935-40. The first of these 
was the land reform program of C&rdenas and, closely re­
lated to it, the expropriation of the Eritish and Ameri­
can oil holdings. Before his election C&rdenas had pro­
mised lands to the peasants, and committed himself to
20giving them all possible aid, although C&rdenas him­
self admitted that Mexico could not pay for the expro­
priated properties immediately.
Perhaps the second most important factor influen­
cing foreign public opinion was the role of labor and
18See Hugh Seton-Watson, From Lenin to Khrushchev 
(NY: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, l§bo;, p. 1̂ 7.
^Burt M. McConnell, Mexico at the Bar of Public 
Opinion (NY: Mail 4 Express Publishing Co., 1939)»
p. 226.
20William Townsend, L&zaro C&rdenas. Mexican Demo­
crat (Ann Arbor: George Wahr ±>ublishing Co, 1952)» p. 87
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the labor leader, Vicente Lombardo Toledano, under Car­
denas. Labor gave C&rdenas a strong base of support, 
and he reciprocated by aiding the workers when possible.
An example of such support occurred in February 
1936, when C&rdenas went to Monterrey, the scene of wide­
spread 8trlkes,and issued his "Labor Doctrine" of 14 
points. C&rdenas wanted both employers and workers to 
form separate united front organizations with which the 
government could work. Both groups were to have the 
same rights, but the government would be the sole arbit­
er in solving problems. C&rdenas wanted management to 
realize it could not intervene in labor affairs, but 
then stressed to labor that its demands would be con­
sidered only insofar as the industries had the capabili­
ty of paying and meeting them. In this policy state­
ment, C&rdenas clearly indicated that the nation needed 
the continued development of industry, and that indus­
trialists who felt they could not meet labor's demands
would be prohibited from simply locking out the work-
21ers. C&rdenas later warned the Confederation of 
Mexican Workers (CTM) that they should be concerned not
only with their own problems, but with those of other
22sectors of the nation as well. This admonition fit
91 L&zaro C&rdenas, Ideario politico (M&xico: 
Ediciones Era, 1972), pp. 189-90.
22Alba, Las ideas sociales. p. 252.
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in well with C&rdenas1 idea of how the political system 
should work as well, since he expected each of the four 
sectors to support the others in elections. But his 
general support of labor gave critics both at home and 
abroad the chance to brand his government radical.
Even more widely discussed on an international 
scale than the labor doctrine was the admission of Leon 
Trotsky for permanent residence in Mexico during the C&r­
denas years. Immediately U.S. newspapers saw Trotsky as 
directing a new revolution patterned after the Soviet 
one. That C&rdenas purposely remained aloof and re­
fused personal contact with Trotsky was largely ignored. 
The most important aspect of this episode is that C&rde­
nas had the power to allow Trotsky to live in Mexico 
despite the protests of supposedly influential Marx­
ists in his government.^ C&rdenas chose instead to 
apply his doctrine to Trotsky and treat him just as 
any Mexican national.
Finally, there can be no doubt that some of the 
key officials and advisers in the government were either 
admitted communists or at least sympathizers, although 
in retrospect, they seem not really to have determined
^Benito Xavier P&rez-Verdia, C&rdenas apostol 
vs. C&rdenas estadista, 2« edicidn (Mlxico: n.p.̂
1940), pp. h-W.
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21government policy. * Lombardo Toledano and Trotsky 
could have had some effect on the thinking and policy 
of Cdrdenas; the other officials must be considered 
minor in their ability to influence him.
Lombardo Toledano and Labor
Originally Lombario Toledano seems to have had no 
leaning toward Marxist ideology, but after he became in­
volved in workers' movements, his personal ideology 
changed. By 1934 he was an avowed Marxist and since 
his views were frequently published in various news­
papers, his Marxist connection undoubtedly was known 
to Cdrdenas. Some of the Mexican newspapers even 
branded him as nothing less than the Mexican agent 
of the Third International, saying that he received a 
monthly sum from the Comintern for directing the com-
2*5muni8t campaign among the workers.
There was some evidence to support this accusation, 
as Lombardo Toledano supposedly wrote a letter dated
June 4, 1938 from Paris in which he speaks of his chief,
26Joseph Stalin. There is also a copy of a confidential
2*Victor Alba, The Mexicans (New York: Frederick
A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967), p. 183.
2^For example, see Excelsior. Jan. 30, 1936, p. 1.
26Vicente Lombardo Toledano, letter, to the CTM, 
Paquete 510, Exp. 542.1/2415, AGN.
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report to the CTM in which he again refers to Stalin
the chief, and adds that Stalin will give then money
27to aid in the oil expropriation struggle. '
If these reports were not enough (if they are 
authentic) to convince one of Lombardo's tendencies, his 
writings and speeches certainly clearly reflected his 
attitude. In 1937 he wrote his "philosophy," and the
thoughts were undoubtedly influenced by Hegelian-Marxian
28ideology. His writings, while illustrative of the 
thinking of many labor leaders during this epoch, were 
criticized by a number of intellectuals for being com­
pletely unoriginal, and this added to the accusation 
that he was a stooge of Soviet communism.
Indeed, Lombardo Toledano was highly compliment­
ary of the Soviet Union, pointing out that only in that
29country was democracy truly of the people. * He seemed
convinced that the only way to peace and happiness for
mankind was through the elimination of private property,
30which he defined as the cause for class struggle.
In this matter of property, his views often seemed
2^Ibid., Document 63224.
2 8For example, see Vicente Lombardo Toledano, 





to, coincide with those of C&rdenas. The record shows 
that Cdrdenas redistributed more land than any other 
Mexican president before him, and in 1938 he decided 
that all holdings larger than 370 acres should be brok­
en up and distributed to the peasants,^ an action sup­
ported by Lombardo Toledano. Cdrdenas respected the 
rights of private property as well, however, and his
government established credit systems for both the
•*2ejidatarlos and small landholders. It is in this 
point that C&rdenas and Lombardo Toledano disagreed and 
where C&rdenas showed his independence from the labor 
leader.
In spite of the evidence against him, Lombardo 
Toledano expressed his loyalty to the ideals of the 
Mexican Revolution, including those portions of the 
constitution guaranteeing the rights of private land­
holders. In a confidential letter dated November 13, 
1940, he complained to C&rdenas that police officials 
were telling high government officials that they had 
found eight agents of the Soviet military intelligence 
network in the country on his orders to commit criminal 
acts. Although stating that the charge was so ridicu­
lous as to be undeserving, of attention, he wanted to
^Townsend, l&zaro C&rdenas. p. 152.
^Alba, Las Ideas sociales. pp. 251-52.
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assure C&rdenas of his personal loyalty.^
His protests to the contrary, Lombardo Toledano 
looked and sounded like an agent of international com­
munism. First, there was the unmistakable evidence of 
his own writings. His visit to the Soviet Union and
his glowing reports also did nothing to dispel the idea
\
of his communist affiliation. He was the editor for a^ 
time of El Popular, a known socialist organ, and he 
was often supported from other communist organisations, 
such as La Vos, the official publication of the Com­
munist party. His later association with the Confed­
eration of Latin American Workers also made him sus­
pect. Finally, both Lombardo Toledano and the CTM 
strongly protested when Trotsky was allowed into Mexico.
The influence of Leon Trotsky on C&rdenas undoubt­
edly was even less than that of Lombardo Toledano, but 
the possibility received much more space in the inter­
national press. In an interview, Ambassador Josephus 
Daniels indicated that he believed that Trotsky had 
about as much influence on the thinking of C&rdenas as 
did the Soviet Union,implying he felt Trotsky had 
no influence on the policies of C&rdenas.
“"Vicente Lombardo Toledano, letter, to President 
C&rdenas, November 13, 1940, Paquete 510, Exp. 542.1/
2415, unnumbered document, AON.
^E1 Naclonal. January 14, 1939, p. 1.
t
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The story of Trotsky's exile from the U.S.S.R. and 
his residence in Turkey, Trance and Norway are too well- 
documented to go into here. On August 28, 1936, the 
Soviets indicated they felt Trotsky should be expelled 
from Norway because of his "criminal-terrorist actions," 
and they branded him as the leader of "counter-revolu- 
tionary assassins."
Friends of Trotsky then began considering where he 
could go if the Norwegian government decided to act. 
Mexico Boon became the only possible choice, and Mexi­
can newspapers started spreading the word that Diego 
Rivera had requested permission from the government for 
an entry visa. By early December 1936, Norwegian prime 
minister Johan Nygaardsvold indicated that Trotsky would 
have to leave when his visa expired on December 18. By
that date Trotsky had not made all the arrangements, and
TtC.became technically a prisoner.
In Mexico, a number of groups were concerned that 
C&rdenas would grant asylum. The CTM announced that 
all necessary steps would be taken to avoid allowing 
foreign leaders of contrary ideology entrance into the
■*7country, obviously with reference to Trotsky. For
^Pravda, August 28, 1936, p. 2.
36Excelsior. Dec. 8, 1936, p. 1; Dec. 19, 1936,
Sect# ^I9 p* 4#
3^Ibid., December 1, 1936, p. 1.
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all the good the protests did, C&rdenas seemed to be 
unaware of them. C&rdenaB proved, as he was to show 
a number of times in the next few years, that he was 
not to be intimidated by one of the world powers.
In giving his instructions to the Minister of 
Foreign Relations on December 1, 1936, C&rdenas indi­
cated that, no country should be frightened of one man, 
especially if that country had a clear definition of 
its own nationalistic g o a l s W i t h i n  a few days, the 
Foreign Minister indicated that the request for per­
mission for Trotsky to live in Mexico had been grant­
ed. He went on to say that this should not be inter­
preted as an adherence to the beliefs of the exile, and
that no one should fear that his residence would in any
39way affect the internal situation of Mexico. ? That 
his residence did not affect internal politics does 
seem obvious when looking at Trotsky's few years in 
Mexico in retrospect. On the other hand, one must ad­
mit that he did affect the internal situation to the 
degree that opposition groups rather strongly voiced 
their displeasure at his presence.
These protests began as soon as the government an­
nounced its intention to grant asylum, but to no avail.
^C&rdenas, Ideario politico, p. 326. 
^ElNacional, December 7, 1936, pp. 1, 3.
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In spite of these protests, the government went ahead 
with the grant of asylum. On his arrival in Mexico, 
Trotsky stated that his desires and those of the Mexi­
can government were exactly the same. He declared that 
he had no intention or desire to interfere in any way in 
the internal affairs of Mexico.*0
Some groups such as the CTM decided to take a posi­
tion of indifference toward Trotsky. The CPM, however, 
and groups affiliated with it, continued to voice dis­
approval of his residence. Mexican communists had been 
strong enough to put up their own ticket in municipal 
elections held just before the grant of asylum. Many 
of these leaders claimed they had been too involved in 
their own activities to concern themselves with the 
question of Trotsky. Nevertheless, the official CPM 
line, given by Hern&n Laborde, the leader at that time,
was that it would try to break up any participation of
41Trotsky in public acts.
As might be expected, within a short time there 
were reports that the Soviet Union would protest the 
asylum. One of the Mexican papers quoted the London 
Daily Telegraph as saying that the U.S.S.R. would
*°Excelslor. January 10, 1937, p. 1.
41Ibid., Jan. 23, 1937, p. 3; Jan. 12, 1937, Sect. 
II, p. 27“7an. 9, 1937, Sect. II, p. 2; and Feb. 8,
1937, p. 1.
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protest to Mexico and hold the Mexican government 
responsible for any disruptive activities caused in 
the Soviet Union by Trotsky's activities in Mexico.^2 
Another newspaper dispatch from Moscow indicated that 
the Soviet government would present a protest to Mexico 
through the league of Nations, to which both countries 
belonged, against the declarations being made in Mexico 
by Trotsky on the Moscow trials.*'5
CArdenas was not intimidated, luring his years in 
office he built up a record of allowing many exiles to 
enter Mexico, and most of the communist elements in 
Mexico recognized his liberal actions. Some of them, 
notably Hernan Laborde, seemed to want to avoid taking 
any part in action against Trotsky for fear that the in­
fluence of the CPM on the government would be diminish-
A Aed. laborde and the other communists probably had an 
inflated idea of Just how much influence they were ex­
erting on the government, and this lessened their at­
tempts at overt action against Trotsky.
Covert action was a different matter, however, 
although events which took place in the summer of 1940 
cannot be traced to the CPM. After the first attack on
*2Ibid., editorial, February 5, 1937, p. 5.
*^E1 Universal. February 4, 1937, p. 1.
**Alba, Historla del comunismo. p. 97.
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Trotsky'a house, he accused Stalin, agents of the Soviet 
Union and several Mexicans of wanting him killed. He 
specifically referred to lombardo Toledano. The CTM 
in turn sent a note of protest to the Ministry of In­
terior, claiming that Trotsky not only unjustly had 
accused Lombardo Toledano, but that he had repeatedly 
abused the hospitality of Mexico. The CTM claimed that
his attitude was contrary to the good of the Mexican 
45Revolution.
Polemics continued until Trotsky's death in August 
1940. One of the first groups to attack the crime as a 
counter-revolutionary act was the CTM, which guaranteed 
full cooperation with investigators.*6 In a message 
directed to the Mexican workers, Cdrdenas, while deny­
ing that Mexico was communist, said that the CPM enjoy­
ed great liberty in Mexico, but that if any members of 
that party had allied themselves with the foreign ele­
ments responsible for the death of Trotsky, then those 
Mexicans had committed treason against their country 
and its institutions.*^ Showing the strength of his 
feelings on this subject, Cdrdenas even mentioned the 
fatal attack in his message to the Mexican Congress on
*^E1 Nacional. June 6, 1940, p. 8.
*6E1 Popular. August 22, 1940, p. 1.
*^E1 Nacional. August 30, 1940, pp. 1-2.
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September 1st. In his conclusion he indirectly attacked 
the Soviet Union for perpetrating a crime against a 
State which had granted asylum.*8 The language he used 
was much stronger than one might expect from a man ac­
cused of leading his country in the same direction as 
the Soviet Union.
Cardenas was known to be extremely wary of all 
foreign influences, and indeed had based his doctrine 
on the idea of ridding the country of any kind of 
foreign intervention. For this reason, if for nothing 
else, had he been influenced toward a communist ideology 
it would not have been from Trotsky, but from Mexicans 
who were communists.
One Mexican who could have been an influence on 
C&rdenas was Diego Rivera, whose own brand of communism, 
carried on through organizations such as the Revolution­
ary Party of Workers and Peasants, formed in 1938, soon 
clashed with that of Trotsky, and even more so with 
that of Joseph Stalin.
In an interview in October 1939, Rivera accused 
Stalin of trying to get control of Mexico, and said that 
he had "documentary evidence" of this fact. Perhaps
*8AHDM, Las relaclones internaclonales de M&xico. 
1935-1936. 2* serle, numero 9 (ta&xico; tublicaciones 
de la Secretarla de Relaciones Exteriores, 1957), p.
41.
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trying to stir up the American press, Rivera added that 
Stalin wanted a base In Mexico from which he could work 
against the United States. The main point Rivera want­
ed to make was that "totalitarian agents" of Stalin 
were well-placed in high government positions in Mexi­
co, and that money from Stalinist organizations was
being used in the Mexican presidential campaign then 
4.9in progress.
Rivera's accusations were important in two respects: 
first, he was a well-known and influential revolutionary 
artist, and many persons could have been influenced by 
what he had to say. Secondly, and most important, he 
gave names of a number of the high-ranking government 
officials whom he labeled as Stalin's agents. If Cdr- 
denas had been an admirer, however, of Stalin, and had 
listened to these men who supposedly were in the ser­
vice of Soviet communism, he would not have been so 
agreeable to Trotsky's residence within the country, 
and he probably would have made more of an effort to re­
establish relations with the U.S.S.R.
As Rivera saw things, some of the chief ministries 
and even the executive office had been infiltrated by 
agents of Stalin. Included in his list was the Minis­
ter of Public Education, Ignacio Garcia Tellez. He
^ New York Times. October 29, 1939, p. 39. 
^°Excelsior, December 9, 1939, p. 1.
was not the first person to single out the Ministry of 
Education, as a number of other sources, including Mexi 
can newspapers, already had mentioned Garcia Tellez as 
a communist agent. He even allegedly had said he was 
happy to see the Mexican proletariat following the ex-
151ample of the Marxists in Europe. The attacks on him 
in the Mexican press over his socialist educational 
program even reached the point where Cdrdenas was forc­
ed to order him to refrain from any kind of polemics
COwith the press.
In summing up its six years in office, the C&rde- 
nas regime explained its original collective aspira­
tions as mainly having been to put an end to the miser­
able conditions in which the Idians and mestizos found 
themselves, and to end the dogmatism found in both re­
ligion and education. The government had been concern­
ed about religious privileges and immunities and the 
economic and political privileges which effected un­
equal distribution of wealth and continued exploitation 
of the masses.^ Social education was considered by
^Eduardo Correa, El balance del Cardenismo (M&ci 
co: Talleres Linotipogrdficos "Acci6n", 1941;, p. 28.
^Presidential order, Paquete 461, Exp. 534.6/74»
AGN.
•^Secretario de Gobernacidn, Seis aflos de gobier- 
no al Berviclo de MAxico. 1934-1940 (Mexico: La
Naciona! Impresora, S.A., l§4b), p. iii»
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the Cdrdenas administration as a major plank in this 
progressive program. In carrying the program to its 
fruition, his administration did little more than enforce 
the religious issues in the constitution which had been 
called anti-clerical. But this enforcement led the pro­
religious forces to brand the regime as communistic.
Early in his term the government passed an amend­
ment setting up a socialist form of eduction, which 
planned for a future where the means of production would 
belong to the Mexican people.^ For Cdrdenas, what this 
definition meant was that social education would counter 
religious fanaticism and would prepare the future genera­
tions of Mexicans so that they would better understand
cctheir responsibilities tottie collective society. J This 
amendment was repealed within a short time after the end 
of the C&rdenas administration.
In answer to his critics in the church, C&rdenas
stated that while the church had been involved in educa-
56tion, few of the people were really educated. He at­
tempted to convince critics that he was only in conflict 
with fanaticism, and that he was not waging a battle
-^Alvear Acevedo, Ldzaro C&rdenas, pp. 318-19.
'^C&rdenas, Ideario -politico, p. 208.
^Josephus Daniels, Shirt-sleeve Diplomat (Chapel 
Hilli University of North Carolina IPress, 1$47), 
p. 70.
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against the church. Nevertheless, he continued to re­
ceive criticism from various parts.^
Perhaps some Mexicans felt this criticism was not
without basis, as the Minister of Education even sent
representatives to the Soviet Union to study methods
58and materials used in teaching there. But more than 
likely it was a combination of events which caused iso­
lated criticism rather than any concentrated effort to 
bring communist-style education to Mexico. For one thing, 
the criticism was only isolated, and came at a time when 
CArdenas' enforcement of the anti-religious articles 
was arousing a great deal of opposition, even in the 
United States. There was probably more church-led ac­
tivity in opposition to the program than communist-led 
activity in support of it. Perhaps one of the reasons 
CArdenas refused to renew relations with the Soviet 
Union was that the religious opposition would become 
even stronger and represent a threat to his regime.
Although CArdenas probably influenced education 
rather than being influenced by those he appointed to 
posts within the Ministry of Education, he was very 
likely influenced by the thinking of some of his other
57Federation of Societies of Fathers of the Family, 
Uruapan, MichoacAn, letter, to President CArdenas, Novem­
ber 29, 1938, Paquete 431, Exp. 533.3/115, Doc. 77600,
AGN.
58E1 Universal, April 14, 1937, p. 1.
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ministers. One of these influential members of his cab­
inet was General Francisco Mligica, who had flirted with 
the communists in earlier days and had been one of the 
most influential persons at the Constitutional Conven­
tion in 1916. Under CArdenas he served in the cabinet 
until he resigned to run for the presidential nomination. 
It was said that he had both a physical and philosophi­
cal resemblance to Lenin. No doubt CArdenas might have
c qbeen influenced by him,  ̂but the events of the six 
CArdenas years seem to indicate that CArdenas was able 
to use those around him, without being unduly influenced 
in turn. Certainly the presidential election of 1940 
should illustrate this objectivity.
CArdenas indicated years later that he had held 
himBelf aloof from the election in spite of being a 
close friend of Mdgica.^0 With the support of CArdenas 
the results might have been different; without his sup­
port, Mtigica probably never had a chance. There is no 
evidence that the Soviet Union intervened in any way in 
the elections (and certainly the Soviets probably would 
have been happier if Mtigica had been the candidate), but 
no fault could be found in the results, especially when
"^Joe C. Ashby, Organized Labor and the Mexican 
Revolution under LAzaro CArdenas (chapel Hill: Univer­
sity of North Carolina Press, 1^67), pp. 11, 19.
60CArdenas, Ideario politico, p. 85.
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Camacho renewed relations with the Soviet Union shortly 
after his election.
Even without having the official relations later 
established, the CArdenas government could be said to 
have had a type of relations with the Soviet Union 
through the Communist party of Mexico. There was a 
network of parties throughout Mexico at the time, and 
they were allowed to function without harra»sment, ̂  
and throughout most of his administration, CArdenas
62was given support by the CPM for his liberal policy.
Although the communists might have praised CAr- 
denas, the 7th CPM Congress established without a doubt 
its international connections in two articles promulgat­
ed:
Art. 72: The Communist Party of Mexico is af­
filiated with the Communist Interna­
tional, with all the rights and obli­
gations according to its Statutes.
Art. 73: The Communist Party of Mexico will main­
tain fraternal relations with the com­
munist parties of all countries.
Por the man who established the CArdenas Doctrine 
as an effective tool against foreign intervention, these
articles must have appeared somewhat menacing. CArdenas
^Prouncement, CPM of Veracruz, October 16, 1937, 
Paquete 280, Exp. 433/238, Doc. 51230, AGN.
/ • a CPM Campeche, telegram, to President CArdenas,
May 13, 1939, Paquete 282, Exp. 433/409, Doc. 23448, ibid
6^Ia Voz, January 23, 1939, p. 10.
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might not have worried about the rights the local party 
might have, but the obligations should have caused him 
to wonder. Cdrdenas1 fight against foreign intervention 
sometimes, however, made him forget about the danger 
from within.
Toward the end of the Cdrdenas administration, the 
CPM came out with its national program for Mexico. The 
proposals for the next six-year term contained the fol­
lowing main points: expropriation of lands of both
foreigners and nationals to be given to the peasants; 
nationalization of banks, the electric industry and 
centralization of the administration of railroads, 
petroleum and electricity; minimum salaries for workers 
based on actual cost of living and a form of social se­
curity with a federalization of the labor tribunals; re­
forms in the fiscal system with a maximum amount of rent 
and protection for the small business owners against 
the giants; development of cooperatives among small 
producers; better economic conditions for the indigen­
ous population;' permission for the natives to elect 
representatives according to traditional customs; the 
teaching of natives in their own language and respect 
for their institutions; increased emphasis on wiping 
out illiteracy and communal diseases; right to vote and 
equal rights for women; improvement in the life of the 
army; strong ties with all countries of the continent,
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especially with the United States, and renewal of re­
lations with the U.S.S.R.64
Sounding very Mexican and not at all extremely 
radical, undoubtedly some of these planks were the same 
as CArdenas himself would have wanted, along with the 
majority of the Mexican population. But the CPM never 
gathered enough support to make its programs part of 
the national picture.
Although the CPM had full freedom during this ad­
ministration, it had a difficult time recruiting mem­
bers, and was always in trouble financially. In spite 
of constant urging by the party newspaper, the handful 
of members seemed unable to attract new recruits. The 
paper was in financial difficulty from the beginning 
and finally had to cease publication. Had the Soviet 
Union been trying to intervene actively in Mexican af­
fairs, there would have been fewer difficulties for the 
local party. In addition, if CArdenas had been support­
ing the party, it should have been much stronger.
Mexico, the Soviet Union and World Affairs
After looking at the internal affairs of Mexico
**4Ibid.. August 27, 1939, p. 9.
65̂For examples of problems that beset the party, 
see ibid., Jan. 11 and 15; March 6 and May 3, 1939.
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and the possible communist influences within the country, 
it is now necessary to look at what both the Soviet 
Union and Mexico were doing and saying about each other 
in the context of world affairs. Although the two coun­
tries did not have diplomatic relations as such during 
the G&rdenas years, there was some contact through the 
League of Nations, and also through the Comintern's re­
lationship with the CPM.
Even without official relations, there was support 
in Mexico for the Soviet Union. On November 7, 1937 
a meeting was held to commemorate the 20th anniversary 
of the Soviet Revolution. It was sponsored by the CTM, 
the PNR, the Society of Friends of the U.S.S.R. and the 
CPM. Valentin Campa, representing the party, spoke of 
the development economically and militarily of the 
Soviet Union, then the press secretary of the PNR spoke. 
He talked of the similarity of the Mexican and Soviet 
revolutions, and said that both countries were seeking 
a common goal— a democracy of the workers.
Following the press secretary, Narciso Bassols 
spoke for the Friends of the U.S.S.R., who claimed that 
the renewal of relations between the U.S.S.R. and Mexico 
was a necessity. He indicated that the capitalists of 
the world had allied themselves with the fascist pow­
ers in Berlin, Rome and Tokyo, and that presently Mexi­
co seemed to be allied with them while the proletariat
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forming the Red International continued the fight against 
imperialism. He pointed out that in this battle com­
munism was shoving the way for solving the social 
problems of the nation, and that a Soviet diplomatic 
mission in Mexico could show how to profit from the 
ways of communism.^
In addition to this internal support of the Soviet 
Union, there was one possible point of confusion for one 
studying Mexican-Soviet relationships during these 
years: both countries were on the same side in the
civil war in Spain, albeit for different reasons. Af­
ter the demands of war cleared the way for extreme 
Leftists to enter the Spanish government, these in­
dividuals were disposed toward friendship with both the
67Soviet Union and Mexico. Because of the friendship 
of the leftists in Spain, Mexico could be accused by 
those so disposed of aligning the Mexican government 
with the communists.
Although Mexico was friendly toward the Spanish 
Republican government from the beginning of the civil 
war, the Soviet Union at first seemed to favor the 
British and French policy of non-intervention. In July 
1936 the U.S. chargd in Moscow had been assured that no
*^E1 Nacional, Nov. 8, 1937, pp. 1, 5. 
67FRUS, 1936, Vol. II, pp. 556-57.
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Soviet equipment had been sent to Spain. Both Italy 
and Germany charged Interference by the Soviet Union 
as their reason for giving aid to the rebels. The 
Soviets then prepared the way for possible future aid 
to Spain. Sounding much like the Cdrdenas government, 
the Soviet Union claimed there was no reason why one 
government could not furnish aid to another to put 
down a rebellion.®8
When Germany, Italy and Portugal refused to adhere 
to a policy of non-intervention, the Soviet Union ex­
pressed the feeling that she would probably have to de­
nounce the non-intervention pact, although at the same 
time the Soviets announced that this act would not nec­
essarily mean they would supply the Spanish Loyal­
ists.®^ In effect, it meant juBt that, and soon there
were reports that foodstuffs and supplies including
70Soviet planes and tanks had been sent to Spain.' Thus 
the Soviet Union, along with Mexico, became the major 
supplier of munitions to the Republicans.
In writing about the Mexican part in the Spanish 
civil war, Soviet writers have pointed out that of all 
the "bourgeois" countries, only Mexico fought against
68Ibid., pp. 452-53. 
®9Ibid., pp. 539-40. 
70Ibid., p. 544.
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the fascist aggression. Cardenas was praised for turn­
ing away from the ineffective policy on non-intervention*
and for helping Spain with all the means at his dis-
71  posal.'
The significance of the Spanish civil war is that 
when Mexico allowed Spanish emigres to make a permanent 
home in Mexico* many of those who came were communists* 
and although they were supposed to refrain from any type 
of political activity, this rule was not always follow­
ed. Nevertheless* Influence on the CdrdenaB government 
seems to have been nominal. Aside from perhaps sug­
gesting to the Mexican government the possibility of 
renewing diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R.* the 
unofficial alliance of the two countries had little ef­
fect on Internal politics.
The attitude of the Cdrdenas government toward the 
Soviet Union's relations with three other countries—  
Germany* Poland and Finland— is perhaps more illustra­
tive of the true relationship between the two count­
ries. When Germany and the Soviet Union signed the non­
aggression pact* there was an immediate outcry in the 
Mexican press claiming treason on the part of the Soviet 
Union. Perhaps because of the outcry in the press* some
71' A.A. Akhtamzian, Istoriia Mezhdunarodnykh Otno- 
shenil i Vneshnei Politikl SSSh. tom I. 1^17-19^9 
(Moskva: Izclaiel*stvo "Mezh&unarodnye Otnosheniia,"
1967), p. 362.
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Mexican congressmen decided it vras time to propose a 
law to dissolve all groups holding to "exotic" doctrines, 
such as the communists, fascists and nazis. Some of the 
congressmen argued that the CPM was directed by the 
Soviet Union, while more moderate deputies pointed out 
that workers already were taking matters in their own 
hands and eliminating communists from their ranks. Be­
cause of the division of opinion, the Chamber of Depu­
ties could not decide whether such groups should be dis- 
72solved or not. It is noteworth that Cdrdenas did not 
take part in any of these discussions over whether to 
break up local groups. His doctrine had been formulat­
ed to make sure that all foreigners adhered strictly to 
the laws of the nation. Native elements were never much 
of a question for him, as he seemed to ignore the pos­
sibility of danger from Mexicans. For this reason, more 
than because of his sympathy with the communist cause, 
he allowed such groups as the CPM almost total liberty.
When Germany turned on the Soviet Union, an of­
ficial of the Ministry of Foreign Relations in Mexico 
reminded the Mexican press that although the aggression 
was a violation of international law, they nevertheless
7 xshould not be confused by the various Ideologies,'r
^Excelsior. Sept. 30, 1939. P. 1; Oct. 4, 1939. 
p. 1; O c T T m m  p. 1.
*^MSRE, septiembre 1940-agosto 1941, p. 153.
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implying that they should remember the ideology of the 
Soviet Union before rushing to its defense.
There was little confusion over right or wrong for 
most Mexican officials when the Soviets marched into Po­
land in September 1939 with the announced attention of 
protecting minority groups of Ukrainians and White Rus­
sians numbering eleven million.7̂  There were those in 
Mexico, however, who bought this line, and tried to jus­
tify completely the Soviet action. Hern&n Laborde ad­
vanced this line in a speech just a few days after the 
invasion of Poland by saying that it would not have been
fair for the Soviet Union to have abandoned the minority 
75groups.
The Mexican Ministry of Foreign Relations felt dif­
ferently, and in answer to the press regarding how the 
government would react to the Polish situation stated
that in no case could the Mexican government recognize
76a conquest by force.
At this time, the Soviet Union was still a member 
of the League of Nations, and the possibility existed 
that something could be worked out through the frame­
work of the League. The U.S.S.R. had not been included
^ Excelsior. Sept. 18, 1939, Sect. II, p. 5.
75Ibid., Sept. 20, 1939, p. 1.
76Ibid., Oct. 3, 1939, p. 1.
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in the early daya of the League and had denounced its 
activities as being a front for the ambitions of strong 
military nations to oppress weak nationalities. The 
Soviet Union had announced that it could not become a 
part of a body whose doctrines sanctioned the exploita­
tion of weaker nations.77
This attitude prevailed until 1934 when Mexico, 
along with twenty-nine other nations, sent a telegram 
to the Soviet Foreign Secretary inviting the Soviet 
Union to join the League.78 In spite of their earlier 
protests of the oppressive doctrines of the League, the 
Soviets accepted and continued in the body until the in­
vasion of Poland was followed shortly by an attack on 
Finland.
After this attack, public opinion in Mexico seem­
ed to be unanimous against the Soviet Union. Naturally 
there were some who insisted on the correctness of the 
action, and anyone familiar with communist party purges 
of those years might have predicted that there might be 
changes in the ranks of the local CPM of those who fail­
ed to support the Soviet policy. Within a very short 
time the CPM did decide to change itself into a true 
Popular Front and in so doing to determine those who
77PVP. Vol. VIII, p. 688.
78MSRE. 1934/35-1935/36, Vol. I, p. 18.
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needed to be eliminated from the ranks, such as those 
who failed to support the action In Finland.
Soon there were were reports of a division within 
the ranks because of both Internal politics and the at­
titude of some members toward the Soviet Union. In 
Harch 1940, the Secretary General of the Comnunist 
International sent a cable to the Extraordinary Session 
of the CPM, and spoke of the need of expelling hostile 
elements within the CPM.*^
Indicating the power of the Comintern, the CPM 
decided to expel Herndn Laborde and Valentin S. Campa, 
former president and secretary, from the party. They 
were accused of maintaining a policy contrary to the
interests of the party which were neutralising the
80revolutionary activity of the CPM. Thus* on the 
question of Finland two of the major leaders of the 
CPM temporarily were dismissed from the ranks.
Non-communist elements meanwhile were extremely 
outspoken in their attacks on the Soviet aggression, 
and these included not only the newspapers, but the 
president himself. Excelsior stated that no reason 
oould be found, political, military or economic, for
*̂ Novedades. March 24* 1940, p. 1.
80B1 Popular. March 24* 1940, p. 1. Both men lat­
er were to be reinstated in the party, and Laborde once 
again gained the top position.
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81the Soviet action* CArdenas sent a message of sympathy 
to the Pinnish people and left no doubt which side he 
was taking when he said that all civilized nations must 
of necessity identify with Finland.82 In spite of this 
verbal reprimand, Mexico was not prepared to meet a 
Norwegian request for extreme sanctions against the Sov­
iet Union, as along with Chile and Peru Mexico refused 
to go along with the proposal. Mexico did say that it 
would support a proposal for a ceasefire and arbitration 
of the U.S.S.R.-Finland question.8^
In addition, Mexico also seemed ready to support, 
along with other American nations, the idea of Ecuador 
and Panama to draft a joint Pan American declaration 
against the Soviet Invasion of Finland.8*
But by this time, the League of Nations was ready 
to take more aggressive action. Argentina, backed by 
other Latin nations but not by Mexico, demanded that the 
Soviet Union be expelled from the body. The League at­
tempted to get the Soviet Union to agree to allow it 
to mediate the conflict, but the offer was rejected, 
leaving the delegates with what they felt was little
81Excelsior. editorial, Dec. 7, 1939, p. 5.
82Ibid., Dec. 8, 1939, p. 5.
8 Ê1 Nacional. Dec. 11, 1939, p. 1.
8*FRUS. 1939, Vol. V, p. 132. Chile refused to 
make the resolution unanimous, and thus the idea was 
dropped.
85choice. Mexico might have frowned on the Soviet ac­
tion, but she also opposed League action which might 
shut off all chances for settlement.
Because Mexico wanted to see the conflict judi­
ciously settled through the League of Nations, the 
Mexican delegate alluded to the high calibre of Finland 
but then added that his government could not concur in 
expelling the Soviet Union. Fart of his argument was 
purely technical, saying that the League never before 
had considered expulsion in earlier cases. He conclud­
ed by pointing out that Mexico felt that expulsion of 
the Soviet Union actually would be harmful to Finland, 
since with that act all possibility would be eliminated 
of finding a solution that would be favorable to the 
smaller country.®**
The council which met to discuss the situation 
nevertheless felt that the aggression demanded strong 
action, and concluded that the Soviet Union had ex­
cluded itself from the League.®*̂  Once this action had 
been taken, Mexico went along with the rest of the Lea­
gue in its condemnation. The Soviet press did mention 
that Mexico, whose policy was independent from the
®^Excelsior. Dec. 5. 1939, Sect. II, p. 5;
Dec. 13,' 1939,""Sect. II, p. 5.
®6MSRE, 1939-40, pp. 239-40.
87___ ___
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United States, had voted against the expulsion.8** Of 
course, the United States was not a member of the lea­
gue, and thus, whatever position Mexico had taken 
would have been independent in that sense.
The first and most important outcome of Mexico's 
stand was that many of the avowed communists in Mexico 
began arguing among themselves. The party never was 
very strong anyway, even under the liberal policy of 
CArdenas. With the split in the ranks because of the 
Trotsky affair, and the purges to which the party sub­
mitted itself over questions in Europe, such as Finland, 
the CPM practically committed suicide.
A second factor in the Soviet invasion of Finland 
is that it very likely ended whatever chance there had 
been for a renewal of relations under CArdenas. Even 
before he had taken office there had been rumors that 
there might be a renewal, and these rumors persisted 
throughout the regime. But just as CArdenas could not 
back down from his own doctrine in the case of the 
foreign oil companies, so would it have been a politi­
cal mistake of the highest degree to agree to a resump­
tion of relations with popular feeling running so high 
against the Soviet Union after the events in Europe.
88Pravda, December 17* 1939, p. 1.
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The Question of Renewal of Relations
In an administration filled with history-making 
decisions, one of the questions which Cdrdenas eluded 
was that of the renewal of relations with the Soviet 
Union. Hardly had he taken office when the requests 
started coming in asking that he consider this ques­
tion. In the early months it seemed that most of the 
requests of this nature were based on the possible 
economic benefit to Mexico once diplomatic ties had . 
been re-established. The point was made that Mexican 
goods at that time had to be sent to the United States 
and then sold to the Commercial Agency of the U.S.S.R., 
and that the re-establishment of relations would elimi-
QQnate this measure which was costly to Mexico. The 
argument was valid in that Mexican goods transported 
to the United States were subject to import duties, 
making the cost higher. But since the Society of 
Priends of the U.S.S.R. was the organization most ada­
mant in these demands, no matter what the outward rea­
son for the request, there was more than a little 
political reasong also.
One other argument used was that the United States 
had agreed in November 1933 to the renewal of relations
8^See such requests in Paquete 686, Exp. 577.2/1, 
Documents 16178 and 13096, AGN.
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with the Soviet Union,and if a country such as the 
United States could take that step, there was all the 
more reason for Mexico to do the same. When the press 
in the United States began publishing articles unfavor­
able to the Soviet Union, the Society of Friends in 
Mexico emphasised to CArdenas the danger that the United 
States might break relations with the U.S.S.R., and then
the only link Mexico had would be cut off, thus costing
91Mexico precious commercial sales.
When CArdenas failed to respond to these pleas 
for renewal on economic grounds, the Workers Federation 
of Tamaulipas sent him a letter requesting that he renew 
relations because the Soviet Union had never done any­
thing to offend Mexico and it was the only country cap-
92able of preventing another war.7 These arguments CAr- 
denas obviously saw as erroneous. He knew that the 
Soviet Union had offended Mexico with anti-Mexican de­
monstrations which led to the break in relations in 
January 1930. And just as obviously he recognized that 
Mexico's relationship with the Soviet Union would have 
nothing to do with that country's alleged ability to
^°FRUS. Soviet Union. 1933-39, p. 27.
^Society of Friends of the U.S.S.R., letter, to 
President CArdenas, February 1, 1935, Paquete 686, Exp. 
577.2/1, Doc. 17540, AGN.
^Workers Federation of Tamaulipas, letter, to 
President CArdenas, May 4, 1935, Paquete 686, Exp. 577.2/ 
1, Doc. 36851, ibid.
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prevent another war.
One of the most logical arguments for reestablish­
ment of relations came from the Syndicate of Railroad 
Workers. This organisation emphasized that Mexico 
maintained relations with most countries of the world 
without regard to ideology, and that the U.S.S.R. should 
not be excluded.^ Had CArdenas adhered strictly to the 
Estrada Doctrine, his government might have listened to 
such arguments.
But CArdenas seemed to fear that Mexico would 
be dealing from a position of inferiority, and that the 
previous insult had been too great. In a meeting with 
a group of radical labor leaders in early 1935 he had 
indicated that the Soviet demand for an apology from 
the Mexicans for the brusque manner in which Soviet of­
ficials had been asked to leave the country was com-
QCpletely unacceptable to his government.  ̂ Had he 
agreed to this demand, it would have been contrary to 
his principles. It would, to his mind, have constitut­
ed a form of intervention in the internal affairs of 
Mexico, and for CArdenas this was unacceptable.
^Syndicate of Railroad Workers, letter, to Presi­
dent CArdenas, April 23, 1937, Paquete 686, Exp. 577.2/1, 
Doc. 18398, ibid.
^Personal interview. Author with Jesus Silva 
Herzog, L.S.U. Archives.
^Pravda, April 3, 1935, p. 1.
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The question did arise, however, from time to time 
during the C&rdenas years. In a secret session of the 
Mexican Senate in September 1936, the possibility of a 
renewal was discussed. After lengthy debates the Sen­
ate simply stated that the area of foreign relations 
was strictly the province of the executive office, and
therefore Cdrdenas would have to be the one to decide
96the issue. That C&rdenas chose not to press the mat­
ter should be considered in analysing the relationship 
of communist elements in Mexico with the C&rdenas 
government•
Por the C&rdenas years, the attitude never really 
changed. About the only real gains made by communists 
were in the field of labor, where Lombardo Toledano un­
doubtedly was the strongest leader. Soviet historians 
have stated that by the beginning of 1936 the CPM had
07reached an agreement with Lombardo Toledano's CTM.
By 1939, Lombardo Toledano had been elected president 
of the Confederation of Latin American Workers, whose 
open connections with the left confirmed to many Lom­
bardo Toledano*s ties with the Soviet Union. At the 
same time it should not be forgotten that C&rdenas 
showed favoritism to labor, no matter the political
^ Excelsior, September 25, 1936, p. 1.
97^'Akhtamzian, Istoriia. p. 365.
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inclinations of the leaders. In this respect, his
policies have been compared to those of Franklin Roose-
98▼elt's New Deal, and Cdrdenas never forgot the com­
mon man of Mexico. His sense of dignity of the indi­
vidual Mexican colored both internal and foreign poli­
cies of his administration.
It was this sense of dignity for the Mexican that 
kept Cdrdenas from renewing relations with the Soviet 
Union. No doubt his ideology was not so far removed 
from that of the Soviet Union that he could not have 
reconciled his administration to having diplomatic 
ties. But in spite of the freedom of the CPM, and the 
number pf requests that came in asking for a resumption 
of relations, C&rdenas probably recognized the damage 
it could do to Mexico. This he could not reconcile.
^Victor Alba, Historia del movjLmlento obrcro 
en America latina (Mexico: iiibreros Mexicanos uni&os,
1964), p. T77“
CHAPTER V
MEXICAN RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES: Oil
When President CArdenas took office in December 
1934, the typical Inage of the Mexican for many North 
Anericans was that of the sleeping Indian with his som­
brero pulled over his face. March 18f 1938 began chang­
ing that image and the events of that day caused the 
United States to begin looking at Mexico differently.
For it was on that day that lAzaro CArdenas start­
ed Mexico on the road to economic independence by an­
nouncing the expropriations of the giant foreign-owned 
oil industries which had in effect controlled the eco­
nomy of Mexico almost since the turn of the century. 
Porfirio Diaz, in an effort to attract foreign capi­
tal and keep the favor of the United States, had grant­
ed concessions which in retrospect had been to the 
detriment of the Mexican people, in spite of the ob­
vious benefit of opening up the country's vast petro­
leum resources.
Because of the treatment received throughout the 
early years of exploitation of the oil fields, the oil
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companies felt that they were outside the laws of the 
country. In applying the Cardenas Doctrine and Mexi­
can law to the companies, CArdenas surprised not only 
the owners of the companies, hat the entire world.
In making the announcement of the expropriations,
Cardenas told his surprised listeners in part that:
. . .  the oil companies have adopted a posi­
tion which obliges the Executive of the Union 
to seek among the recourses of our legisla­
tion an efficacious means of definitely pre­
venting . . . the attempted annulment of 
judicial decisions at the simple will of 
one or both of the parties to a dispute by 
means of a declaration of insolvency, as is 
being attempted in the present case.
Background to the Crisis
After Mexico had gained her independence, she had 
claimed that the subsoil rights which previously had be­
longed to the Spanish Crown were then invested in the 
new government. But in 1884, a new mining code was 
drawn up, and this code allowed the surface owners to 
claim all subsoil rights. The Mining Law of 1892 gave 
additional weight to the 1884 code giving the surface
owners full rights to exploit subsoil wealth without any
2need of special concessions.
Government of Mexico. Mexico's Oil: A Compila­
tion of Official Documents in the Conflict of ^conomlc 
Order in the Petroleum Industry, with an Introduction"" 
summarizing its Causes and Consequences (Mexico: Govern­
ment of Mexico, 1940;, pp. 877-^3.
2Ibid., pp. xxvii-xxviii.
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This situation prevailed throughout the time of 
Porfirio Diaz, and reached its peak with the Petroleum 
Law of 1901. The exemptions of 1901 were factors ac­
counting in large measure for the rapid development of 
the oil industry. Among them were 1) exportation, duty 
free, of the natural, refined or finished products re­
sulting from their exploitation; 2) importation, duty 
free, of the initial lot of requisite materials and 
machinery for any new well, pipeline, or refinery;
3) exemption of invested capital and capital goods of 
exploitation for two years from all federal duties ex­
cepting the 8tamp tax; and 4) continued enjoyment of the 
provisions of Article 4 of the Mining Law relative to 
free exploitation without the need of special conces- 
slons.
Through these laws, the oil companies managed to 
exploit the wealth of Mexico and remove large profits. 
U.S. Ambassador Josephus Daniels even admitted that the 
foreign oil companies had managed to gain control of 
Mexico's most valuable riches without having to pay any­
thing like the true value, while at the same time keep­
ing wages and living standards of the Mexican oil workers
Aextremely low.
^Ashby, Organized Labor, p. 184.
^Daniels, Shirt-sleeve Diplomat, p. 212.
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The laws were changed with Mexico’s 1917 constitu­
tion, however, when Article 27 reaffirmed the 1857 con­
stitution and gave back to the nation ownership of all
esubsoil wealth. Although the article was very clear, 
the governments in Mexico were either too weak, or un­
willing, to enforce the law. Because of the backward­
ness of the country, and the lack of capital to invest 
in such large-scale endeavors, the various governments 
felt the exemptions and privileges given to the oil com­
panies were justified in that riches which otherwise 
would have been unexploited were extracted by the for­
eigners. Diaz and others failed to have sufficient 
foresight to realize that the wealth could have remain­
ed in the country indefinitely until such time as Mexi­
co did have the resources and technology to exploit and 
receive the benefits of her own riches. Had they not 
been so anxious to receive even the small portion of 
what the oil companies extracted, Mexico would have re­
ceived in the long run far greater benefit with much 
less friction.
Because of this lack of foresight, troubles did 
start with the foreign companies which claimed that they 
had exploited their holdings prior to the drafting of 
the new constitution, and therefore believed they should 
not be affected by it.
T̂efla Ramirez, Leyes fundamentals, p. 826.
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The complaints of the oil companies reached the 
U.S. State Department, and resulted In a decision as 
part of the Bucareli Conference in 1923, wherein the 
oil companies were assured that Mexico would not con­
sider the 1917 constitution as being retroactive, and 
as long as they had performed some "positive act" in­
dicating their intention to exercise their former
crights, those rights would not be abrogated.
Then on December 26, 1925» President Calles pro­
mulgated the Regulatory Law of Article 27 of the con­
stitution dealing with petroleum. Article 14 of the Law 
did recognize certain rights for the oil companies but 
limited those rights to fifty years, and demanded that 
the companies apply for their concessions within a per- 
iod of one year.' Inherent in the law was what was to 
become known as the Cdrdenas Doctrine, since the law 
stipulated that all foreigners should be treated equal­
ly with nationals rather than having access to their own 
governments for any grievances. Had the rules been en­
forced by Calles, it might have become known as the Cal­
les Doctrine, but just as his predecessors had done,
^Antonio Gdmez Robledo, The Bucareli Agreements 
and International Law, trans. by br. Salomon <Sie la Selva 
(Mexico: National University of Mexico, 1940), p. 83.
7Government of Mexico, The True Pacts about the 
Expropriation of the Oil Companies1 Properties In Mexico 
(Mexico: Government of Mexico, 1^46), p. 5$.
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Calles failed to tighten the reigns on the foreign- 
controlled companies.
The companies almost immediately showed their dis­
dain for Mexican authority, and the Mexican Petroleum 
Company instituted amparo proceedings in the Mexican 
courts to have the fifty year limitation lifted. The 
action was successful, as on November 17, 1927, the
Federal Supreme Court upheld the company's contention
8that the rights could not be limited to fifty years.
Just a few months after this decision, the United States 
State Department issued a formal statement agreeing that 
any questions that should arise concerning the oil
qproblem would have to be settled in the Mexican courts. 
There is no substantial proof that Cardenas later took 
this as a basis for enforcing his doctrine, but he must 
have been aware of this precedent.
Although the State Department agreed to abide by 
the decisions of the Mexican courts, the companies still 
rebelled against bettering the position of the workers. 
Between 1917 and 1920 their opposition had reached a 
point wherp the companies formed their own armies to 
make sure of the exportation of their oil. Then between 




deny to the government Its portion of the Income from 
the oil exploitation.
Then on December 1, 1934, Idzaro C&rdenas became 
president of Mexico, and announced a six-year plan which 
Included the nationalization of Industries controlled 
by foreign capital.^1 He also announced that his gov­
ernment would seek stronger legislation regarding petro­
leum exploitation since the Petroleum Law of 1925 had
proved to be insufficient and probably even unconstitu-
12tional. Although undoubtedly the companies believed 
Cdrdenas was bluffing, there was some concern among the 
foreign Interests in Mexico.
Previous presidents had threatened to try to con­
trol the enormous oil industry, but their words had 
been empty threats. Nevertheless, the companies im­
mediately saw the possible danger and conferred with 
Ambassador Daniels, claiming that the Morrow-Calles ar­
rangement likely would be disregarded. Before the years 
of Cdrdenas, the Mexican Supreme Court in five different 
decisions had declared that land held prior to Kay 1, 
1917 also carried with it subsoil rights. These de­
cisions had been reconfirmed by the Warren-Payne talks
10E1 Nacional. editorial, March 18, 1940, p. 5.
1],The New Republic, editorial, Dec. 8, 1937, p.
114.
12E1 Universal. Sept. 2, 1935, p. 4.
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of 1923, and the United States had Insisted that Mexico 
recognize this principle before official recognition was 
given to the 0breg6n regimb. The Supreme Court again 
had recognized the validity in 1926, and this decision 
served as the basis of the Morrow-Calles agreement of 
1927.13
After conferring with representatives of the oil 
companies, Daniels set the tone for the U.S. attitude 
by completely accepting the cArdenas Doctrine and ad­
vising the State Department that it had no more right to 
interfere in Mexican court decisions than any Mexican 
would have to try to interfere with U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions.
The State Department made no effort on the part of 
the companies, and in 1935 CArdenas made attempts at 
settlement. But in July 1936* representatives of the 
18,000 members of the Union of Petroleum Workers met 
in Mexico City and proposed a collective labor contract. 
The companies rejected the proposal of the workers and 
a strike was set for November 1936. CArdenas succeed­
ed in getting the workers to stay on the job while
■^T.R. Armstrong, on behalf of the oil companies, 
to U.S. Secretary of State, September 21, 1938, Doc. 
812.6363/4783, RG 59.
■^Daniels, Shirt-sleeve Diplomat, p. 221.
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further attempts were made to work out a settlement.^
When no agreement was reached with the companies, 
the oil workers began demanding even more than previous­
ly. The Syndicate of Petroleum Workers sent a request 
to C&rdenas asking not for higher wages and more bene­
fits, but for expropriation.^^ Although this was not 
the first time the word had been used in relation to the 
oil companies, coming at this time it must have bother­
ed the foreign owners. They still were not afraid that 
this action would be taken, but Cdrdenas had announced 
his six-year plan in terms less than comforting to the 
companies.
Although they might have been worried about the
future, the petroleum companies indicated they still
felt they held the upper hand as they indicated they
would refuse to abide by the decision of the Labor
Board if it accepted the terms the government experts 
17had indicated. The companies had been able to get 
away with this attitude in the past, and there seemed 
no reason that they could not wait out the Mexican gov­
ernment this time also. When in 1933 the Supreme Court
^Townsend, L&zaro Cardenas, p. 248.
■^Syndicate of Petroleum Workers, letter, to Presi­
dent Cdrdenas, August 20, 1937, Paquete 421, Exp.
527.1/8, Doc. 51332, AGN.
•^El Universal. Aug. 21, 1937, Sect. II, p. 3.
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rejected their appeal and upheld the Labor Board's de­
cisions, the companies had little choice. They either 
could abide by the decision until they had shown there 
had been a denial of justice, or they could refuse to 
obey the court and see how the government would react. 
The latter was their chosen course of action.
The companies might have felt they had some legal 
foundation for their refusal to obey, since earlier even 
the Mexican Bar Association objected officially to the 
Law of Expropriation which had been promulgated on
November 25, 1936. The Association objected because it
18felt the act was unconstitutional, but the Mexican
IQcourt on October 23, 1936 declared it was legal.
On January 1, 1938, Cdrdenas spoke to the nation
and talked about the law. He stated that it could not
be used except for expropriations deemed indispensable
for public utility, and emphasized that the law was
not confiscatory since it provided the obligation to
20pay for any expropriated property. After the expro­
priations actually took place, Mexico insisted that 
recognition of the obligation to pay for the properties 
made the act completely legal.
18E1 Nacional, Oct. 13, 1936, Sect. II, p. 1
19Ibid., Oct. 24, 1936, p. 1
20Cdrdenas, Ideario politico, p. 42.
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While Cdrdenas was defending the Expropriation 
Law, the companies were doing everything they could to 
avoid having the Mexican government use that law. As 
time began running out for compliance with the arbitral 
award to the workers, the oil companies sent a written 
message to the Federal Board of Conciliation and Arbi­
tration again stating they could not economically meet 
the figure set. The companies stated that to comply 
would mean their economic ruin. The oil workers' union,
on hearing of the refusal, petitioned the Board to con-
21demn the companies for disobediance. Still the com-
22panies refused to comply, and the CTM and the Syn­
dicate of Petroleum Workers requested that the Board
23terminate their contracts with the companies. '
By failing to comply with the Labor Board's de­
cision, the companies left Cdrdenas little alternative. 
When he announced the expropriations on March 18, Am­
bassador Daniels was surprised, but admitted that Cdr­
denas was acting in accordance with clearly-understood 
Mexican law.2  ̂ Although the ambassador saw the situa­
tion thusly, there were many others who would express
21E1 Universal. March 16, 1938, Sect. II, p. 3.
22B1 Nacional. March 16, 1938, pp. 1, 6.
25Ibid., March 17, 1938, p. 1.
2^E1 Universal, March 17, 1938, Sect. II, p. 2.
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the feeling that not only had Mexico committed an il­
legal act, but had over-reacted and now would suffer 
economically and politically.
There were even some who believed that the Mexican 
government had contrived the entire plan so it would ap­
pear that Cdrdenas had been forced into the act. Ac­
cording to Ambassador Daniels, he was informed by an 
American bank official that the reason for the timing 
of the expropriations was the lack of money left in 
the Bank of Mexico. Supposedly, the bank only had five 
million dollars more to support the peso, and had warn­
ed Cdrdenas of this on March 14th. Had the peso been 
devalued, then the oil companies would have been able 
easily to meet the financial demands made of them, and
the principal cause for expropriation would have been 
25postponed.
This argument is weak from two standpoints. First 
of all, the companies had access to the same information 
as did the ambassador, and should have known that the 
Bank of Mexico could not support the peso for a long 
period of time. Under these circumstances, their fi­
nancial advisers would have been able to tell the com­
panies that with an impending devaluation they would be
^Josephus Daniels, memorandum, to U.S. Secre­
tary of State, September 20, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/4819,
RG 59.
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able to meet any demands made previously, and therefore, 
it would not be worth the risk of expropriation to re­
fuse to comply with the labor Board's decisions.
A second factor to consider is that the Mexican 
government obviously was not surprised by the bank's 
announcement that the reserve funds were low. The gov­
ernment had to have been aware for some time of the 
dwindling funds. Since it would have made more sense 
to expropriate the properties when the government still 
had considerable funds with which to ride out the in­
evitable time of trouble which would come with the ex­
propriation, the government could have taken the prop­
erties sooner. The Expropriation Law was already 
recognized as constitutional, and the companies had 
given Cdrdenas ample opportunity to expropriate their 
properties with justification. That Cdrdenas attempted 
to work out settlements seems to indicate that the gov­
ernment knew it was not ready to take over the foreign- 
owned oil industry.
Regardless of what prompted the decision to ex­
propriate the properties, one of the first issues dis­
cussed was simply the matter of expropriation versus 
confiscation. Those who were anti-Mexican on this mat­
ter held that even if the country had the right to ex­
propriate the property, this was not what Mexico had 
done. Their main point was that Mexico was unable to
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pay, and therefore the expropriations actually were con­
fiscations.
There was some cause to doubt that the government 
would pay,.as Mexico had failed to satisfy U.S. claims 
over previous expropriations of agrarian lands. When 
Daniels had asked that the Mexican government fix im­
mediate payment for the expropriated properties, warn­
ing that President Roosevelt could not otherwise def­
end Mexico before the attacks of some senators, Cdr­
denas answered that Mexico would pay its debts chrono­
logically, and could not give preference to American
26property-holders.
Regarding the oil expropriations, the U.S. Secre­
tary of State issued a press release on March 30, 1938, 
in which he gave an initial U.S. government policy 
statement. He indicated that the United Staes could 
not question the right of a sovereign power such as 
Mexico to expropriate property, but that it was the 
U.S. position that those properties expropriated must
be paid for in an amount accurately reflecting their 
27true value.
Within a few days of this press release, the oil 
companies were in contact with the State Department,
Cdrdenas, Obras, Tomo I, p. 376.
27FRUS, 1938, Vol. V, p. 662.
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and In a letter to the Secretary of State, Indicated 
the points of protest they felt he should present to 
the Mexican government. First, they believed that he 
must clarify what he said on March 30th, pointing out 
that he had not recognized that any valid expropriation 
had taken place. Secondly, the companies felt he should 
insist that compensation be paid immediately and in 
cash as per the agreement in the Warren-Payne negotia­
tions in 1923. Furthermore, they informed the Secre­
tary that property not actually mentioned in the decree 
had been taken, and that this was clearly a violation. 
Finally, perhaps taking a cue from the British, the 
companies felt that since, in their own minds, there 
had been no valid expropriation, then the United States 
would have to protest against the sale to other govern-
p pments as there would be no valid title.
Perhaps this letter, to their own Secretary of 
State, is indicative of the frustration often felt by 
Cdrdenas. In this case, the companies had the audacity 
to try to tell the U.S. Secretary of State just how to 
handle his job, even to the point of indicating that 
perhaps he had not been clear in what the companies felt 
he should have said in his announcement of March 30th.
p p Oil companies, letter, to U.S. Secretary of State, 
April 8, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/3386, RG 59.
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Mexican officials had given assurance that the companies 
would receive compensation for their properties, but it 
is obvious from the letter that either they did not be­
lieve Cdrdenas, or that they didn't want the State De­
partment to believe him.
Mexico offered to set aside 20% of the amount re­
ceived from sales abroad to pay the oil companies, but 
it was pointed out that this amount would total only 
about $3,680,000 a year, while interest at 4% on the 
original value of the properties as set by the companies 
at $200*000,000 alone would be $8,000,000 a year.^ 
Finally, the Secretary of the Treasury and Public Credit, 
Bduardo Sudrez, the Secretary of the Rational Economy, 
Efran Buenrostro, and a commission appointed by Cdrde­
nas reached the conclusion that the emission of bondB
of national redemption was the best way to pay off the
30national debt.
The matter of payment in cash apparently became 
the major issue, although the question arises as to 
whether the oil companies realized the validity of the 
Mexican government's action, but alBO knew of its in­
ability to pay cash immediately and used this excuse
^Division of the American Republics, U.S. State 
Department, note, April 9, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/3388, 
ibid.
^°E1 Nacional. March 25, 1938, p. 1.
146
rather than try to force the issue over the expropria­
tion itself. Undoubtedly, they were hoping that the 
State Department would back them up in insisting on 
immediate cash payment, and when Mexico could not com­
ply with the demand, then the properties would have to 
be returned.
For a time there were rumors that the government 
would return the properties to their former owners, but 
Cdrdenas insisted that such rumors were absurd since 
the problem was merely one of a national character.
He insisted that a manner of payment would be worked 
out as soon as the inventory of the properties was com­
plete.^1
This question of how much the properties were 
worth plagued attempts at settlement throughout the rest 
of the Cdrdenas administration. Two Mexican sources 
placed the value on the expropriated properties im­
mediately after the decree as being being between 100 
million and 200 million pesos,^ while the companies 
originally had expressed a figure around $200 million 
dollars. While the Mexican government was considering
^Josephus Daniels, telegram, to U.S. Secretary 
of State, July 6, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/4334, RG 59.
^Division of the American Republics, U.S. State 
Department, memorandum, April 6, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/. 
3441, ibid.
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only the basic value of the above-surface properties, 
the companies were Jbasing their evaluation on not only 
their existing properties, but future profits they might 
have extracted from their wells.
A short time after the expropriation, the companies 
agreed with the Mexican government to participate in an 
inventory of goods in order to determine some kind of 
valuation. The companies made the agreement on the con­
dition that representatives of the labor syndicates not 
be allowed to participate since their presence would 
have created controversy. The companies then claimed 
that the Mexican government reneged on the agreement and 
came up with a different plan, including the labor syn­
dicate, and the conpanies refused to participate on 
these terms.^ Cdrdenas instructed his Minister of 
National Economy and the Minister of Finance to con­
tinue with the process of evaluation without the com­
panies. The two ministers were told to proceed im­
mediately, but to follow strictly the terms of the
54Mexican Constitution and the Expropriation Law.
In light of all attempts by the companies to have
^T.R. Armstrong, letter on behalf of the oil com­
panies, to R.A. Gibson, U.S. State Department, July 28, 
1938, Doc. 812.6363/4595, ibid.
^Josephus Daniels, dispatch, to U.S. Department 
of State, July 22, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/4459, ibid.
148
the properties returned, it might be logical to assume 
that they had no de.Qire to participate in an inventory.
i «
To have done so would have implied the concession on 
their part of the acceptance of the act of expropriation. 
Had they gone through with the inventory along with the 
Mexican government, they probably would have been forced 
into an early agreement.
On September 1, 1938, Cdrdenas addressed his con­
gress and stated that the early oil concessions in effect 
had been granted to the companies only so that they 
could recover the amount of their original investments.
He claimed that the attitude of the companies had in­
validated these concessions, and that the amount of
money owed by Mexico was only equal to the amount which
35the companies had not yet recovered. In a document 
signed by Cdrdenas, the Mexican government made it 
plain that it felt the concessions given to the oil com­
panies only allowed for the right of extraction, but 
did not confer titles of property over the wells. This 
interpretation meant that only when the oil had been ex­
tracted did it become the property of those who had the 
concessions.^
*^T.R. Armstrong, letter on behalf of the oil com­
panies, to U.S. Secretary of State, Sept. 21, 1938, Doc. 
812.6363/4783, ibid.
•'Josephus Daniels, dispatch, to U.S. Secretary 
of State, Oct. 26, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/4998, ibid.
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In effect, what the various interpretations meant 
was that neither side could agree on the value of the 
property, and an inventory would have been meaningless 
as far as an immediate settlement was concerned. Mexi­
co obviously wanted to settle on the best terms possible 
since the treasury was depleted, and the companies want­
ed no settlement at all. They wanted the return of 
their properties, and nothing else.
The intransigency of the companies had been shown 
as early as June 1938 when they indicated that they 
would agree to only two possible alternatives: the
return of the properties, or the immediate payment in 
cash.^ Cdrdenas was not disposed to return the prop­
erties, and it was obvious that the Mexican government 
could not pay immediate cash, so a temporary stalemate 
resulted.
In spite of an inability of both sides to come to 
an agreement on the value of the property, the compan­
ies continued to demand immediate compensation. For 
the most part, the U.S. government seemed ready to ac­
cept the idea of expropriation, but it also demanded 
immediate payment. The Mexican government claimed that 
there was no universally accepted rule which called for
37American Consulate in Monterrey, dispatch, to 
U.S. Secretary of State, June 3, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/ 
4108, ibid.
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immediate compensation;38 Secretary Hull expressed his
opinion that no other nation in the western hemisphere
•xahad ever advanced such a theory.
The Mexican government's contention was that it 
had every intention to pay, and that this intention made 
everything completely legal. But even if Cdrdenas was 
to be believed, there was some cause to have little 
faith in Mexican ability to pay. It was true that in 
1935 Mexico ranked seventh in world petroleum produc­
tion behind the United States, the U.S.S.R., Venezuela, 
Rumania, Persia and the Dutch East Indies.^® But what 
worried many knowledgeable oil experts was that Mexico 
would not be able to sustain the same levels.
Most of these fears were based on the lack of 
technicians capable of taking over the big oil indus­
try, and therefore it was believed that completely aside 
from the matter of payment, Mexico would have difficulty 
in operating the industry efficiently. If one analyses 
the problem objectively, it can be seen that even this 
was the fault of the foreign oil companies since they 
had failed to train Mexican technicians to do the job.
Not oniy did Mexico lack t.;e technicians to handle
58PRUS, 1938, Vol. V, p. 679.
39Ibid., p. 686.
^°E1 Nacional, Feb. 19, 1935, p. 1.
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the administration of the plants, but Mexico's economic 
situation was none too stable. Devaluation of the real 
wages of the workers had started before expropriation.
In 1937 the oil companies with an eye to the future had 
started withdrawing some of their funds, and from August 
1937 the metallic reserves of the Bank of Mexico fell 
from $194,000,000 to $110,000,000 in 1933. Private 
banks also suffered from the flight of capital. The 
Mexican peso, which had teen set since 1934 at 3.60 to 
the dollar, had been devalued by the end of the year to 
4.85 to the dollar.
This flight of capital in 1937 and early 1938 brings 
up the question as to whether there was some kind of 
conspiracy on the part of the oil companies to force the 
peso downward, so that if tney were forced to pay higher 
wages, those wages would be watered down to the extent 
that the companies would not be paying what it appeared. 
The oil companies even could have been hoping that 
should Mexico decide to expropriate their holdings, 
that the economic situation would deteriorate so rapid­
ly that the government would be forced to return the 
properties on the terms of the companies.
If the companies were hoping for an economic
^Antonio Manero, La revolucidn bancaria en 
Mexico (Mexico: Talleres Graficos (3e la Nacidn, 1957),
pp. ?l9-?5?0.
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collapse, they must have thought in the first few Months 
after the expropriation that this event would cone at 
any time. In Tampico, one of the centers for oil opera­
tions, business, commercial and banking activities slow­
ed considerably, with no loans being made by the banks. 
Local stores almost immediately raised prices by as such 
as 15% and further increases were expected. Business 
and professional men seemed to think the government had 
made a mistake, especially in view of the lack of local 
technology. The American Consul in Tampico felt that no
local important elements wholly supported the policy of 
42Cdrdenas.
The workers also had reason to be unhappy with the 
government’s policy. Although the regular workers had 
been retained at the same wage rates as before, they were 
receiving fewer social benefits and less overtime pay.
In effect, they were receiving somewhat less than before, 
although up to this time it had not really affected their 
standard of living. Nevertheless, many of the workers 
feared that the future would bring both payroll reduc­
tions and the laying off of a number of men. One cause 
of unrest was the policy of sending men from Mexico City
42L.S. Armstrong, memorandum from American Consul, 
Tampico, to Josephus Daniels, April 4, 1938, Doc. # 
812.6363/3357, KG 59.
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to fill the higher positions, rather than promoting men
from the fields to fill the positions formerly held by
41the foreigners. J
But the men from Mexico City were not able to keep 
up production, and as the peso declined and the produc­
tion dropped, one question began to worry officials of 
the United States and Great Britain. Without the mar­
kets in those two countries, where would Mexico sell her 
oil? It did not take much reasoning to figure out that 
Japan, Italy and Germany could be possible purchasers. 
Already war was becoming imminent in Europe, as Hitler 
moved into Austria, and Japan was creating problems in 
China. The United States, and perhaps Great Britain to 
an even larger extent, were afraid to see any oil deals 
go to these countries.
But there was no doubt that Mexico would have to 
come up with some plan in order to operate the industry 
and to find markets. The problems involved could be 
summarised briefly as followsi Mexico had no experience 
in the petroleum businessi there were no organizations 
to market oil abroadi the government could not reduce 
the wages of the workers after expropriating the proper­
ties because the companies had refused to pay higher 
wagesi and the government could pay off the former owners.
iiiL.S. Armstrong, dispatch from American Consul in 
Tampico, to U.S. Secretary of State, June 28, 1938, Doc. 
812.6363/4314, ibid.
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Ambassador Daniels indicated that Sub-secretary of 
Foreign Relations, Ramdn Beteta, informed him of a num­
ber of refusals by American companies outside the oil 
industry to deal with Mexico. The ambassador recognis­
ed the validity of the claim that if U.S. companies re­
fused to deal with Mexico, then no one could be able to 
say anything when Mexico turned toward Europe and the
jutFar East to supply such materials. U.S. firms did 
change their attitude later, and Jesds Silva Herzog, 
the director in charge of finding foreign purchasers, 
did find some U.S. markets.**-*
Mexican government sources had almost immediately 
indicated there would be no difficulty in selling oil 
from the expropriated properties since the Mexican gov­
ernment already had as many as fifty orders, including
46some from British and Japanese sources. These govern­
ment press reports to the contrary, no real sales to 
foreign markets had been concluded several weeks after 
the expropriations, with the only movements out of Tampico
44Josephus Daniels, dispatch, to U.S. Secretary of State, November 2, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/5070 DG, ibid.
^Personal interview. Author with Jesus Silva 
Herzog, L.S.U. Archives.
46Division of the American Republics, U.S. State 
Department, memorandum, April 6, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/
3441 I/JPS. RG 59.
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being for local consumption.**̂
«
Several months later, however, the Mexican govern­
ment did sign a contract with W.R. Davis for $10,000,000. 
The contract was for six months and Davis was to pay kOJt 
in cash and the remainder in merchandise, mostly of Ger-
kftman manufacture. Four months later, Silva Herzog had
to announce that the deals contracted through Davis had
been cancelled. Nevertheless, Italy decided to buy 7%
of the Mexican production in exchange for tankers and 
49rayon. 7
In spite of these few contracts, Mexico was having 
a difficult time selling her oil. The government began 
to urge independent operators whose properties had not 
been expropriated to ship oil they held in storage. In 
that way, with the few contracts Mexico did have, the 
government not only would be able to receive revenues 
from the sale of oil, but could point to these companies 
as having no problems in operating, Kxcept for one 
operator in the early months, the others refused the of­
fer,, and made no moves to relieve the financial pressure.
47'L.S. Armstrong, American Consul in Tampico, memo, 
to Josephus Daniels, April 4, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/3357,
****B1 Universal. July 7» 1938* Sect. II, p. 2.
**̂ lbid.. November 8, 1939, p. 1.
^°William P. Blocker, American consul in Monterrey, 
dispatch, to U.S. Secretary of State, June 3, 1938, Doc. 
812.6363/4108, RG 59.
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Obviously these small operators, who had been dependent 
on the larger companies for much of their business( 
were counting on a return of the properties to the for­
mer owners, and they did not want to jeopardize any 
future business they might have. In this case, they had 
more confidence in the foreign oil companies than in 
the Mexican government.
The United States saw the possibility of Mexico's 
selling to such countries as Germany, but recognized the 
complete right of Mexico to dispose of her oil as she 
saw fit. At the same time, it was admitted that the sale 
of oil to Germany would be the cause of some concern 
among the soon-to-be-allied nations.^1 The Standard 
Oil Company was not so anxious to grant Mexico the right 
to sell her oil, and the company representative in Wash­
ington wanted the State Department to instruct its mis­
sions abroad to emphasize to governments considering the 
purchase of Mexican oil that there would be a legal 
question over the ownership of any oil they purchased.
He was informed that the missions had been instructed to 
express no opinion on the subject.^2
*̂E1 Nacional. January 13, 1939* p. 2.
-*2Mr. Bohannon of the Standard Oil Company and Mr. 
Bursley of the Division of the American Republics, U.S. 
State Department, memorandum of conversation, Oct. 12, 
1938, Doc. 812.6363A935 1AM, RG 59.
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This reply was extremely significant, and had the 
Mexican government known about it, Ctfrdenas probably 
would have felt more sure of himself. It indicated that 
the State Department had decided that the matter really 
was a national, one for Mexico, and although the United 
States would still insist on fair payment for the oil 
properties, the Department was not going to take the 
part of the oil companies in obstructing the foreign 
sales of Mexican petroleum.
In addition to this rebuff to the oil companies, 
Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles indicated to the 
Secretary of State that he saw no reason for giving out 
information to the companies on the Department's specific 
policy on Mexican exports.”̂  This attitude was a far cry 
from the days of U.S. "Dollar Diplomacy" and indicated 
that the State Department was not going to pull the oil 
companies' chestnuts out of the fire. The companies had 
expected that their government would back up their de­
mands for the return of their property, and when it did 
not, their position was much less tenable.
Connected as closely as Mexico was with the United 
States and the rest of Latin America, it would have been 
in her own best interests not to sell oil to the fascist
53U.S. Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, 
memorandum, to U.S. Secretary of State, October 13,
1938. Doc. 812.6363A935 LAM, ibid.
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countries. But CArdenas recognised what it seems the 
United States only recently has come to accepts that to 
deal commercially with countries of varying ideologies 
does not imply a sympathy with those ideologies. Just 
because Mexico was forced to deal with the fascist-nasi 
countries did not mean acceptance of their political 
ideals.
Mexico had to sell her oil to someone, or else face 
an economic collapse. The country was learning how 
dangerous it was to be dependent on one product, es­
pecially when that product had been controlled by for­
eigners. Had the United States taken all of Mexico's 
oil, there would have been few problems, but when CAr- 
denas had to begin searching elsewhere, he ran up against 
not only the wrath of the United States and Great Brit­
ain, but other economic problems.
Although with some difficulty, Mexico was able to 
find other markets for her oil. The representative of 
Standard Oil went to the State Department and complain­
ed about foreign sales of the Mexican product. He was 
especially concerned about the Eastern States Petroleum 
Company of the United States, which had made an agree­
ment with Mexico to receive oil at the rate of 10,000 
barrels a day, although supposedly all the oil was to
159
co»e from the former British properties.
The companies did not limit themselves to protests 
against the sale of Mexican oil. They also protested 
against the U.S. State Department for the manner in which 
that agency was handling the problem. For one thing, 
they believed that notes of protest sent to Mexico and 
alluded to in other notes from the State Department 
should be made public as quickly as possible, since C&r- 
denas was able to use the apparent silence of the U.S. 
government to convince the Mexican public that the United 
States was behind his actions. The argument was used 
that the longer the State Department delayed in the pub­
lication of the notes, the more embarrassing and dif­
ficult it would be for the Mexican government to return 
the properties. The companies hoped that the publica­
tion of the notes would influence the Mexican Supreme 
Court in deciding that the expropriations could not be 
sustained under Mexican law.^ The companies also point­
ed out that Cardenas was under the influence of radical 
elements and that the State Department must handle the 
matter so that it became feasible for Cardenas to return
-̂ T.R. Armstrong, letter on behalf of the oil comp­




From the vast amount of material available ex­
pressing public opinion over the controversy* it seems 
obvious that the oil companies tried to play up to the 
fullest the idea of radicalism in Mexico. The comp­
anies warned the State Department that the Mexican 
people deserved to know the United States did not ap­
prove of the Mexican government's actions. They empha­
sised that under the present scheme of "confiscation" 
Mexico was heading toward catastrophe in the form of dis­
order and revolution. Extreme elements were seen as us­
ing the situation to sweep Mexico into the "revolutionary 
vortex" in which some European countries* especially 
those such as the Soviet Union* had already become em- 
broilled.57
In addition to exploiting the theme of radicalism* 
the companies also warned the State Department of pos­
sible ramifications throughout the rest of Latin Ameri­
ca. They accused CCrdenas of taking advantage of the 
lack of printed protest on the part of the United States 
over the expropriations. This lack of apparent protest 
allowed Latin Americans to believe that the policies of
^T.R. Armstrong, letter on behalf of the oil comp­
anies* to Under Secretary of State Welles, May 9, 1938* 
Doc. 812.6363A003 L/JPS, ibid.
57Ibld.
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the United States and Great Britain were different* aa 
Cardenas constantly referred to British protests while 
not mentioning any on the part of the United States. 
According to the companies* this strategy had allowed 
people of Latin America to believe that the United States 
was not interested in the fate of the companies,-*® thus 
implying that if the State Department did not make public 
its protests that there would be wholesale expropriations 
throughout Latin America.
Naturally, what the companies were after was to 
create such a fear that the State Department would be 
compelled to help them recover their properties. They 
prepared briefs for the State Department and wrote 
articles concerning the situation. Occasionally they 
would come up with what they termed a compromise pro­
posal* but the aim always was to gain control again. The 
companies once sent a proposal to the State Department 
in which they suggested a long-term contract calling for 
a fixed schedule of taxes and reasonable wages to the 
laborers. They also insisted that the Mexican government 
pay them for the losses the companies had sustained since 
the seizure of the properties* If the government would 
agree to these terms* then at the end of the contract*
-*®T.R. Armstrong* letter on behalf of the oil comp­
anies* to U.S. Secretary of State* September 21* 1938* 
Doc. 812.6363A?83 LAM, ibid.
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the companies would turn over the properties without ex­
pecting any further remuneration.^
In September 1936 the oil companies submitted a 
five-point protest which they wanted the State Depart­
ment to present to Mexico. The first point was the same 
as they had been making from the beginning. They wanted 
to emphasize that Mexico could not pay the debts • and 
therefore the "confiscations" were a violation of in­
ternational law. Secondly, the expropriations were 
directed solely against foreign-owned properties and on 
that basis also were a violation of international law.
The third point was that the expropriations were a direct 
repudiation of the former Mexican Supreme Court deci­
sions and of agreements between Mexico and the United 
States. Again insisting that their properties be re­
turned, the companies demanded that all further sales 
from the confiscated properties cease and that the prop­
erties be returned until the matter was settled. Fin­
ally, the companies suggested that the United States agree 
to participate in a series of conferences designed to 
protect the rights of Mexican labor.
^Standard Oil Company, Present Status of the Mexi­
can Oil "Expropriations" (NYi Standard Oil, 19 0̂), p. 67.
^°T.R. Armstrong, letter on behalf of the oil comp­
anies. to U.S. Secretary of State, September 21, 1938,
Doc. 812.6363/4783 LAM, RG 59.
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In analysing thess points, only the first one might 
have been considered partially valid by the Mexican gov­
ernment. Although Mexico continued to claim that there 
mas no international law calling for immediate payment, 
responsible officials no doubt were worried as to how 
Mexico would pay for the properties even after a suit­
able inventory was compiled. The oil companies no 
doubt felt they had a valid point when they claimed that 
only foreign-owned properties were involved, but Carde­
nas could say that the reason for the Expropriation Law 
was mainly to protect the rights of the Mexican Nation 
and that it was only the foreign companies that were 
infringing on those rights.
Technically speaking, the expropriations did neg­
ate the earlier court decisions and certain agreements 
between the two countries. But the companies could not 
deny that even the United States Supreme Court, in 
keeping with' the changing times, had negated former de­
cisions. In addition, those earlier decisions had been 
made under Mexican officials who could not always have 
been said to have the best interests of their country at 
heart. Decisions had been handed down in the same man­
ner that the oil companies now were accusing the present 
court— for political, rather than legal, reasons.
As for ceasing the sale of oil and returning the 
properties until the matter was settled, Mexico felt that
I6*f
the natter already was settled* and that oil must be sold 
in order to pay the debt which was recognised by the gov­
ernment. If the government did not sell the oil* then 
there would be no way to pay the companies* and then 
Mexico really could be accused of confiscating rather 
than expropriating.
Company officials had a further setback when a 
Mexican district court denied the injunction requested by 
the companies to keep the government from operating the 
properties. Mexican officials felt that this decree was 
the most important legal announcement since the expro­
priation decree itself, since it seemed to put an end to 
the controversy. In effect, the decision found the ex­
propriation decree constitutional and ordered the comp­
anies to obey all the terms.^ The following year the 
Supreme Court found the Expropriation Law valid and 
fixed the time for paying for these and future expro­
priated properties at ten years* based on a percentage
62of production to be fixed at a later date.
Finally, on December 1* 1939* the Supreme Court 
once again ruled against the oil companies* thus ex­
hausting the legal recourses available to the companies. 
This action precipitated a meeting with the U.S. State
^ Bl Nacional. June 8, 1938* Sect. II, p. 7 
2̂Ibid.. November 16, 1939t p. !•
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State Department by the oil companies, but that agenoy 
declined to act hastily in the situationAlthough 
the State Department did not give up its efforts to 
reach a settlement, by this time it seemed to have ac­
cepted completely the tenets of the CArdenas Doctrine 
in letting the Mexican courts decide the issue.
In considering the possibility of some kind of U.S. 
intervention in the matter, CArdenas had further expound­
ed on his doctrine and indicated that Mexico could ac­
cept no formal intervention on the part of the United 
State s. He warned that if the government allowed some 
kind of intervention by foreign powers in such matters 
that it would set a precedent which would endanger the 
very sovereignty of the country. He emphasised that only 
through the Law of Expropriation could his government 
fulfill the tenets of the Mexican Revolution, and that
to allow foreign governments to intervene on behalf of
6 ktheir citizens would annul that instrument.
Therefore, although Mexico did not object to U.S. 
participation to the extent of helping the companies 
reach an agreement, it would have been a rejection of 
CArdenas* policy to allow the United States to intervene 
actively in what the Mexicans felt was strictly an internal
^B1 Universal. December 5, 1939, p# 1.
6 k CArdenas, Obras. Tomo I, p. k07.
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problem. For the United States to have taken part in 
agreements for the protection of Mexican labor in Mexi­
co would have been an attack on Mexican sovereignty.
Anti-Mexican Propaganda
Official United States intervention into the mat­
ter did not seem to be as dangerous at tiroes as did non­
official intervention. This "non-official" intervention 
took the form of a gigantic press campaign in the United 
States against Mexico. This campaign became so slan­
derous that even Ambassador Daniels denounced it. He 
mentions both The Lamp, a publication of the Standard 
Oil Company* and the Atlantic Monthly as being particu­
larly guilty of misrepresentation and slander.6-* In 
July 1938* the Atlantic printed a 64-page issue under 
the title "The Atlantic Presents Trouble Below the Bor­
der." Daniels described it by saying that "every page 
smelled of oil."66
In referring to the press campaign* a Mexican news­
paper recognized that the large oil companies had been 
responsible for much of the anti-Mexican propaganda.
The paper also noted that the campaign in reality was a 
failure because there were also journalists in the United
6^Daniels* Shirt-sleeve Diplomat, p. 257.
66Ibid.. p. 258.
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States who backed Mexico's rights. This backing was 
looked on as a moral victory for Mexico.^
Although Mexico might have claimed that the propa­
ganda campaign had been a failure, nevertheless there 
were signs of coneern. The Mexican government even filed 
a formal protest with the United States State Department 
over an apparent campaign to discourage tourists from 
Texas from entering Mexico. Daniels was instructed to 
inform the Mexican Foreign Ministry of the State Depart­
ment's attitude toward the Mexican complaints. The De­
partment emphasised the right of free speech in the 
United States and indicated that the high degree of pub­
lic opinion running against Mexico at that time because 
of the expropriation without compensation might further 
be aggravated should any action be taken against propa- 
ganda activities.
Normally this rather evasive answer might have been 
taken as evidence that the State Department was taking 
sides with the oil companies against Mexico. But in 
light of the Roosevelt administration's efforts at mak­
ing the Good Neighbor policy work, and the lack of in­
sistent efforts by the State Department to have the
^Tb.1 Nacional. editorial, December 15, 1938, p. 3.
68Sumner Welles, dispatch, to Josephus Daniels, 
September 30, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/4701, RG 59.
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properties returned, it seems that the United States was 
merely sidestepping what could have been a very sticky 
issue.
At times, the biggest problem for Mexico in this 
field waB not propaganda within the United States, but 
from journalists stationed inside Mexico. One such 
journalist was Prank Kluckhohn of the New York Times. A 
copy of a draft of his book, The Mexican Challenge, can 
still be found in the Mexican National Archives along 
with the Cardenas papers. In this work Kluckhohn des­
cribes Mexico as being praised by Hitlerites, Trotsky- 
ites and Stalinists, as well as by a few liberal North 
Americans.^
Kluckhohn's articles so incensed the Mexican govern­
ment that in mid-January 1939 he was detained by agents 
of the Ministry of Interior and told that he must leave 
Mexico. In explaining the reasons for his expulsion, 
the Department of Publicity and Propaganda accused him 
of inaccuracies in his reports and of attempting to
alarm the population against the administration's poli- 
70cies. On January 18, the Mexican Embassy in the U.S.
^Frank Kluckhohn, Paquete 14-1, Exp. 111/1721, 
unnumbered document ("El re to mexicano"), AGN.
7°D.A.P.P. Bulletin, ibid.
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sent a letter to the Mexican president, stating that 
Kluckhohn was publishing his side of the story in the 
New York Times. The letter claimed that he was using 
the stories to impress the American public, talking 
about the lack of freedom of the press in Mexico, close 
relations with Germany and other fascist countries of 
Europe, and of a supposedly anti-Jewish campaign in 
Mexico.71
Mexico could complain of such journalists as 
Kluckhohn who took an anti-Mexican attitude, but there 
were other American publications which took the side of 
Mexico. Generally, those who did so seemed to favor 
Mexican action for three major reasons. One was the 
simple fact that they believed Mexico had a right to 
take the action it did, and that the United States would 
have to accept that action. A second reason was one 
brought about by an anti-big business attitude of those 
who believed that big business in Mexico or anywhere else 
took advantage of the people and earned enormous profits 
at the expense of the host government when foreign in­
vestment was involved. The third reason was an effort 
to protect the Good Neighbor policy, which many officials 
felt had paid dividends. The contention here was that
71' Mexican Embassy, Washington, to the office of the 
Mexican presidency, January 18, 1939, Paquete 14-1,
Exp. 111/1721, Doc. 224, ibid.
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the expropriation of private property was not a matter 
which the United States should allow to affect that 
policy.
Official United States Reaction
While Mexico might complain of the propaganda in 
the United States, there was no denial that the official 
U.S. position did not reflect a similar attitude. Mexi­
can ambassador to the United States. Francisco Castillo 
Najera, personally expressed President C&rdenas' ap­
preciation of the manner in which President Roosevelt 
was handling the oil expropriation matter.72
The United States did not exhibit the same degree 
of official condemnation of Mexico as did Great Britain, 
but nevertheless, Washington wanted to resolve the prob­
lem and took an active interest in the matter. The 
State Department favored a settlement by arbitration, a 
proposal the Mexican government continually rejected. In 
August 1938 the Mexican Foreign Minister said that arbi­
tration should be reserved for diplomatic matters that 
could not otherwise be resolved, and that the present 
case did not fall into that category.7-̂ For Mexico,
72Division of the American Republics, U.S. State 
Department, memorandum, April 6, 1938, Doc, 812,6363/
3* m  L/JPS, RG 59.
73FRUS. 1938, Vol. /, p. 683.
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the natter was strictly a domestic one and was covered 
adequately by Mexican law. To the Mexican government, 
any effort at arbitration would have meant submitting 
basic Mexican law to international intervention,^ and 
this act clearly would have been in conflict with the 
Cardenas Doctrine.
When the United States suggested arbitration, the 
government party stated that the mere suggestion was 
contrary to the sovereign power of Mexico and represent­
ed a danger for all Latin America. If the United States 
tried to interfere into the internal affairs of other 
nations in such a manner, then all nations would fear that
the United. States would try to nullify their internal
7 5laws as regards to foreign capital.-'
There was another possible reason the Mexican gov­
ernment might have backed off from arbitration with the 
United States. Earlier in the century the United States 
had proposed arbitration of the Chamizal dispute and 
Mexico had accepted. But when the decision was reached,
the United States refused to abide by the majority vote,^
n  itOscar Rabasa, "La cuestitfn internacional mexicano- americana," Paquete 682, Lxp. 571.3/1, AGN.
^^Excelsior. April 9, 19̂ 0, pp. 1, k.
^^For a complete discussion of this dispute, see 
Sheldon B. jjiss, A Century of Disagreement» The Cha»tzal 
Conflict (Washington, D.C.» University Press of Washing­
ton, 1965).
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Since Mexico refused to submit the matter to arbi­
tration as it considered the question to be a national 
one only* various other attempts were made at settlement. 
In March 1939» Donald Richberg, as a representative of 
the American oil companies, arrived in Mexico with the 
intention of carrying on talks with President Cardenas. 
Richberg believed that Mexico and the companies should 
agree to a long-term contract which would allow both 
parties to receive profits from production.77 The ques­
tion of management came up during the talks, and in a 
note to the Mexican ambassador in the United States, 
Richberg stated that any idea of a board of directors 
with a majority of Mexicans and a Mexican president was
out of the question and was not what the companies had in 
78mind. Obviously what the companies, still had in mind 
was a return to the status q u o  ante, where the foreign­
ers controlled all phases of the operation.
There were a series of eight conferences between 
Richberg and Cardenas, but no conclusion reached. When 
Richberg returned to the United States, he announced that 
Cardenas had accepted in principle the idea of collabora­
tion between his government and the companies.7  ̂ When
77B1 Universal. April 15. 1939* Sect. II, p. 3.
78FRUS. 1939. Vol. V, p. 694.
7^Donald R. Richberg, The Mexican Oil Seizure 
(n.p., n.d.), p. 37.
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this proved not to be the case, Richberg concluded that 
either Cardenas was not negotiating in good faith, was 
unsure of the details of the negotiations as they un­
folded (and when given explanations by his advisers had 
changed his mind), or that his efforts were hindered by 
the opposition of the strong labor groups which were
onbacking his administration. This latter argument had 
some foundation, as even one of the Mexican papers be­
lieved that Cardenas and Richberg had agreed in general 
terms on a settlement, but that possibly some Mexican 
groups brought pressure to bear on Cardenas not to agree
Q«to a settlement.
With the apparent failure of the Richberg talks, 
the United States made a proposal in late summer 1939. 
Since the chief obstacle seemed to be the question of 
management, the U.S. proposal dealt primarily with this 
point. According to a memorandum of conversation by 
Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, the problem 
would be resolved by appointing four different boards of 
directors with nine directors on each board. In each 
case the Mexican government would appoint three direct­
ors and the companies three. The remaining three would 
be selected from a list compiled by both Mexico and the
80I£i£*» pp. 50-51.
***£1 Universal. June 10, 1939, Sect. II, p. 3.
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United States and would consist of nationals of other 
82countries.
The Mexican argument against this proposal, as 
revealed in a memorandum of conversation between Welles 
and the Mexican ambassador, was basically that Mexico 
still would have the disadvantage since the persons ap­
pointed would all be experts in the oil industry and 
would be likely to sympathize with the three directors 
appointed by the companies.83
As a counter-proposal, the Mexican government offer­
ed the companies a minority representation in a new comp­
any which would direct the operations while the Mexican 
government controlled the distribution end. The comp­
anies rejected this offer, saying that while the Mexi­
can government would benefit from such an arrangement,
84there were few advantages for the companies. This con­
clusion was not difficult to reach, yet the companies 
seemed to fail to see what must have been obvious to the 
Mexican government by this time. Although there were 
still a number of difficulties, nevertheless Mexico had 
ridden out the worst part of the storm.
The attempt at a boycott had failed and Mexico had
82FRUS. 1939. Vol. V, pp. 688-89.
83Ibid.. p. 696.
8A£1 Universal. August 4, 1939. p. 1.
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been able to find some markets for her oil. Although the 
production was not going as smoothly as under the former 
owners* nevertheless the Mexicans were learning how to 
run the oil industry. With the advent of war in Europe* 
Mexico recognized that sooner or later Great Britain 
would have to turn to Mexican markets for oil. Finally* 
by now Mexico knew that the United States State Depart­
ment was not going to take an active role on behalf of 
the companies in forcing a return of the properties.
Two years after the expropriations* the oil comp­
anies* particularly Standard Oil* were blaming the State 
Department for the failure to reach a settlement. The 
company accused the State Department of being too nice 
and extending too much courtesy to Mexico* and said that 
this attitude had played right into Mexico's hands.
Not all the companies shared this attitude of 
Standard Oil, as one of them took the initiative in try­
ing for an accord. Patrick Hurley and the Sinclair in­
terests separated themselves from the other oil companies 
and continued working toward agreement. In talking with 
Under Secretary of State Welles in early April 1940* the 
Mexican ambassador said that an agreement with Sinclair 
was very near whereby Mexico would pay most of the debt
*̂ Ibid.. January 27, 1940* Sect. II, p. ?•
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86in oil over a period of years.
Once this step had been taken by Sinclair and Mexi­
co , the United States State Department allegedly let the 
other companies know that if they did not come to some 
kind of agreement of their own accord, then the State 
Department would have to step in and make the deals for 
them.8  ̂ This report later was denied by the State De­
partment, yet the companies might well have expected 
that the United States government might take this at­
titude once the first step had been made.
On November 19» 19*H# the two governments finally 
concluded an agreement which ultimately led to the final 
settlement of the controversy. Ambassador Daniels calls 
this date the Day of Deliverance, and recalls that he
felt it had resulted in a fair settlement of the oil
88controversy. The Washington agreements actually did 
not mean there was full agreement on both sides, and the 
matter dragged on through most of the next administration. 
But even by the time Cardenas left office he knew he had 
won. He had put forth the traditionally Mexican idea 
that foreigners could not appeal to their own govern­
ments for financial redress, and he had made it stand up 
to two fcf the most powerful governments in the world.
86PRUS, 19̂ 0, Vol. V, pp. 1007-08.
8^Novedades. February 3, 19^1,„P* 1.
88Daniels, Shirt -sleeve Diplomat, p. 266,
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United States public opinion had treated Cardenas 
kindly and had crucified himi called him a traitor, a 
communist, a fascist, a nationalist and a great super 
patrioti berated him and sympathized with himi treated 
him with admiration and contempti called him an honest 
man and a thief. But whatever was said, nothing deterred 
him once the act had been proclaimed.
Ctfrdenas* act in expropriating almost certainly
hastened the economic independence of Mexico. One thing
is surei Cardenas will always be remembered in Mexico
for that act. On his death in October 1970, one of the
major Mexican newspapers saidi
L£zaro Cdrdenas is one of the builders of 
modem Mexico. The one episode of the re­
possession of our oil would suffice to put 
him in that category.“9
^%ovedades. October 20, 1970, p.
CHAPTER VI
MEXICAN RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES» PART TWO
THE QUESTIONS OP SILVER AND 
TERRITORIAL RIGHTS
There can be no denial that the major application 
of the CArdenas Doctrine was against the oil companies 
in March 1938* But the doctrine was more than just a 
tool to force foreigners within the country to comply 
with Mexican law rather than calling for help to their 
own countries* The very heart of CArdenas' policy was 
"Mexico for Mexicans," and it was toward this goal that 
his regime was directed. The oil issue has often over­
shadowed other aspects of both internal and external
policy of the CArdenas administration. But to set mat­
ters straight, there weve a number of other issues be­
tween the United States and Mexico which colored the years 
from 1935 through 1940.
CArdenas immediately started his regime off on the 
wrong foot with the United States by expropriating agrar­
ian lands for his agrarian reform program. In 1924 the 
United States government had accepted a proposal by Mexi­
co to issue bonds to American citizens then having claims
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due to expropriated lands in Mexico. The Mexican govern­
ment had failed in this case to uphold its end of the 
agreement and had paid no interest on the few bonds 
given. The State Department felt released, therefore, 
from all promises given as to the acceptance of bonds 
in lieu of actual payment.* When the Cardenas adminis­
tration began expropriating additional land, the United 
States was understandably concerned about the rights of 
its citizens.
But Cdrdenas immediately began setting forth his 
principle that foreign governments could not interfere in 
Mexican internal affairs under the guise of protecting 
the interests of foreigners residing in Mexico. In the 
case of the agrarian expropriations, however, there was 
even less cause for complaint on the part of foreign gov­
ernments, since the agrarian xeforra attacked large land­
holders of all nationalities, including Mexican. In ad­
dition, the total value of all the lands was minuscule 
in comparison with what the oil companies later would 
claim as the amount of indemnification owed them by the
1935. Vol. IV, p. 754.
2See ibid.. 1935. Vol IV* 1936 and 1937. volumes V, 
Mexico and the United States. The amount of material cov­
ered in these volumes prohibits a detailed discussion 
here, but can give the reader an early insight into the 
Cirdenas Doctrine prior to its application to the oil companies.
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Mexican government.
The Question of Territorial Waters
As if the question over agrarian claims wase not 
enough to occupy the attention of the two governments, 
Cfirdenas dared to incur more of the wrath of the United 
States when he signed a decree in 1935 which committed 
Mexico to the protection of her territorial water rights 
out to nine nautical miles into the sea.
As had been the case with El Chamizal (the tract 
of land near El Paso, Texas, which both countries for 
years claimed as their own), the question of territorial 
waters had its beginning in the very early years of the 
20th century.
In August 1906, the United States State Department 
received a telegram from the Sulf Fisheries Company 
stating that one of its boats had been stopped by a 
Mexican gunboat on the high seas. The Mexican patrol 
had demanded to see the Mexican fishing license, and want­
ed to see the ship's cargo. The U.S. ambassador in 
Mexico, D.E. Thompson, informed the State Department that 
a Mexican law of December 1902 had established a ter­
ritorial limit of twenty Kilometers, and that the Mexican 
government felt it could stop and inspect vessels of any
nation within that area.-̂
3Ibid.. 1906, pp. 109̂ -95.
181
Soon the company was complaining again, this time 
charging that the Mexican government had given its gun­
boats authority to stop all American fishing vessels 
within the three-mile limit, regardless of weather con­
ditions. The complaint was in this case that Mexico was 
the only country which refused to grant ships the right
h,to go to any available port during bad weather.
The Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations denied 
that any such order had been given to the gunboats. He 
said that an order had given the gunboats authority to 
stop any vessels, national or foreign, which were in 
Mexican territorial waters and which might have failed 
to obtain the proper Mexican papers.-*
Within the next few years the Mexican government 
probably would have liked to make additional attempts to 
detain U.S. vessels and to establish control over what 
it felt to be the territorial limits, but President Por- 
firio Dfaz, still in power in Mexico, was concerned with 
keeping the favor of the United States. When he was forc­
ed to resign, the beginnings of the Mexican Revolution 
occupied the attention of those in quest of power. With 
the United States Navy at Veracruz during parts of the 




In the late 1920*s under President Obregdn, Mexico 
again insisted that United States fishing vessels needed 
Mexican licenses to operate along the coast. In the next 
few years there were additional incidents, mostly along 
the coast of Lower California. In 192?, several boats 
out of San Diego were accused by the Mexican government 
of actually catching fish in Mexican territorial waters. 
The boat owners said that the fish had been caught in 
United States territorial waters and refused to pay the 
fines. In August, three other boats, also out of San 
Diego, were accused of fishing in Mexican waters and were 
stopped by Mexican gunboats. Two of the ships were tak­
en to Snsenada, while a third made it back to San Diego 
after supposedly having been rammed by the Mexican gun­
boats. According to the captain of the ship, he had ob­
tained from Mexico anchorage and bait permission, and 
since he had no fish on board, he believed that the ac­
tion might have been in retaliation for the refusal of 
the earlier boats to pay the fines.^
The main argument up to this time was whether the 
U.S. vessels had the proper credentials or not and lit­
tle official action had been taken. Because of the dif­
ferences between the two countries in the 1920's and 
1930's, the United States Senate ratified a treaty in
^New fork Times. August 2*1, 1927, p. 48.
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1935 in which both countries agreed to permit vessels of
the other country to enter national territorial waters
7for either rescue or salvage operations.'
This was really just the beginning of problems in­
volving territorial waters, however, since the new presi­
dent of Mexico, Cirdenas, followed up this treaty by 
promulgating a decree in 1935 firmly establishing the 
limit of territorial waters at approximately nine nautical 
miles. Shortly after this decree was made known, the 
Secretary of State in Washington instructed the American 
charg£ in Mexico to tell the Mexican Foreign Office that 
the United States would accept no enforcement of the leg-
oislation which would endanger U.S. commercial interests.
In May 1936, the Mexican Minister of Foreign Rela­
tions, £duardo Kay, wrote to Ambassador Josephus Daniels 
explaining that Mexico had taken into consideration in­
ternational law before passing the decree. He noted in 
addition that the decree was in accord with Article V of 
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo which had said in part 
that "the dividing line between the two Republics shall 
begin in the Gulf of Mexico, three leagues from land at 
the mouth of the Rio Grande." According to Mexico, three 
nautical leagues at the time of the treaty (1848) equaled
?Ibid.. August 25, 1935» Sect. II, p. 3. 
8FgU£, 1936, Vol. V, pp. 758-59.
184
nine nautical miles* or 16.668 kilometers* the figure 
mentioned in the decree.9
The United States claimed that the article in ques­
tion referred only to a boundary at a given point and 
that it could not be used to establish a territorial 
limit. In addition* the United States contended that all 
the territorial waters bordering Mexico was a question 
totally separate from that of an international boundary.10
The position was being maintained by the United 
States that there was at least an unwritten international 
law that the limit of territorial waters should be three 
miles. Mexico continued to argue that there was no in­
ternational law determining the exact extent of territor­
ial waters* and that Mexico was justified in her claim to 
the nine mile limit.
To aid in establishing this point of the non­
existence of any international law limiting territorial 
waters to three miles* Mexico pointed out to the State 
Department a number of treaties Mexico had signed into 
effect in the 19th century establishing territorial lim­
its with other oountries. In 1882* Mexico and Guatemala 
had signed the Treaty on Limits* which set the jurisdic­
tion of each country at exactly the same distance as
9Ibid.. p. ?60. 
10Ifcid.* p. 763.
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Mexico now was claiming with the United States. In 
1888* Mexico and Ecuador had agreed on territorial lim­
its exceeding this distance when they signed the Treaty 
of Friendship* Commerce and Navigation and established a 
twenty kilometer limit. The same figure was mentioned 
in a treaty with the Dominican Kepublic in 1890.11 Arm­
ed with these treaties* the Cfirdenas government could 
feel sure that the U.S. contention of an international 
law providing for a three mile limit had little basis 
in the relationship between the two countries.
While the United States and Mexico were discussing 
the presidential decree and former treaty provisions* 
the Japanese began exploring in earnest the area west 
and northwest of the Yucat&i Peninsula in the area of 
Campeche Bay. This exploration made U.S. fishermen aware 
of the potential wealth in the area* and the next decade 
saw a tremendous increase in the number of U.S. fishing 
vessels in the Bay. No firm resolutions were made by 
Mexico other than promulgating the 1935 decree* however.
Nevertheless* friction did increase as the numbers 
grew* and once the issue of the oil expropriations was 
out of the way* subsequent Mexican governments attempted 
to resolve the problem. But it had been the CArdenas 
administration which put some teeth into the Mexican
P« 766.
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claim of territorial rights, and although Cardenas was 
too busy with other matters to give this question much 
attention, it provided the Mexican government with a
12basis to end the issue on terms advantageous to Mexico. 
The Question of Silver
Naturally, the main issue that occupied C&rdenas' 
time was that of the petroleum question. But very close­
ly related to that problem was another issue that caused 
some friction between the United States and Mexico dur­
ing his administration. This friction was caused by 
changes by the United States in its silver-buying poli­
cy, a policy which directly affected Mexico's economy.
From 1521 to the end of 1935# an estimated 6,388 
million fine ounces of silver with a value of 15#000 
million pesos had been extracted from Mexican mines.
Out of the 328 producing mines in Mexico in 193̂ # fifty- 
nine were concerned mainly with silver. Of those fifty- 
nine, twenty-four were owned by Mexicans, seven by for­
eigners, and twenty-eight were jointly owned. These 
figures did not represent the ownership accurately, how­
ever, as of the 210 million pesos invested in the silver
12See New York Times. February 16, 1968, p. 9 and 
U.S. Department of State, American Foreign Policy1 Cur­
rent Documents. Doc. VIII-17 (1967), p. 657 for details 
of the agreement.
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industry in 193̂ * 167.7 million were American, 5*6 
French, only 3.5 million Mexican, with the rest dis­
tributed among the Italian, Spanish and German inter­
ests.1-̂
As can be seen, the U.S. companies had an extreme­
ly large interest in the mining industry of Mexico, and 
when the oil companies started having trouble with labor 
under the Cardenas government, the miners must have be­
gun to worry about what would happen to their invest­
ments. They were in a somewhat different situation, how­
ever, as the only real market for their product had been 
the United States government.
Since 1933* the United States Treasury Department's 
purchases of Mexican silver had exceeded 55,000,000 ounces 
annually. In addition to the normal amount, the Trea­
sury had agreed to buy 35,000,000 ounces Mexico wanted 
to sell in December 1937
An agreement had been made on January 8, 1937 for 
the United States to buy 5*000,000 ounces a month (against 
a total output of 7,000,000) at a price to be fixed day 
by day. In addition, the United States had agreed to
^Robert G. McGregor, Jr., "Analysis of the Mexican 
Silver Industry," January 30, 1939, Doc. 812.63^2/36 
1M, RG 59.
ikDivision of the American Republics, U.S. State 
Department, memorandum. May 26, 1939, Doc. 812.63^2/37 
LAM, ibid.
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attempt to stabilise the Mexican peso at the rate of 3,60 
the the dollar.1*’ Naturally the agreement was a dis­
tinct benefit for Mexicof since it meant that almost 
all the production would be bought by one purchaser. Dur­
ing 1937» when the oil companies began fighting Mexican 
labor in an attempt to hold down wage increases* the 
mine owners might have been worried* but there was no 
sign of any real trouble.
With the agreement due to terminate at the end of 
1937* the two countries came to another agreement where­
by the United States agreed to make its purchases on a 
month-to-month basis. There still was no sign of real 
trouble over the issue as the Treasury Department seemed 
to want to accommodate the Mexican government. The 
Mexican Secretary of the Treasury visited the U.S. Sec­
retary and informed him that Mexico faced a critical 
financial situation* and the silver purchases were a big 
factor in alleviating this problem. It was at this time 
that the United States had agreed to the purchase of the
35 million additional ounces of Mexican silver in the
16Federal Reserve Bank of California.
In early 1938* when there began to be rumors that 
the United States would end the agreement entirely* the 
Mexican government made it known through Ambassador
1 N̂Y Heraid-Tribune. March 28, 1938, p. 10, 
16FRUS. 1937, Vol. V, p. 676.
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Daniels that it felt the United States was tying the is­
sue of silver to the case of petroleum, which at that 
time was still before the Mexican courts. According to 
Mexican authorities, the petroleum matter was up to the 
appropriate authorities in Mexico, while the buying of 
silver was a matter between two governments.1̂
Shortly after the oil companies had exhausted all 
their legal possibilities arid Cardenas expropriated the 
properties, the United States announced that it would 
stop buying Mexican silver. Before the announcement was 
made public, the Secretary of State sent Ambassador 
Daniels a telegram on March 26, 1938, explaining what was 
about to happen. Daniels was informed that the Treasury 
Department would simply announce its decision to re­
examine its financial and commercial relations with Mexi­
co and therefore would have to stop buying Mexican sil-
18ver for the moment.
In answering the Secretary's telegram, Daniels ex­
pressed doubt that Secretary of the Treasury Henry Mor- 
genthau was justified in this decision. Daniels inform­
ed his Secretary that he knew Mexico would consider it as 
a reprisal, and he feared that under these circumstances 
the current negotiations over the oil issue would be
^CArdenas, Qbras. Tomo I, p. 382. 
18FRUS. 1938, Vol. V, p. 735.
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stifled,*̂  That Mexico did consider the action as a
U.S. reprisal then was not a surprise, and that had to
be considered by the State Department in formulating its
policy in regards to the debate over the oil properties.
Possibly one of the reasons the United States
reversed its attitude in such a short period of time was
that, as Daniels points out, not only were the officials
of the Mexican government upset, but the owners of the
mines, many of them who as we have seen were Americans,
also were affected. Some of them felt they were being
20punished for the misdeeds of the oil companies. The 
miners had not tried to go in the face of the Cirdenas 
Doctrine and seek help from their own country. Instead 
they had abided by Mexican law, and now saw themselves 
as possible pawns in an international struggle.
The reasons for the sudden switch in the U.S. silver 
policy are complex, and even two years before the oil ex­
propriations there was some agreement that the policy
21had been a failure. Yet the United States continued 
buying silver from Mexico after that time and had signed 
the 1937 agreement. It was only after the expropriation
19̂Josephus Daniels, telegram, to U.S. Secretary of State, March 27, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/3160, RG 50. Also see ibid.
^̂ Daniels, Shirt-sleeve Diplomat, p. 2̂ 9,
21S1 Universal. April 3. 1936, Sect. II, p. 3.
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of the oil properties that a decision suddenly was made 
to 8top purchasing the Mexican silver. The United States 
government would not admit that the decision was made in 
retaliation, but the timing made it seem as if the govern­
ment were reacting to oil conqpany pressure.
Before the expropriations. United States Secretary
of the Treasury Morgenthau had announced that the U.S.
was buying the additional 35 million ounces of silver
to keep it from being dumped on the market, an action
22which would have jeopardized the current price. Yet 
the same situation existed after the expropriations, and 
Morgenthau must have known that the price would begin 
fluctuating as soon as the United States made any kind 
of announcement. It would seem reasonable to assume, 
therefore, that the sudden decision to review U.S. com­
mercial relations with Mexico was an attempt on the 
Treasury’s part to bolster the position of the oil comp­
anies. The resultant decision to again buy silver was 
very likely a reaction against the strong Mexican pro­
tests for the retaliation.
After considering the situation both economically 
and politically, the United States decided that there 
would be an advantage to again agreeing to silver pur­
chases. One very strong point for this continuation was
22Ibid.. January 11, 1938, Sect. II, p. 3.
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the need to bolster the Mexican peso in relation to the 
U.S. dollar to stem the tide of declining United States 
imports to Mexico. During the first nine months of 1938* 
United States imports (into Mexico) declined 35«5£ or 76 
million pesos while German products imported by Mexico 
increased by 2,000,000 pesos. Although Mexican mer­
chants might not have wanted to deal with Germany, Italy 
and Japan instead of the United States, any reduction in 
the peso would force Mexico into this action. J But the 
government of C&rdenas already had assured officials of
the United States that Mexico did not want to sell to
2kthe fascist nations. Nevertheless, just as in the case 
of oil sales, Mexico was looking at the situation from 
the standpoint of economic survival.
Cardenas assured the American Smelting and Refining 
Company that he had no intention of expropriating any of 
the mining properties in Mexico,2-* even after the deci­
sion of the U.S. Treasury to cease buying Mexican silver. 
By the first part of April, the Treasury still had not 
decided exactly what to do about silver purchases, other
23■'Robert G. McGregor, Jr., "Analysis of the Mexican 
Silver Industry," Jan. 30, 1939, Doc. 812.63^2/36 IK,
HG 59.
2ZfFRUS. 1938, Vol. V, p. 728.
2^Division of the American Republics, U.S. State
Department, memorandum, April 6, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/Jkkl L/JPS, RG 59.
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than to complete the March purchase of Mexican silver.
At that time the Treasury officials were concerned
about how much any silver dumped on the world market
26might affect the world price, but they had not decid­
ed what policy to follow in Mexico.
This hesitancy had another indirect effect on rela­
tions between the United States and Mexico. Because of 
all the various rumors in Mexico City concerning the 
silver purchases, the conversations over the agrarian 
claims had slowed down considerably.^ Perhaps this was 
because the silver issue was of more urgency for Carde­
nas* government. Or perhaps it was a form of retalia­
tion by Mexico for what the government felt was a form 
of reprisal against Mexico for the expropriations.
The State Department already had been warned that 
no matter what the reasoning or how valid the reason for 
ending the purchase of Mexican silver, nevertheless, the 
Mexican government would consider it as a dire blow 
against its economy and a direct blow against Mexico. In 
spite of the assurance of Cardenas, the Mexican govern­
ment might start taking more direct reprisals than just
26Pierre de L. Boal and Lawrence Duggan, memorandum 
of conversation, April 6, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/3^50, ibid,
27'Pierre de L. Boal and Lawrence Duggan, memorandum 
of conversation, April 8, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/3518, ibid.
a slowdown In conversations over the agrarian claims.
The United States was well aware that Cardenas might
somehow evoke the CArdenas Doctrine and begin a program
28of ejqpropriation against the American mine owners. 
Whatever the reasoning, on April 9i 1938* Mexico receiv­
ed the announcement that the United States had resumed 
buying Mexican silver at a rate of 42.75 cents an ounce 
on a day-to-day basis.
No doubt, the silver program of the United States 
had been a tremendous advantage to Mexico, increasing em­
ployment, revenues, foreign exchange and other economic 
benefits. The one danger to Mexico was that the program 
might be suspended, and since the industry could be main­
tained only through large-scale purchases, the economy 
could suffer a severe shock. Undoubtedly, U.S. economic 
experts recognized this danger, and the official United 
States' policy was caught in somewhat of a precarious 
situation. With these silver purchases suspended, the 
Mexican economy could suffer a letdown from which it 
might never recover in time to make any kind of payment 
to the oil companies. But with the continuance of the
28Robert McGregor, Jr., "Analysis of the Mexican 
Silver Industry," January 30, 1939# Doc. 812.6342/36 LM,
im.-
2 9•'Josephus Daniels, telegram, to US Secretary of 
State, April 9, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/3388, ibid.
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purchases* the Roosevelt administration was bound to come 
under fire from those who would accuse him of giving aid 
to the enemy* so to speak.
An additional point to consider was that if the 
United States ceased to purchase Mexican silver* then the 
companies would operate at a loss until they were forced 
just to turn the mines over to the workers* saving the 
Mexican government the process of expropriating them.^0
Regardless of these points which the U.S. Treasury 
must have considered in reversing its decision to stop the 
purchases* there were a number of persons in the United 
States who felt the first decision was the proper one.
In general there were two basic reasons why it seemed the 
Treasury had made the correct decision. The first of 
these was simply from a standpoint of reprisal for what 
CArdenas had done to the oil companies. There was little 
logic in this argument* simply a desire to retaliate 
against the attack on U.S. business interests.
The second idea was less vituperative* but never­
theless recognized some corelation between the Treasury's 
decision and the expropriation of the oil companies. This 
idea simply was that the abrogation of the silver accord
■^Division of the American Republics* U.S. State 
Department* memorandum* May 26, 1939* Doc. 812.63^2/37 
LAM* ibid.
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would show Cardenas that the United States government was 
not ready to accept at full face value his doctrine, and 
that if he insisted, he would have a fight on his hands*
In addition, at the same time, it would give him an op­
portunity to compromise on the oil issue without compro­
mising his principle of national independence,^1 This 
last argument showed a singular lack of knowledge of both 
the Cardenas Doctrine and the man responsible for that 
doctrine* Cirdenas simply could not have said that Mexi­
co would agree to giving back the properties if the United 
States agreed to continue purchasing silver* Not only 
would it have been politically disastrous, but C&rdenas 
knew that if the United States did not give in on the 
point of silver, then the mines would end up reverting 
to the Mexican government by default*
Just as there were voices raised praising the deci­
sion of the Treasury Department, so were there voices pro­
testing the hypocrisy of the move. In general, the argu­
ment was not so much that the United States was making a 
bad move in stopping the purchases* The complaint was 
that the United States was taking the action at just the 
time when the Mexican government would have to consider 
it as a tactical retaliatory act* For opponents of the
^For examples of this type argument, see the San 
Francisco Chronicle* March 29, 1938, p. 10 and March 30, 
1938, p. 1 0 * Also see the NY Herald-Tribune. March 31* 
1938, p. 14.
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move, the Treasury decision once again placed the United 
States in the position of practicing "dollar diplomacy"
instead of trying to live up to the Good Neighbor poll-
32cyS
Even members of the United States Congress spoke 
out against the U.S. action. One representative stated 
that the action was contrary to the Good Neighbor policy* 
while another denounced the act and said it was obvious 
to him that the decision was made as a means whereby the 
government could rescue the oil companies. He tacitly 
recognized the Cardenas Doctrine when he pointed out that 
the companies had had access to the Mexican courts and 
had left the Mexican government little choice.
There were other members of congress who continued 
to be in favor of ending the agreement. Senator John 
G. Townsend* the author of one of the bills to end the 
purchase of foreign silver* launched an attack on Mexico. 
He said that the only reason for continuing the buying of 
silver was that Mexico wanted it that way. In his attack* 
he obliquely mentioned the expropriated properties and 
blasted Mexico for not paying for them.^
Thanks to persons such as Senator Townsend* the
_  P-°yi9r-Jgttrn»l,Mar. 29* 1938* p. 6 and Lk Times. Mar. 29. 1938. p. 4.
^ Washington Post. March 30. 1938, p. 4.
^B1 Nacional. July 29, 1939. p. 2.
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U.S. silver policy continued to be nore a natter of whim 
than definite policy. In June 1939* the U.S. again 
temporarily stopped buying silver, precipitating another 
slight crisis in the Mexican economy. The Bank of Mexico 
announced that it would cease operations on the foreign 
exchange market in order to conserve what reserves it 
did have,33 Townsend was still trying to put an end to 
the silver purchases permanently, but he claimed that his 
proposed plan had nothing to do with Mexico's expropria­
tions of U.S. property. He even denied that it would 
hurt Mexico's economy, as industries would continue to 
buy foreign silver, principally from Mexico. Mexican 
newspaper reports to the contrary, the senator claimed 
that reports from Mexico even indicated no concern over 
official United States policy.3<*
In spite of what the senator said, discussions be­
tween U.S. officials and Mexican officials seemed to re­
veal that Mexico was always extremely concerned over that 
policy. In discussing the payment of claims for agrarian 
seitures, Sub-secretary of Foreign Relations Ram£n Beteta 
claimed that Cdrdenas did not want any suggestion to 
arise during the discussions that the United States
33Ibid.. June 28, 1939# P* 1«
36Excelsior. April 1, 19^0, Sect. II, p. 7.
resume purchasing s i l v e r T h i s  order from CArdenas 
was completely in keeping with his doctrine* Por Mexi­
co to have suggested officially that the United States 
resume its silver purchases in exchange for a settlement 
of agrarian claims would have been a fora of interven­
tion in the internal affairs of the United States*
Nevertheless* Ambassador Daniels got the impres­
sion in light of what was said by the Finance Minister* 
Eduardo SuArez, that the payment of claims in any sub­
stantial amount would depend on U.S. resumption of sil­
ver purchases.Since Mexico had expropriated the oil 
properties and was having difficulty finding markets* the 
silver purchases had to be important to the economy* To 
be true to his own policy* CArdenas could not make an 
agreement to settle claims based strictly on the ques­
tion of silver* but his Finance Minister realised that 
the purchases were necessary to sustain the government 
and meet at least some of Mexico's obligations*
A number of points* therefore* had been placed before 
the United States as reasons for continuing the silver 
policy as in previous years. Some of these points must 
have been valid* because a May 19^0 report indicates
37•"Josephus Daniels* dispatch* to U.S. Secretary of 
State, April 5. 1938, Doc. 812.6363/3358 L/JPS* RG 59.
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that in the previous year the United States had paid 
out $10,700,000 to Mexico for silver. The reason, how­
ever, for the article was that the United States had
39just voted to end purchases of foreign silver. 7 Of­
ficial United States policy continued to fluctuate for 
the next year and a half, although purchases of Mexican 
silver did not cease completely. Then in December 19̂ 1» 
when the Senate ratified the Washington agreements signed 
in November, the United States agreed to.purchase from 
Mexico 6,000,000 ounces of silver each month.
Because of the difference in overall reaction, the 
silver industry was treated somewhat differently from 
the oil industry. C&rdenas undoubtedly could have used 
the termination of the United States silver agreement as 
an excuse to claim intervention in Mexican internal af­
fairs. But the somewhat vacillating policy of the U.S. 
Treasury also gave Cardenas the opportunity to compro­
mise. Naturally, the idea that the silver industry was 
not as valuable to Mexico as the oil industry must have 
occurred to Cfirdenas, who had enough difficulties with­
out creating more.
3?U.S, News. May 17$ 191*,0, p. l*f.
^°New York Times. December 30, 19̂ 1, p. 8.
CHAPTER VII
MEXICO AND GREAT BRITAIN» OIL AND IMPERIALISM
While the most important facet of the relationship 
between the United States and Mexico over the oil expro­
priations often was the public opinion generated, the 
situation between Mexico and Great Britain was differ­
ent. There never was any real danger that Mexico and 
the United States might break relations over the mat­
ter.* But one of the problems facing Roosevelt fluid his 
Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, was the attitude of 
the British.
Immediately after the expropriations took place, 
Great Britain begpui adopting a hard line and insisted 
that the properties be returned to the former owners.
For Great Britain, the Cdrdenas Doctrine had no real 
significance. The British government took the stand 
that the stockholders of the companies were British 
citizens and that meant that the British government had
*B1 Nacional. April 2, 1938* P* 1 carried comments of Cardenas on the U.S. attitude. He sent a message to 
the U.S. ambassador, thanking the United States for its recognition of the sovereignty of Mexico.
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to protect their interestsv regardless of the political 
consequences* Naturally, the tremendous value of the 
oil properties also played a part in the British position*
This is not to say that British officials had not 
tried to avoid the expropriations in the first place or 
that they had not foreseen what might happen* The Brit­
ish minister in Mexico City talked with representatives 
of the Aguila Oil Company on March 6, 1938, almost two 
weeks before the expropriations, and had come up with a 
number of suggestions for avoiding a showdown with Carde­
nas.
The Mexican Federal Board of Conciliation and Arbi­
tration on January 19th had insisted that the oil comp­
anies comply with the decision of December 18, 1937* in 
which the companies were ordered to pay an increase of 
26 million pesos in wages. The British Minister be­
lieved that the government of Cardenas could convince 
the labor syndicates to accept the companies* earlier 
proposals since in the long run it would amount to more 
than 26 million pesos. But on the other hand, the Brit­
ish official advised the companies to accept the Labor 
Board’s decision and agree to spend an additional 26 mil­
lion pesos in wages and benefits combined.  ̂ Ambassador
2FRUS, 1938, Vol. V, p. 720.
3•'Josephus Daniels, enclosure to dispatch, to U.S. 
Secretary of State, March 31* 1938, Doc. 812.6363/3362,
RG 59.
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Daniels already had indicated to the companies that he 
felt they should give in and pay this figure. At one 
time they had insisted that they could not pay. Later 
they agreed to pay, but objected to certain administra-
Lltire clauses in the Labor Board's decision.
In the area of administrative changes, the British 
minister had suggested that the companies agree to a mix­
ed commission set up under the President's authority, 
but he seemed to be more concerned with the financial 
aspects at the time. He further suggested that the dif­
ference between the 26 million demanded in wages and the 
22 million offered by the companies be spent for houses, 
schools and other such benefits. The companies already 
had agreed to compromise by two million, and the British 
minister believed that the additional two million could 
be borrowed from the Bank of Mexico.^ It can be seen in 
these suggestions that the British officials were not as 
set against spending the extra money as were the officials 
of the oil companies. The official position even recog­
nized the possibilities of operating under different ad­
ministrative conditions from before, but the companies 
remained stubborn and refused to listen to the advice.
4PRUS, 1938, Vol. V, pp. 724.25.
'’Josephus Daniels, enclosure to dispatch, to U.S. 
Secretary of State, March 31, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/3362,
RG 59.
20k
With the advent of the expropriations* the British 
government took the part of the companies* and insisted 
on the return of the properties. Prom the very beginning 
the British attitude was firmer than that of the United 
States. There were those in the United States who felt 
that the British attitude in demanding the return of the 
oil properties might have complicated the U.S. position* 
but at the same time felt that the British were correct* 
and that perhaps the bluntness of their attitude might 
give Cardenas second thoughts
But Mexico, as well as other Latin American nations* 
long had held to the principles of the Calvo Clause* 
which as far back as 1868 had contended that foreign in­
vestors could not appeal to their own government inasmuch 
as they had recourse to the host nation’s courts. The 
Cardenas Doctrine had brought this idea up to date and 
had nationalized it to fit Mexico's needs. Cardenas went 
one step further in proclaiming that all foreigners in 
Mexico must consider themselves a3 nationals under Mexi­
can law. But the oil companies of both nations had im­
mediately turned to their respective governments for what 
they thought were some of their grievances. While the 
U.S. companies were given some sympathy and help from the 
State Department, the United States never intervened as
^New York Herald-Tribune, editorial, April 9, 1938*
p. 12.
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actively as did Great Britain.
It should be pointed out that in Great Britain* 
just as in the United States, there were groups and in­
dividuals who supported the action of Mexico. Within a 
matter of days of the expropriations* there began to be 
signs of this support. In London* in the House of Com­
mons* the Laborite Members of Parliament applauded the 
action of Cardenas. On the other hand* the conservative 
members wanted to know if the government had taken steps 
to protect British interests in Mexico; They were told 
that the British ambassador had talked with Cardenas and 
warned him of the consequences* but that the problem was 
only being studied by the British government.^
While the government was studying the problem* the 
CTM of Mexico sent its own version with pertinent data to 
the General Council of Labor Unions of England* request-
oing support. Within a few days the Labor Party in Great 
Britain sent a proclamation to Mexico saluting the action 
of the government. This proclamation correctly predict­
ed that the British government would stand firmly behind 
the oil companies in their protests* and stated that the 
labor movement would have to be prepared to withstand 
the strong opposition. Somewhat prematurely* the Labor
^E1 Nacional. March 24, 1938* p. 1
8Ibid.* Sect. Ill* p. 1.
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party congratulated Mexico on agreeing not to sell its 
petroleum to the fascist countries.9
While receiving such support from groups in Great 
Britain, Mexico still was critical of the British govern­
ment , much more so than of the United States. One news­
paper pointed out that Great Britain had the largest 
international debt in the world, and that this debt was 
practically unpayable.10 Yet Great Britain throughout 
the debate insisted that Mexico pay immediately for the 
expropriated properties.
In light of what is known, this insistence seems to 
have been made with the prior knowledge that the Mexican 
government could not comply. In his list of proposals 
made on March 6, 1938* and communicated to the Sub­
secretary of Foreign Relations of Mexico, the British 
minister indicated that should the companies be expro­
priated, then the Mexican government should be required 
to compensate for them within ten years. He even agreed 
that the liability incurred by the government to the 
Mexican bank for the loam he was suggesting the government 
underwrite for two million pesos would rank ahead of the 
liability to the companies.11 It is obvious, therefore,
9Ibid.. March 29, 1938, p. 1.
10Ibid,, May 1?, 1938, p. 5.
11Josephus Daniels, enclosure to dispatch, to U.S. 
Secretary of State, Mar. 31, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/3362,
RG 59.
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that before the expropriations actually occurred, the 
British government recognised the right of Mexico to 
spread the payments over a period of years. The demand 
for payment immediately then apparently was just an at­
tempt to get Mexico to return the properties.
Background to the Problem
In 1906, the company of S. Pearson and Son, Ltd.,
obtained special privileges which led to the establishment
of £1 Aguila, the company which grew to be the largest
and most powerful in Mexico. For twenty-nine years it
enjoyed special privileges considered later to have been
prejudicial to the national interests of Mexico. But in
1935* in accordance with his campaign to bring foreign
companies under Mexican law, President Cardenas signed
an administrative decree which supposedly brought £1 
*Aguila down to the level of businesses owned by Mexican
12nationals. A month later, the Stock Exchange in Lon­
don suspended trading for the company pending a meeting 
of shareholders. The reason for this action was that the 
Mexican Supreme Court, also in the spirit of CArdenas* 
program for returning Mexico to the Mexicans, had just 
indicated that the company might be forced to comply with
12B1 Nacional. February 5* 1935* P- 1
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Mexican labor board decisions*  ̂ Ordinarily, this action 
would not have seemed so unusual, but in light of the 
leniency with which the companies had been treated for 
the first quarter of a century of operation, it was a 
definite threat to their special position*
The British companies at least had moral support 
from the British government during these early days of 
disputes. The foreign investments in the Mexican petro­
leum industry then were considered to be around $500 
million (a figure later determined to be inflated), and 
the British government began considering a request from 
Mexico for information on the situation. The British be- 
came especially concerned when the rich MFoza Rica" field 
belonging to the British company was struck in 1937*
Yet, at the same time the British government was be­
coming concerned over the British investments In Mexico,
✓the management of £1 Aguila was stressing the Mexican 
character of the company* In denying a report which ap­
peared in one of the Mexican newspapers, which said that 
El Aguila was a subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell, the 
president of the company emphasized that the company had 
been established in accordance with Mexican laws and 
that the majority of the shares of the company were in the
13£1 Universal. March 7. 1935. Sect. II, p. 3.
lifIbid.. August 2k, 1937. Sect. II, p. 3.
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hands of the p u b l i c W h a t  was not made clear was 
whether the "public" to which he was referring was the 
Mexican or British public. Later the British government 
made it very clear to which public it felt the oil prop­
erties belonged.
The question of the nationality of the shareholders 
seemed to be unimportant in November 1937 after Cdrdenaa 
came to an agreement with the British company* There 
was optimism on all sides as even the Union of Petro­
leum Workers and Drillers congratulated the Mexican 
president for solving the problem* They felt that the 
agreement would mean not only direct benefits to the 
workers* but also additional job centers* and thus more 
jobs for Mexican workers in general.1*’ The honeymoon 
did not last very long as before the end of the year the 
company was complaining that it could not meet the de­
mands of the laborers.
The demands of the workers were upheld by the Laboe 
Board in December 1937* and £1 Aguila announced that it 
would appeal to the Mexican Supreme Court. The company 
claimed that the Labor Board's findings were inaccurate 
and that its profits in the preceding three years had
^̂ Novedades. August 25, 1937* pp. 1* 10.
■̂̂ Union of Petroleum Workers and Driller, letter, 
to President Cdrdenas* November 25* 1937* Paquete 4-21*
Exp. 527.1/8, Doc. 60899* AGN.
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been only $68,000,000 rather than the $163,000,000 claim­
ed by the Board, At the same time, the company denounc­
ed the administrative provisions set forth by the same
decision, saying that these provisions would wreck dis-
17cipline and make operations impossible. r As already 
pointed out above, it was the problem with the adminis­
trative clauses which seemed to bother the companies 
more than the financial side. Nevertheless, both Brit­
ish and American oil companies began belittling the pro­
fits they had made, while the Mexican government con­
tinued to emphasise the years of exploitation by the 
foreign investors.
When Cardenas announced the agreement reached with 
£1 Aguila in November 1937, he stressed that the item of 
major importance was the recognition by the foreign oil
companies of the right of the nation to the subsoil 
18wealth. Yet in their complaints about the lack of 
profits and the demands made by the workers, the comp­
anies were talking as if they felt the subsoil rights 
still belonged to them. As can be seen from the high 
valuations placed on the properties, the companies be­
lieved that Mexico should pay even for the future oil 
that the companies would have pumped out of the ground
17E1 Universal, Dec. 30, 1937, Sect. II, p. 5.
^Ibid.. January 2, 1938, p. 5»
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had they continued as owners.
The British company turned to its government after 
the expropriations, just as did the American companies, 
but the attitude of the British government probably kept 
the company from beginning meaningful talks with Mexico 
much longer than the American companies. Because of the 
hard line taken by the British government, the company 
probably felt that it could hold out for more of a share 
than received by the U.S.-ewned companies.
Through the American Embassy in London, the State 
Department learned that the Chief of the American Depart­
ment of the British Foreign Office was expressing the 
hope that the United States government would not let 
Mexico succeed in the expropriations. Probably trying 
to throw a scare into his U.S. counterparts to get them 
to take more definitive action, the British Foreign of­
ficer hinted that he believed Mexico was on the verge of 
a revolution.1  ̂ Although the British Foreign Office ob­
viously agreed with the State Department over the matter 
of immediate compensation, the similarity of the attitudes 
ended there.
By mid-19^0 there was still no authorisation from
1%erschel V. Johnson,.London dispatch, to U.S. 
Secretary of State, March 24, 1938, Doc. 812.6363/3301 
L/ttl, RG 59. This dispatch also shows the great concern 
of the British over similar action in other Latin Ameri­
can countries.
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either the company or the British government to anyone
20to talk to the Mexican government about the dispute.
As late as October 19*0» there were still rumors that 
El Aguila would return to operate in Mexico through ar­
rangements which would give the government of Mexico
2150% of the company's utilities. Just as many of the 
rumors surrounding the oil question, this proved to be 
unfounded.
While the British companies were hoping that they 
would be able to return to their former properties, they 
were also depending on their government to do most of 
the work for them. The British government, in turn, 
although probably appalled at the somewhat weak position 
taken by the State Department, nevertheless turned to 
the United States for support and cooperation.
The Breaking of Relations
On March 21, 1938, the British government wrote a 
note to Eduardo Hay stating that the government of Great 
Britain claimed retention of all previous rights in the 
matter of petroleum. The note said that no earlier com­
plaint had been issued in the hope that the government of 
Cfirdenas itself would correct the situation and return
^°B1 Universal. June 16, 19̂ 0, p. 1. 
^ Todo. October 7, 19**3» P« 6.
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the properties to the companies. The British were not 
discussing the general right even of a government to ex­
propriate property for public utility with accompanying 
compensation, but claimed that the Mexican expropriations 
were arbitrary. The British also claimed that the award 
by the Board of Conciliation and Arbitration was not 
justified by the facts. It was also believed that the 
facts of the case did not justify such a drastic action 
as expropriation, and therefore the act was totally un­
justifiable, since the British could not fathom how the 
expropriations served the public utility. According to 
the official note, the act was merely a political one 
designed to acquire permanently the advantages of the 
control of the properties. The message concluded with
the statement that Great Britain could see no solution
22other than the return of the properties.
In discussing the situation with the British, Cfirde- 
nas always rejected the use of the word "arbitrary" in 
connection with the oil expropriations. He was so op­
posed. to the use of the word that he personally refused 
to accept a second note which utilized the same word.
For this reason, the British had to address the note to 
the Minister of Foreign Kelations rather than to the
22E1 Nacional. April 12, 1938, p. 1.
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president.2̂  For C&rdenag, there was nothing arbitrary 
in taking what he believed really belonged to Mexico,
In answer to the British note, the Mexican govern­
ment stated that in the case of SI Xguila, the company 
was a Mexican enterprise (just as the president of the 
company had stated), and that the British government had 
no right to patronize the company and interfere in the in­
ternal affairs of Mexico. In official language, the Mexi­
can government insisted that it could not recognise the 
right of Great Britain, under the guise of protecting 
shareholder interest in a Mexican enterprise, to inter­
fere in the judicial proceedings of the Mexican courts*
The note went on to say that Mexico recognized the right 
of each nation to determine its own definition of public 
utility, and that the action was therefore in any case 
justified. Mexico was denying the right of the British 
government to interpet the rules of expropriation of 
property in Mexico, and thus was interpreting for Great 
Britain the heart of the Cardenas Doctrine. The British 
government was also reminded that the Mexican people 
publicly had shown their good faith and intention to pay 
compensation. In conclusion, the Mexican Foreign Minister 
again emphasized that a Mexican company such as £1 Xguila
2^Pierre de L. Boal and Lawrence Duggan, memorandum 
of telephone conversation, April 8, 1938, Doc. 812,6363/ 
3518. RG 59.
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had no right even to seek the protection of a foreign 
okpower. If Great Britain had not understood the Car­
denas Doctrine up to this point* the Mexican note should 
have made it very clear.
When Washington learned of the contents of the 
Mexican note to Great Britain* officials probably were 
glad they had taken a more diplomatic approach to the 
matter. Although both the United States and Great Brit­
ain were in the same situation, Mexican newspapers seem­
ed to think that Washington had acted a little more 
realistically than had Great Britain.2^
Mexican public opinion might have thought the United 
States was acting more realistically, but the British 
government had its own opinions. The government of Great 
Britain refused to admit the validity of the points made 
by the Mexican Foreign Minister in his note. The British 
claimed that they were not defending the company as such, 
but were arguing in favor of the shareholders of the comp­
any, whose nationality now was admitted as being English.
2̂ E1 Nacional. April 14, 1938, pp. 1, 4.
2-*El Universal. April 15, 1938, p. 1. U.S. Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles a few days earlier had 
explained to the British ambassador in Washington that 
the United States saw no need in exchanging notes with 
Mexico utilizing harsh words. See Sumner Welles, memo­
randum of conversation with Sir Ronald .Lindsay, April 1, 
1938, Doc. 812.6363/3325 L/JPS, RG 59.
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The British admitted that in the strict sense of the word 
the company was Mexican, but argued that the majority of 
the shareholders were British, and that the enterprise was 
essentially British. For this reason, the government of 
Great Britain felt it had the right to complain about the 
expropriation, since there was an "international right" 
of a foreign state to protect its interests, thus allowing 
a State to intervene in behalf of its subjects. As an 
additional reason for intervention, the British question­
ed whether, as Mexican claimed, there had been no denial
of justice, calling the Mexican action contrary to inter-
26national law. The British still could not understand
that Mexico did not even accept the right of a foreign
government to question whether there had been a denial
of justice in the Mexican courts.
While this exchange of notes was taking place, the
English Legation in Mexico City let it be known publicly
that the best reply Mexico could make to the British
notes was simply to return the properties to their for- 
27mer owners. ' Mexico*s next answer was not what the 
British Legation desired.
In its answer, Mexico claimed that the British had 
admitted in their note that the company was Mexican in
26B1 Naclonal. April 22, 1938, pp. 1, 5.
2?Novedades. April 26, 1938, p. 1.
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spite of the British stockholders, and that because the 
company was Mexican, there was absolutely no basis for 
intervention. Furthermore, Mexico did not consider the 
stockholder as a co-proprietor of social goods, and he 
was considered only to have certain rights in the dis­
solution or liquidation of the company. Also, the note
went on to say, there would be no loss to British sub-
28jects since they would be compensated by Mexico.
Mexico then indicated that Mexican law did not per­
mit handing over of subsoil rights to any company, and 
that any foreigner involved in Mexico must consider him­
self the same as any Mexican, again alluding to what was 
to become the Cardenas Doctrine. In so doing, the in­
dividual gives up his right to invoke the protection of 
his government. Furthermore, the Mexican government 
again rejectedjthe idea of any denial of justice to the 
companies, saying that they still had recourse to the 
Mexican courts, and that no government could claim the 
right of intervention while its nationals still had not 
exhausted the judicial processes of the host nation.29
Up to this time the notes from Great Britain had 
been considered rude,-̂0 but there still was opportunity
28E1 Nacional. April 27, 1938, p. 1.
29U>id.
3°Ibid.. May 6, 1938, p. 8.
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for the two governments to settle their dispute. Then 
in Hay 1938 the British government asked for immediate 
payment of an annual debt that Hexico had failed to pay 
when due in January. The British claimed that a similar 
debt owed to the United States had been paid promptly.
The demand also noted the expropriation, and in addi­
tion to listing Mexican debts, added that the cost of 
the oil properties would greatly increase the amount.^1
Mexico had listened to enough from Great Britain. 
This last note was am insult that the Mexican government 
could not ignore,-̂ 2 In referring to the British note 
demanding the immediate payment of the Mexican debt, the 
Minister of Foreign Relations presented a check to Great 
Britain for $361,737*17• At the same time, Mexico said 
that it felt there was no alternative except to close its 
Legation in London. The Foreign Minister added that
Mexican financial conditions were no affair of the Brit-
33ish government. In handing over the check for the
•^Herachel V. Johnson, London dispatch, to U.S. 
Secretary of State, May 19, 1938, Doc. 712.4/75 L/JPS,
RG 59 (original sourcei Parliamentary Debates, House of 
Commons, London, May 16, 1938).
•^Personal interview. Author with Jestfs Silva 
Hersog. L.S.U. Archives.
•̂ Bl Nacional. May 14, 1938, p. 1. Clement Attlee 
and others expressed similar views when asking the British 
Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs if the U.S. ever had 
questioned Great Britain's internal debt. See Parlia­
mentary Debates, House of Commons, London, May 16, 1938.
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annual Indemnity and at the same time informing Great 
Britain of the break in relations, Mexico reminded the 
British that even the most powerful governments were
34not always up-to-date in the payments of their debts.^ 
Cirdenas noted the breaking of relations simply by stat­
ing that the British government had gone beyond the
3 *5limits of tolerance for Mexico. J
On preparing to leave Mexico, Owen St. Claire 
O'Malley, the British minister, stated that he believed 
there was no anti-British feeling in Mexico. The news 
of the break in London was published without any real 
outcry on the part of the British press,and the 
Mexican minister in London stated that the situation was 
more like a suspension in relations than a break.^
Although there might not have been a public out­
cry in London, it was noted that for the first time in 
one hundred years a foreign power had broken relations 
with England. The British claimed they were not being 
vindictive in asking for the payment of debts, but that 
there had been no other solution. The government of
3ifEl Universal. May 14, 1938, Sect. II, p. 3.
■^C^rdenas, Obraa. Tomo I, p. 394.
^^Herschel V. Johnson, London dispatch, to U.S. 
Secretary of State, May 19, 1938, Doc. 712.4/75 L/JPS,
RG 59.
3?E1 Universal. May 15, 1938, Sect. II, p. 2.
9
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Great Britain expressed regret over the breaking of rela- 
tionSf and hoped it would be only a temporary suspension. 
This was believed to be the case since the Mexican Con­
sul General remained in London* although O'Malley had 
received orders from his government to leave Mexico.38
According to sources in Great Britain, it would be 
up to the initiative of Mexico to resume relations, but 
that full payment of debts would be needed before the re­
sumption of full relations. At the same time there was 
concern in Washington over the split. Especially trouble­
some was the idea that the United States might be called 
on to act as intermediary.39 Although the British repre­
sentative in Washington talked with his U.S. counter­
parts over the situation, there was no immediate official 
request made public for the United States to act on be­
half of Great Britain.
Rather than entrust their affairs to the United 
States, the British almost immediately ordered the Con­
sul General of the British Consulate in New York to go
to Mexico as a representative of the British govem- 
Zj>0ment. At the same time, the Minister of Denmark in 
Mexico was asked to take charge of the British interests
38B1 Nacional. May 15, 1938, p. 5.
39I_bid.. May 16, 1938, p. 5.
L nEl Universal. May 25, 1938, p. 1.
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2liin the Mexican capital.
This did not mean that Great Britain was not inter-
42ested in United States cooperation in the matter. Dur­
ing the next several years, the British government was 
very concerned with just what the United States was doing 
over the petroleum issue. When the United States start­
ed suggesting arbitration, the British government was 
first worried that the United States would succeed in 
getting Mexico to agree to the suggestion, then concern­
ed that the British would not be included.
In discussing the matter of arbitration, the Brit­
ish ambassador to the United States wanted the U,S, to 
include in any proposal for arbitration the question of 
the British properties also, and for the two governments 
to agree on the terms. He was told by the State Depart­
ment that the United States could not agree to include 
the British properties, and that there could be no agree­
ment to a joint United States-Great Britain proposal for 
the arbitsation. At the time, the main reason given was
^Ibid.. May 26, 1938, p. 1.
42In fact, Great Britain did approach the United 
States about assuming representation of British interests 
in Mexico. The British ambassador to the United States 
was told that the State Department believed it could be 
more helpful if it did not become the British representa­
tive, thus having to speak for both U.S. and British in­
terests. See Sumner Welles, memorandum of conversation 
with Sir Ronald Lindsay, June 1, 1938, Doc. 712.4/81 i,
RG 59.
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that the United States wanted to avoid having opponents 
accuse the two governments of imperialistic motives. 
Although this might have been a realistic reason for 
turning down the British proposal, apparently the dif­
ference in attitude toward the problem was the deciding 
factor.
Great Britain indicated this wide difference in 
opinion when pointing out what would be acceptable terms 
for arbitration. The British ambassador to the United 
States indicated that the only way his government would 
agree to arbitration would be that if the tribunal select­
ed decided the only practical solution was the return of 
the properties, then this action would be acceptable 
under the terms of the convention. The problem with 
this attitude was twofold. First, the United States had 
not invited. Great Britain to participate in arbitration. 
Secondly, it should have been obvious by that time that 
Mexico was not going to consider any idea which enter­
tained the thought of returning the properties.
The British were not deterred, however, by the cold 
United States attitude toward a joint proposal. Through 
the British Embassy in Washington, the British government 
insisted that any separation of the two cases would weak­
en both and would be considered as a victory by Mexico.
^FRUS, 1940, Vol. V, pp. 982-84. 
^Ibid.. pp. 988-89.
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It was pointed out also that the friendly relations of 
the various companies would be in danger, especially 
if the separation encouraged the Mexican government to 
deal separately with each company. J What the British 
were saying was that the British government did not want 
to see the American companies receive any kind of compen­
sation at the expense of the British companies.
In putting an end to this debate, Under Secretary
of State Welles made it clear to the British ambassador
that the United States recognized there was no "united
front" between his government and Great Britain in this
case. Welles emphasized that he knew the British were
only interested in having the properties returned, while
the United States had never questioned Mexico's right
46to expropriate the properties.
The Chamberlain government in Great Britain never 
really seemed to realize this position with any clarity. 
In fairness to Great Britain, it should be realized that 
the situation facing that country was slightly different 
at the time from that facing the United States. Great 
Britain was dependent on outside sources for petroleum, 
and was especially worried about repercussions in other 
countries, not only in Latin America, but in countries
^5Ibid.. pp. 991. 
46Ibid.. p . 995.
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such as Iran and Iraq. For Great Britain, oil was of
U>7vital interest to her national defense. ' In addition 
to this reasoning, Chamberlain probably looked on Carde­
nas as directing a communist-style government, and he 
didn’t want what he considered as British oil supporting 
such a regime.
No matter what his reasoning, Chamberlain decided 
to stick to that policy. He announced before the House 
of Commons in July 1938 that his government was not 
ready to make any proposals to Mexico regarding the pos­
sibility of the revival of relations. CSrdenas hinted 
that he would not object to the renewal of relations if 
Great Britain would make an unconditional proposal for
such renewal. Britain would make no such proposal ac-
kflcording to Chamberlain. After this refusal, Mexico 
indicated that it would not make the first move toward 
a resumption of relations, but that it would be up to 
Chamberlain to initiate the action.^
For approximately the next two years Great Britain 
was to continue to tie the question of the oil proper­
ties to the renewal of relations. In November 1938, in 
answer to a question in the House of Commons on the
47Ibld.. 1939, Vol. V, p. 718.
ilAJB1 Universal. July 26, 1938, p. 1.
h oyNovedades. July 30* 1938, p. 4.
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Mexican situation, the British Under Secretary of Foreign 
Relations said that in view of the Mexican attitude tow­
ard British properties, the government could not consid­
er the renewal of diplomatic relations.**0 Six months 
later, the House of Commons was told that the British 
government considered the re-establishment of relations 
to be in the best interests of British subjects, but that 
the policy of the British government could not change un­
til Mexico had reconsidered her attitude toward the ex­
propriated prope rtie s • ***
What the British meant by a change in Mexican at­
titude was that the Mexican government would agree to 
British proposals. By late 1939 the British, in their 
own minds, had compromised somewhat, and were willing to 
see a partnership between the Mexican government and the 
oil companies. The two "partners" would split profits 
while management would be in the hands of neutral par­
ties. Cardenas and his advisers could plainly see that 
this suggestion still carried more benefits for the comp­
anies than for Mexico. Under the existing conditions, 
Mexico didn’t have to split the profits with anyone. In
**°B1 Universal. November 3# 1938* P» 2.
^Herschel V, Johnson, London dispatch, to U.S. 
Secretary of State, May 10, 1939» Doc. 712.4/83 DG,
RG 59.
52FRUS. 1939, Vol. V., pp. 709-10.
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addition* one of the key issues was that of control* and 
Cdrdenas jealously guarded Mexico's right to control her 
own industries.
When the Mexican Supreme Court on December 2* 1939 
handed down a decision (a decision the British government 
called a farse), the British complained to the United 
States State Department that this action ended the 
chances of the companies to receive legal redress in 
Mexico. The British suggested that the only possible 
agreement could be through a long-term lease since Mexico 
simply could not pay. They also used the old argument 
that Mexico was incapable of efficiently running the prop­
erties.^ The British arguments impressed neither the 
State Department nor the Mexican authorities* and there­
fore the two governments were at an impasse in regards to 
their renewal of relations.
One more year passed before the two governments 
seemed to get serious over the resumption of relations.
In May 1940 Minister of Foreign Relations Eduardo Hay 
was interviewed after it was rumored that Chamberlain's 
government was interested in ending the oil dispute. Hay 
said that Mexico also wanted to end the quarrel if a just 
solution could be found.^ Note should be taken of the
53Ibld.. pp. 715-18.
^ *B1 Nacional. May 4, 1940, p. 1.
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datei military problems besetting Great Britain at this 
time began overshadowing the political and even the eco­
nomic problem of individual English enterprises.
The military reason for England's desire to come to 
an accord with Mexico was substantiated when it was re­
ported that Great Britain, toward the end of May 19̂ 0, in 
an attempt to develop a military force to defeat Germanyt 
was ready to try to re-establish relations with Mexico.
One of the reasons* as was obvious by this time* was to 
reduce the possibility that Germany would acquire petro­
leum from Mexico.^
Yet the British had said earlier that the outbreak 
of war made it more necessary than ever not to oondone the 
expropriations. The British government felt that the war 
made conditions for settlement even more propitious* and 
had suggested that the United States use its influence 
Mexico night not have wanted to sell petroleum to Ger­
many* but C&rdenas was not so concerned about the war at 
that time that his nationalization program could be aban­
doned.
But by June 19^0 the situation seemed to have become 
even more critical for Great Britain, and the British gov­
ernment seemed to be considering compromising even more.
55Ihid.. May 26, 19^0, p. 3.
56FRUS. 1939. Vol. V, p. 707.
228
The British Under Secretary for Foreign Relations stated 
before Parliament that it mas desirable to straighten out 
the problem with Mexico, this time admitting that petro­
leum was becoming very important.^7 It looked as if the 
problem was almost settled when Mexico started speaking 
of the possibility of ending the problem and emphasised 
that relations really had not been broken, but suspended, 
and that consuls of both countries had been acting in the 
interests of the two governments.'*®
In spite of the stated desires of both countries to 
renew relations, nothing was done toward this end in 194-0. 
Perhaps it was because Great Britain had so insulted Mexi­
co that the Cdrdenas administration simply would have 
lost face had it agreed to a resumption of relations. It 
could also have been attributed to the opening up of a 
few markets for Mexico, so that Cdrdenas was not so 
dependent on contracts from British firms.
Toward the end of the summer of 1941, after CArdenas 
had left office, the world situation was even worse, and 
Mexico had to be aware of the problems facing Great Brit­
ain. In August, a number of senators approached Ezequiel 
Padilla, the new minister of Foreign Relations, about the 
renewal of relations with Great Britain. Their argument
57*1 Nacional. June 13, 1940, p. 2.
^®Ibld.. June 14, 1940, p. 1.
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was that it was incongruent that there were no friendly 
relations between two democratic countries in such ter­
rible tines.Less than one month later, a group of 
senators and deputies called for the immediate renewal 
of relations with Great Britain and the U.S.S.R., stat­
ing that these two nations were leading the fight against 
the fascist forces*
Whether because of the petitions of various Mexi­
cans, the worsening world situation, or just the fact that 
the Cdrdenas government was no longer in power, relations 
were renamed with Great Britain, as the Mexican Minister 
of Foreign Relations announced on October 21, 1941 that 
through mutual agreement the two governments had resumed
diplomatic relations*^ The news of the renewal was
62warmly received in Washington, mainly because it in­
dicated a fora of solidarity of Mexico with the democrat­
ic nations against the Axis* The resumption of diplomat­
ic ties, however, did not mean a settlement of the oil 
controversy.
^Novedades. August 10, 1941, p. 1*
^°la Vos. Sept. 1, 1941, p. 6. Private citizens 
also added their voices to the pleas for resumption of 
relations with these two countries* See ibid.. Sept. 8, 
1941, p. 6.
^ Novsdadea. October 22, 1941, p. 1.
62Ibid.. October 23, 19^1» P* 1.
230
.MeXirai.QU
The road to the resumption of normal relations mas 
not very smooth. First, there had been simply the prob­
lem of the expropriations themselves, and the hard at­
titude of the British government. But this was net the 
only question that faced the two governments during the 
time of broken relations. When Mexico started looking 
for buyers for her oil, the British decided that it was 
in the best interests of both the companies and the Brit­
ish government to try to close off the potential markets.
Less than one month after the expropriations, the 
British Under Secretary of Poreign Relations announced 
the British government's opposition to any part taken by 
British citizens or companies in the purchase of oil 
produced from expropriated British property. Some Brit­
ish interests had begun negotiating with Mexico to pur­
chase all of its oil exports. The British government in­
structed its minister to try to block the deal in spite 
of assurances from the British firm that should war break 
out, all the oil would go to Great Britain.^ This at­
tempt to block private contracts started rumors of an 
embargo on Mexican oil. But Mexico must have felt at
•̂ Pierre de L. Boal and Lawrence Duggan, memorandum 
of telephone conversation, kpril 8, 1938* Doc. 812.6363/ 
3518, RG 59.
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the time that petroleum was so valuable to British secur­
ity that the government would fear trying to set any kind 
of formal ban. Unfortunately for Mexico, the rumors soon 
proved to have some basis in fact.
Shortly after the rumors of a ban had been denied, 
an official statement by Prime Minister Chamberlain was 
read to the House of Commons which stated that no oil 
from Mexico would be bought by the British government un­
til a satisfactory solution to the problem had been ar- 
6kranged. In retaliation, a group of Mexican senators 
passed a resolution stating that since Great Britain had 
declared a boycott against Mexican oil, Mexico would not 
sell any oil to the British government then or in the 
future, even if the policy were changed and Mexico re­
ceived a request for permission to buy oil.^ Since the 
British government had just stated that it would not buy 
Mexican oil, this resolution was more of a defense of the 
dignity of Mexico than anything else.
The boycott soon became portentious for Mexico. In 
August 1938 El Xguila petitioned before the court in The 
Hague to be allowed to place an embargo on Mexican oil 
in a tanker in the port of Rotterdam. ̂  The company
^ 1  Nacional. April 30, 1938, p. 1
65Ibld.. May 12, 1938, p. 1. 
^^Novedades. August 19* 1938, p. 1. 
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went ahead and seised the oil* protesting that the oil
shipped to the Netherlands actually belonged to the
British company. The Dutch court* however* decided
against the company* saying that it had not proved that
the seised oil had come from its property.**?
The decision was a welcome one for Mexico* since the
boycott by England and the cool attitude of the United
States had sent the Mexican economy into a tailspin. Even
without the problems of trying to learn how to do the
technical aspects of the job, tasks previously done by
the British and Americans, Mexico in the early days was
hard-pressed to find world markets.
The decision did not deter the British, however.
In Dordrecht, The Netherlands* the company again seized
250 tons of gasoline shipped from Mexico, and again
petitioned a Dutch court* asking that a decision be made
68as to whether the oil really belonged to the company.
This time the Mexican government lost the battle.
After having its right to seize Mexican oil upheld 
in Belgium and The Netherlands* the British company seis­
ed some 12,900 tons of petroleum shipped to Le Havre,
Prance* and in October 1938 brought up the first court
69case in that country. 7 The initial decision by the court
**?E1 Universal. Aug. 24, 1938, Sect. II, p. 2.
68Ibid.. Aug. 27, 1938, Sect. II, p. 5.
69Ibid.. Oct. 12, 1938, Sect. II, p. 3.
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was that the company had the right to seize Mexican 
petroleum as it apparently legally still belonged to the 
companies. The Mexican government asked the court to 
decide on the legality of the British embargo and to have 
it lifted.?0 The decision of the court automatically 
denied this petition, and Mexico seemed to have untold 
riches which it could not sell.
But after the provisional court order allowed the 
seizure of the Mexican oil in October 1938, the civil 
court in Le Havre in July of the next year reversed this 
decision.?1 The new case involved the tf.R. Davis comp- 
anyf which was concerned with obtaining German contracts 
for Mexican oil after Mexico failed to find markets in 
the democratic countries. In July 1939* the court deci­
sion was in favor of Davis and the French importers of 
Mexican oil. The court claimed that £1 Iguila could not 
really prove the oil belonged to the company. In addi­
tion , the court decided that the company must pay damages 
both to Davis and the French importers.?2
The decision of the court was announced immediately 
in Mexico by the Minister of Foreign Relations* who said 
that the British company would be responsible for damages
?°Ibld.. Oct. 29* 1938, p. 1.
71Ibid.. July 23, 1939, Sect. II, p. 5.
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and losses incurred by Mexico in the confiscation of the 
oil shipment. He felt that the decision not only gave 
more international validity to Mexico*s right to expro­
priate the properties, but also opened the French aarket 
for Mexican oil,?^ giving Mexico a market that came at 
an appropriate time*
Davis, mho was still acting as an agent for the mar­
keting of Mexican oil, indicated the importance of Prench 
and other ports in October of the same year when he com­
plained of further British seizures. He protested that 
the British had seised an additional 32,000 tons of petro­
leum belonging to his company and bought from Mexico.
The oil had been shipped to Scandinavian countries in 
three ships contracted by Davis. He indicated at the 
same time that he held contracts for large quantities of 
Mexican oil, but that it was practically impossible to 
sell it to European nations because of the opposition of 
the British. He wanted to sell the oil to Italy, but was 
afraid that the British would confiscate the oil when the 
ships passed Gibraltar.?**
Even the aarket in France proved to be an illusory 
one. In November 1939 it was reported that France was 
ready to make a large deal with Mexico for petroleum, but
73B1 Nacional. July 23, 1939* p. 1.
?**£! Universal. October 10, 1939* Sect. II, p. 3.
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that British protests supposedly ruined the deal. Because 
of such failures, it was believed that perhaps the United 
States would be called on to help Mexico solve the prob­
lem of the British embargos.^
The United States was not involved officially in 
trying to end this particular phase of the problem, and 
Mexico continued to have problems marketing the oil. It 
was only after the failure to find other markets, a 
situation caused mainly by the British embargo, that 
Mexico seriously turned toward Germany, Italy and Japan.
On the problem of international markets, Jesds 
Silva Herzog, who became the director of distribution, 
indicated that the loss of some German contracts during 
the time of the British embargo had really endangered the 
Mexican oil program. In addition, although Mexico had 
found a market for a time in Italy,when that country en­
tered the war on the side of Germany, another important 
market had been lost.^
With the entry of Italy into the war, however, the 
situation changed somewhat. It is true that the market 
was lost to Mexico, but the attitude of Great Britain al­
so changed slightly. Foreign Minister Hay annnounced that 
Mexico was ready to negotiate with Great Britain over
^^Ibid.. November 6, 1939. Sect. II, p. 4.
^Novedades. August 6, 19^0, pp. 1, 10.
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the petroleum issue, after the news was published that 
Neville Chamberlain's government had stated it would pre­
fer to negotiate with Mexico rather than see Mexican oil 
shipped to Italy and then re-shipped to Germany,77 Al­
though Britain couldn't seem to understand the Cardenas 
Doctrine, she could understand the exigencies of war.
Nevertheless, the British government at that time 
still was not concerned enough about its own situation to 
push for a settlement with the C&rdenas government. No 
doubt, the British realized that within a few months 
Cfrdenas would be out of office, and they probably felt 
that his successor would not be faced with the same polit­
ical problems in settling the dispute. In the meantime, 
Great Britain continued to refuse to deal with Mexico 
and hindered Mexican efforts to make the new nationalized 
industry productive•
77Ibid.. May 4, 1940, p. 1.
CHAPTER VIII
LAZAJRO CARDENAS. J8IDER STATESMAN. OF MEXICO
Cardenas did not disappear completely from the 
political scene when he finished his term of office* but 
to say he was a dynamic figure in determining Mexican 
foreign policy would be to give him too much credit. 
Perhaps his greatest contribution to Mexico during the 
1940*8 and 1950*s was his divorce from active partici­
pation in the affairs of Mexican politics. This lack 
of an attempt to influence affairs was something rela­
tively new for ex-presidents of Mexico.
When the new government announced its plans to 
modify Article 3 of the constitution, Cardenas admit­
ted he did not like the modifications since they would 
aid the ambitions of the clergy.1 But he did nothing 
to try to force the new president to change his plans, 
and indication that Cardenas really meant to stay out 
of active politics. As will be seen below, Cdrdenas was
^Ldzaro Cdrdenas, Obraai I-Aountes 1941-1956.Tomo II (Mexicoi Universidad Nacional Auttfnoma deMexi­
co, 1973), PP. 18-19.
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not always pleased with his successor's relations with 
the United States* but again he did not exert pressure 
to have the new government adhere to his personal wishes.
Cdrdenas himself tried to strengthen relations be­
tween Mexico and the United States during the last few 
months in office. He worked out the details for resolv­
ing all outstanding problems between the two nations.
The first question was the total amount of claims and 
counterclaims. Cirdenas refused to oblige Mexico to make 
agreements beyound its capacity to pay since involuntary
suspension of payments would have been prejudicial. In
\
addition* he worked out agreements to stabilize Mexican 
currency through a loan of $30 million dollars* while at 
the same time the United States agreed to raise the import 
quota for Mexican petroleum. Mexico meanwhile was able 
to negotiate separately with each company over the expro­
priations. Another source of irritation during his ad­
ministration had been the silver-buying policy* and this 
question also was more or less resolved before he left of­
fice. A question not resolved but discussed was that of 
the problem of international rivers between the two neigh­
bors. Cdrdenas believed that all these questions needed 
to be studied together* and felt that by bringing them up 
his administration served as a transition from a period 
of differences to one full of possibilities of mutual
239
friendship.2
After discussing these questions with the United 
States and leaving office, Cardenas tried to fade into 
the background. But his youth and popularity kept him 
from becoming totally obscure politically. In spite of
not putting any pressure on his successors, CArdenas was
3constantly sought out for his opinions. Nevertheless, 
while he might have been important to Mexico, his actions 
attracted little international attention until his stand 
during the Cuban-United States conflict in the i960's.
This is not to say that he failed to have direct 
dealings with countries outside Mexico in the intervening 
years. When Cardenas heard the declaration of war by the 
United States on Japan in late 1941, he indicated he hop­
ed Mexico would not follow other nations in doing the 
same, although he recognized the need to collaborate with 
the democratic countries. Nevertheless, he sent a mes­
sage to the Mexican president offering his services if
needed. Camacho immediately called and asked him to come
n,to Mexico City from Jiquilpan. When CArdenas finished
2Ibid.. pp. 13-14.
3Ibid. There are so many instances throughout the 
immediate years following his retirement that it would be 
impossible to list them all. All of volume II is evidence 
of this close connection with national leaders.
4Ibld.. pp. 52-53.
his term of office, he expressed the desire to become 
just a private citisen, but he felt he had to serve when 
called to service by the new president. Avila Caaacho 
informed C&rdenas of this desire in December 1941, and 
in early January of the next year Cdrdenas took up his 
new responsibility as commander of the Pacific Military 
Region.^ During the next several months C&rdenas again 
found himself confronted by what he termed intervention 
by the United States in Mexican affairs.
Within a few weeks of taking office, Cfrdenas talk­
ed with the conaander of the 4 th U.S. army, who present­
ed a defense plan to him. On studying the plan, Cdrde- 
naa realised that the United States was proposing that 
U.S. forces participate in defense operations of Mexico. 
Cdrdenas personally rejected the plan since it not only 
would have damaged Mexican sovereignty, but aade Mexico 
seen to be an inferior country.^ He rejected any fora 
of United States intervention in the oil dispute while he 
was president, and now as a military officer he Rejected 
any idea of U.S. troops on Mexican territory.
When told by the U.S. commander several months later 
that he had been instructed to place radar equipment in 
Baja California and to staff the stations with U.S. per­
sonnel, Cdrdenas informed him that Mexico was capable of
^Ibid.. pp. 64-66,
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handling such installations* and that as far as he knew 
his orders were to have Mexicans staff all installations 
within the territory.^ On May 16* 1942* however* he 
learned that the Mexican-United States Joint Defense Com­
mission had come to an agreement on U.S. troops' entering 
Mexico. He felt this agreement represented more of a 
threat to Mexican sovereignty than any act during his
Dpresidency. His attitude over this issue indicates two 
things about the former president. First* it shows that 
it was not only the CArdenas Doctrine he was upholding as 
president against the oil companies* but also a deep re- 
rentment of any form of foreign control. More important­
ly* from a strictly political standpoint* was the failure 
in spite of this attitude either to try to force Xvila 
Camacho to follow Cardenas' desires or to resign.
This latter point is emphasised in the attitude of 
Cardenas when the president called him to Mexico in May 
1942 to inform him that Mexico would have to declare war 
on the Axis. Although expressing his concern at such a 
secision* Cardenas also reiterated that he remained at 
the orAAvs of his government.^ The president might not 
have agreed with CArdenas* ideas on maintaining a position




of neutrality, but he recognised the value of such a man 
in a war-time government. On September 11, 19k2, Carde­
nas was named Secretary of National Defense,10 a position 
he held for the rest of the war years.
No sooner did Cardenas take over as the Defense 
Secretary when he again faced the theoretical threat of 
United States' intervention in Mexican internal affairs.
The United State8 began suggesting in late 19^2 that the 
railroad system in Mexico needed overhauling with the aid 
and supervision of U.S. technicians. Cdrdenas argued 
against active participation by the United States in the 
administration of the project.11 CSrdenas, therefore, 
was taking a much narrower view of intervention than the 
government of his successor.
Probably a combination of these problems with the 
United States and a winding down of the war caused Carde­
nas to ask in October 19^ that he be relieved of his 
post. His official reasoning was that in the political 
campaign about to begin certain elements might try to use 
him and his political background to cause the president 
problems if he remained as Secretary of National De­





was his resignation accepted.1̂
On leaving office as Secretary of National Defense, 
Cdrdenas looked back with pleasure on his days in the 
Pacific Military Region and the constant refusal to al­
low U.S. troops to enter Mexico to do what he knew Mexi­
cans could do. In sunning up his country's contributions 
to the war, he proudly emphasized the building of air­
strips, participation of Squadron 201 in Pacific Opera­
tions, the active service of thousands of Mexican resi­
dents in the United States, and the service of braceros 
(Mexican farm labor) in the United States.1** It is a 
little odd that he would single out the contribution of 
the braceroa since he opposed their entrance into the 
United States and continued to do so for years.^
In spite of his conflicts with the United States, 
during the 1940's C&rdenas was more involved in national 
politics than in international affairs. After he left 
his cabinet post when the war ended, Cdrdenas was again 
called to national service by Miguel Alemdn, this time as 
Executive Committee Member of an agricultural board.
Finally Cdrdenas was able to do officially what he wanted
13Ibid.. p. 185.
1/fIbid.. p. 186,
*^Por example, see ibid.. p. 20?.
^Todo. June 5, 1947, p. 5.
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to do when he left the presidency-- work with an held 
the rural Mexican laborers.
During this period of time, C&rdenas insisted that 
he was nothing but a private citizen and that what he 
said had no importance on the affairs of the Mexican 
government. He stated that he was only a patriotic citi­
zen serving the country and that he was a loyal servant
17of the Mexican president. ' One of the reasons he began 
making such statements was that during Alemdn's admin­
istration, he was accused of intervening in the affairs
of his home state, Michoac&n, where his brother was
idelected governor. There is no evidence to indicate 
the truth of the accusation, and Gdrdenas denied it 
publicly. Ex-presidents had intervened so often in 
Mexican politics that maybe the newspapers just expected 
C£rdenas to follow the same pattern.
But there was definitely more to the attacks by the 
press than just tradition. Almost any regime following 
Cfrdenas would have appeared to swing toward the Right. 
Therefore, all the rightists who had felt neglected under 
Cdrdenas now had a chance to voice protests against him.
One problem he faced was his attitude toward the 
United States. Cdrdenas recognized the problem himself, 
summing up in 1946 the reasons he appeared to be anti-U.S.
^ Ibid.. November 11, 1948, p. 7.
^Ibid.. November 24, 1949, p. 5.
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(although he insisted he was not). The main reasons for 
this apparent antipathy were t 1) his attitude in trying 
to keep out U.S. troops during the wari 2) his opposition 
to the braeero program and 3) his condemnation of the 
United States' campaign against the Soviet U nion.Car­
denas fails to mention one of the most important reasons 
for his differences with the United States— the expro­
priation of the oil companies while he was president.
In contrast with his friendship with Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, Cardenas called Harry S. Truman a war criminal
for having dropped the atomic bomb on Japan when that
20country already was defeated. This attitude is com­
pletely understandable in light of the stand Cardenas 
took during the war against all bombing of open cities.
In spite of being a revolutionary general, Cardenas be­
came one of the world's leading proponents of peace.
Because of his stand for peace, and because he had 
become an internationally-recognized figure, Cardenas 
was sought out for a position by the United Nations in 
1948. In that year Ambassador Lu£s Quintanilla inform­
ed the Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations that the UN 
Committee on Nutrition and Agriculture wanted Cfirdenas 
to serve as committee chairman. Cardenas replied that he




knew neither the United States nor Great Britain would
want him in the position, and that since it lacked any
real autonomy, he did not want the job. He stated that
his ideas were completely alien to those of Truman and
the United States and of Great Britain, and that those
21two nations had too much power to intervene in the UN.
■*n
This antipathy toward the capitalistic nations was 
not as important at home as other attitudes that C&rdenas 
began expounding. His fights with the United States and 
Great Britain had been to Mexico's benefit. But it was 
his attitude toward the communist nations that caused cer­
tain elements of the press to come out against him.
During his administration, such legislation as his 
socialist education was responsible for C£rdenas* being 
called a radical, but at least he had not renewed relations 
with the Soviet Union. After he left office, however, 
this failure obviously was seen as a belief on his part 
that it would have infringed on Mexico's integrity rather 
than from any policy standpoint in regard to communism.
On the anniversary of the Russian Revolution in Nov­
ember 1943* C£rdenas applauded the victories of the Red 
Soviet Army against Germany. He indicated that the army's 
strength was in its patriotism and the social organization 




liked the consents, theoretically Mexico was one of the 
Soviet Union's allies* so no one could condesn very 
strongly Cdrdenas* feelings toward that country.
But three years later Cfrdenas was accused openly* 
along with Lombardo Toledano, of being responsible for 
consunist infiltration in Mexico. While denying that 
responsibility* C&rdenas admitted that he always had 
been in sympathy with a social system such as commun­
ism.2^ Ctfrdenas did not say that he had been in sym­
pathy with Soviet-style communism as practiced by Joseph 
Stalin* but obviously he had softened his opinion after 
his denunciation seemingly directed at the Soviet Union 
for the death of Leon Trotsky in Mexico.
There were those in Mexico in the 1950's who be­
lieved that Cirdenas had gone over completely to the com­
munist camp. In 1950* Lufs N. Morones* the former head 
of labor under Calles* stated that he had a copy of a 
document from the Mexican Communist party to the Comin- 
form in which Valentfn Campa spoke of a communist congress
in Guatemala and of Cardenas as leader of the communists
okin Mexico. Within a few more years* Cardenas was being 
singled out as the supreme chief of the communists in
23Ibid.. p. 208.
2kTodo. March 23, 1950* p. 7.
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Mexico.2^
Cardenas' denunciations of the United States and 
the United Nations during the Korean conflict added fuel 
for such attacks from the Right in Mexico. He was ex­
tremely critical of the intervention of the United States 
and immediately began attracting adverse comment in that
26part of the Mexican press favorable to the United States.
As is often the case with an idealist such as CArdenas• 
he sometimes ignored the faults of the opposing side of 
an issue. In the case of the Korean War, he never once 
mentions the entrance of Chinese "volunteers" into the 
conflict, but always talks only *f the North Korean army 
and its successes over the allies.
Cardenas' association with the communists concerned 
a number of persons after he left office. Supposedly he 
received a confidential letter from Henry A. Wallace, for­
mer vice-president of the United States whom CArdenas con­
sidered as a friend of Mexico, urging him to abandon the 
communists and declare him as anti-communist.2  ̂ CArdenas 
does not mention the letter, and considering the political 
similarity in ideals of Wallace and CArdenas, it it likely 
that the Rightist press at least took great liberties with
25Ibid.. July 22, 1954, P. 10.
26CArdenas, Obras. Tomo II, pp. 398-42?.
2?Tpdo. August 10, 1950, p. 7.
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the contents of the letter if it existed.
One conceivable explanation of the Rightist attacks 
on Cfrdenas is that Miguel Alem&i was considering an at­
tempt at re-election as president at that time, and his 
supporters might well have considered an attack on Carde­
nas as advantageous to the campaign since he always was 
strongly against any re-election.
In September 1952* Alemfin wanted to know the 
opinion of CArdenas on this subject* and sent a represen­
tative to query him. C&rdenas warned that anyone ad­
vising re-election was a false friend* and that Alem&i
28should not listen. Aleman followed the advice, and 
Adolfo Rufz Cortines was elected president. But toward 
the end of his administration, there were rumors that 
supporters of AleraAn again would try to get him re-elected 
and that Cardenas would be the opponent.2? Cardenas put 
an end to these rumors by stating that he believed in the 
principle of no re-election, and would not try to change 
it .3° This was the second time CArdenas ended rumors of 
his candidacy for president, the other being in the years 
of his own term of office.
It is possible that CArdenas might not have been
28Cardenas, Obraa. Tomo II, p. 440.
29jueves de Bxcelaior. June 16, 1955* p. 35«
3°Ibld.. June 30, 1955. p. 1.
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re-elected even if he had decided to run again, since in 
the 1950*s he was identified more and more by the Mexican 
press as being part of the extreme left. He remained 
popular with the common man, but the press attacks un­
doubtedly diminished his political power.
The press could point to February 1956, when he 
received the Stalin International Peace Prise in a 
ceremony arranged by the Mexican Movement for Peace ,3* 
as an example of his association with the Left. Up to 
this time Cardenas had attracted relatively little in­
ternational attention with his actions after leaving the 
presidency, and the prise likely was given to capitalise 
on his popularity among the workers of Latin America.
Two years after receiving the prize, CArdenas un- 
explicably started taking a more active interest in in­
ternational affairs. Late in 1958* He began talking with 
representatives of the House of Krupp of Germany about
going to Europe and inspecting some of their industrial
32installations. As the trip began taking shape, a num­
ber of foreign representatives issued invitations to 
the former president to visit their countries.
On October 8, 1958, the Soviet ambassador extended
^ Bl Nacional. February 26, 1956, p. 3.
^2LAzaro CArdenas, Obrasi I^Apuntes 1957-1966. Tomo 
III (MAxicoi Universidad Nacional Aut&ioma de Mexico, 
1973). PP. 49-50.
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an official invitation to visit the Soviet Union. The 
U.S. ambassador, knowing that CArdenas would be travel­
ing by train across the United States to his port of 
embarcation in New York, told him that he had informed 
all proper authorities to extend any aid needed. Am­
bassadors of France, Switzerland, Yugoslavia and the 
minister of Czechoslovakia also issued formal invitations 
to CArdenas ,33
CArdenas informed the Mexican government that he 
would visit France, Germany, Italy, Yugoslavia, the 
U.S.S.R. and the Republic of China to see for himself
3kthe development of those countries. In addition to 
those named, he also visited Belgium, The Netherlands, 
Austria, Switzerland, Poland, Hong Kong and Japan.^5 On 
November 29, 1958* CArdenas talked with Nikita Khrush- 
chev in Moscow, and after visiting Europe, arrived in
China in late January 1959. He was greatly impressed with
the living standard there and felt that the work of the 
Chinese was an example to the world.37 Other than this, 







political atmosphere in any of these countries.
Upon his return from the trip that took approxi­
mately four months, Cardenas visited President Adolfo 
LApez Mateos, who had taken office while CArdenas was 
out of the country. CArdenas informed him of what he 
had seen and LApez Mateos seemed mostly interested in 
the comments on the Krupp installations as that company 
was studying plans to establish a steel factory in 
MichoacAh.^ Probably mostly because of these plans, 
the president had offered CArdenas a sum of $30,000 to 
pay for the trip before he left. CArdenas refused the 
offer, leaving the money with a friend until his return. 
After returning to Mexico, CArdenas, on March 20, 1959* 
gave the money back to LApez Mateos.^ CArdenas not 
only did not want to become indebted to the Mexican gov­
ernment, but as events proved, his political ideals were 
not the same as those of the new president.
Almost immediately upon his return, CArdenas was 
accused of having ideals not only different from LApez 
Mateos, but oontrary to Mexican policy. As these charges 
of having a radical ideology and of being anti-Mexico 
began appearing, CArdenas put the blame on his consider­
able number of enemies, paid writers and those men who 
attached themselves to others in power. He compared the
3aibld.. pp. 92-93.
39Ibid.. PP* 99-100.
Chinese and Mexican revolutions* saying they both sought 
to destroy the economic and political oligarchies and to 
turn over land to the peasants. In mentioning two other 
major revolutions* Cardenas emphasised that the progress 
made in the Soviet Union since 1917 was undeniable* and 
that already Cuba had started on agrarian reform. Car­
denas' conclusion was that the road being followed by the 
socialist countries someday would mean the end of capital­
ism* a system which hindered the development of the un-
Uodeveloped countries. These conclusions displeased 
those on the Right who were attacking Cardenas* and the 
attacks became stronger as he became more deeply in­
volved in movements against the United States.
L5pez Mateos and his government seemed to be caught 
in between the capitalist countries and the socialist 
nations. For a time it seemed that Khrushchev might be 
invited to Mexico* and event which would have caused 
consternation in the United States. Although not invit­
ed* he did send a message to Mexico stressing that the 
Soviets would do everything possible to strengthen rela-
2iitions between the two countries. The message might have 
pleased Ctfrdenaa, but it was difficult for Ltfpez Mateos 
to forget the proximity of the United States* although to
40Ibid.. pp. 100-03.
/LiPravda. October 27, i960, p. 1.
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his credit his country often stood against the United 
States in the Organisation of American States (OAS).
When the American nations began preparing for the 
conference of foreign ministers at San Jos£, Costa Rica, 
in August I960, Mexico was among a small but powerful 
group which exerted pressure on the United States to
iLOsoften its line toward Cuba. The conference was held 
from August 22 through 29, and a final declaration gener­
ally directed against Cuba was signed on the last day of 
the meetings. It condemned the threat of intervention 
from outside, and agreed that all states in the hemisphere 
were under obligation to rejection intervention. The 
declaration stated that totalitarianism was incompatible 
with political systems in the hemisphere, and that all 
member states were held to be under obligation to adhere 
to the principles set forth in the inter-American system. 
In signing the declaration, the Mexican delegate qualified 
his vote by saying that it could in no way be considered 
as a threat against Cuba, which received the full sup­
port of the Mexican government.^
The Left in Mexico took the signing as a direct blow
42Paul Kennedy, NY Times. Aug. 14, I960, p. 18.
43̂Department of State, American Foreign Pollcvi 
Current Documents, i960 (Washington, D.C.i Government 
Printing Office, 1964), pp. 219-20,
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k/iagainst Cuba, and according to the political ideals of 
CArdenas, it was a blow against the Mexican Revolution* 
CArdenas had not been extremely outspoken on Mexican 
foreign policy in the administrations which followed his, 
but the conflict between the United States and Cuba gave 
him an opportunity to voice his international opinions.
In referring to accusations of his own communist 
tendencies, Cardenas* replies sometimes were vague. Once, 
when asked if he were a communist, he turned the question 
around and asked the definition of communism. He com­
plained that it was not what the anti-communist propa­
gandists said it was, and that he had been impressed with 
the spirit of the people of the Soviet Union and China.
He added that he could not see how anyone could be against 
systems which tried to help the masses.^
CArdenas commented that many persons feared that if 
communism were established in Mexico, there would be no 
freedom. All this propaganda he said was a lie. He added 
that although he was not proposing communism for Mexico, 
he believed that it was a theory which led to economic 
emancipation.^ Since the CArdenas Doctrine essentially 
was based on economic emancipation, it is only natural
hii.Editorial, Polltica. Vol. I (Sept. 1, I960), p. 2,
^Biempre1. March 8, 1961, p. 26.
46 *Cardenas, Ideario politico, pp. 97-98.
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that Cardenas would turn to any doctrine which seemed to 
promise the attainment of this objective.
CArdenas called on the United States to analyse 
its economic policy and the reasons Cuba had been forced 
to go outside the hemisphere to look for markets. He 
blamed both the United States and other American repub­
lics for not supporting the Cuban revolution, and claim­
ed that if the American nations had shown enough solid­
arity to avoid an economic breakdown in Cuba, then that 
country would not have had to look elsewhere for help.^ 
Because of his support for Cuba, Cardenas was 
chosen as president of the Latin American Conference for 
National Sovereignty, Economic Emancipation and Peace.
The Mexican conference took place during March 5-8, 1961. 
CArdenas says that the news of the conference was sent 
to Novedades and Excelsior as paid advertisements, but 
these two papers refssed publication. Only La Prensa
IlOin Mexico City took note of the conference.
The Soviet press was not as reticent, and ran a num­
ber of articles on the conference. According to Pravda. 
it was an indication of Latin American solidarity. N.S. 
Khrushchev sent his congratulations to the leaders of the 
conference, and CArdenas expressed the gratitude of the
^ Ibid.. p. 289.
hfl
CArdenas, Obras. fomo III, p. 186.
delegates to the people of the Soviet Union.^ On the 
surface* this act seemed far different from the actions 
of Cardenas the president in granting exile to Trotsky 
and refusing to renew relations with the Soviet Union.
But in terms of the conference, Cdrdenas had not 
changed his policy at all. On speaking at the congress, 
he attributed to it the exact same goals as the Cardenas 
Doctrine. He emphasised that all too often foreigners 
received more consideration than nationals, and this 
condition needed to be changed if Latin America was to 
have sovereignty and independence.^0
Ctfrdenas was accused of being a traitor to his 
country for having participated in the conference. He 
complained that it was the press which was not being 
patriotic since it would not publish any articles on the 
proceedings, but instead published anti-communist arti­
cles by the U.S. ambassador. The conference, according 
to Ctfrdenas, was composed of various social organizations 
and parties of wiedly-varying political ideas, mainly 
designed to discuss problems of each country. One of 
the themes was the discussion of how to regain natural 
resources from the hands of foreigners. C&rdenas accused
**9Prayda. March 7, 1961, p. March 17, 1961,
p. 1.
^°C£rdenas, Obraa. l'omo III, p. 239,
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the foreign companies of launching a campaign against the 
conference as soon as they learned of this point.-*1 The 
CArdenas Doctrine had survived from the time of his presi­
dency, and this time was being applied on a larger scale.
One country which definitely did not support the 
ideas of Cdrdenas was Guatemala. In April 1961, Presi­
dent Miguel Ydfgoras claimed that Guatemala had the right 
to allow foreign troops to train on its soil, and in the 
case of an attack by Cuba, he would not hesitate to use 
those troops. He added that his country had no intention 
of attacking another country.One of the reasons for 
this statement came out the next month, when the govern­
ment of Guatemala supposedly made a formal protest to 
Mexico in the face of what it felt was threat of invasion 
from land in Mexico owned by Cdrdenas. Ydfgoras warned 
there might be an invasion of Guatemala, £1 Salvador, 
Honduras and Nicaragua. The Mexican government denied 
that any formal protest ever was made.^
But Mexico could not deny the next protest of the 
Guatemalan government. This time the government sent a 
radiogram to the General Secretariat of the OAS claiming 
that communist troops were being trained on land owned by
51lbid.. pp. 192-93.
-*2La Prenaa. April 12, 1961, p. 4.
53Ibid.. May 31, I 96I ,  p. 3.
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C£rdenas. Mexico denied the charge and requested that an 
investigation be Bade. A committee met, but without 
making the inspection decided that Mexico was not doing 
anything wrong. ̂  Cardenas then suggested to Ldpez Mateos 
that he take a position in Grijalva instead of one offer­
ed in the north, as an act of confidence and in answer 
to the intrigues of Ydfgoras.-’-’ Ldpez Mateos refused, 
perhaps remembering that Castro once used Yucat&i as a 
training area, and realizing the close friendship Carde­
nas felt with Castro.
CArdenas first met Fidel Castro Ruz on September 2, 
1956, and characterized him as being a young intellectual 
with a violent temper. ̂  When CArdenas learned in 1959 
of the overthrow of Fulgencio Batista, his relationship 
with Castro still was not as close as it later became.
At the time of the overthrow, he conmented that he hoped 
it did not mean just a change of those in power and that 
the new program would justify the blood spilled.^
The relationship between Castro and Cardenas seems 
to have started becoming closer when CArdenas traveled to
^OAS, Annual Report of the Secretary General to the 
Council of the Organization (Washington. D.C.i Pan Ameri­
can Union, 1961), p. 6.
^CArdenas, Obraa. Tomo III, p. 243.
56Ibid.. Tomo II, p. 647.
■^Ibid.. Tomo III, p. 75.
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Cuba on July 26, 1959 to visit agricultural areas.**8 Then 
when the April 1961 invasion took place, the hatred of 
CArdenas for any kind of foreign intervention made it 
natural for him to take up the Cuban cause.
After the invasion, CArdenas stated that the Cuban 
cause was ideologically the same as that of Mexico, and 
that Latin American countries could not remain indifferent 
to this attack. He advised President John F. Kennedy to 
carry his battle against communism to the Soviet Union, 
not to Latin America where the countries already had suf­
fered from the consequences of the Cold War.**9 CArdenas 
agreed that revolutions should be neither imported nor 
exported,^0 but there was never any doubt that the Cuban 
Revolution had sprung from local uprisings rather than 
being caused by foreign ideologies.
Immediately after news of the attempted invasion,
CArdenas announced his intention to fly to Cuba, saying,
however, that the purpose of the trip was not to help
against the invaders, but rather simply to spend two
weeks visiting the agricultural areas to study their sys-
61tern of development. Not even CArdenas could have believ­
ed that this excuse would be accepted by his own government
58Ibid.. p. 110.
59Ibid.. p. 211.
8°CArdenas, Ideario politico, pp. 33-3*K
8lExcelsior. April 18, 1961, pp. 1, 9.
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and nuch less by the rest of the world.
Supposedly, bad weather cancelled CArdenas' flight
62to Havana, but sources close to the situation claim 
that the government of LApez Mateos prohibited the flight 
because they did not want to take the chance that the ex­
president might be killed in a foreign revolution.^
This explanation is much more logical in light of sub­
sequent conversations held between LApez Mateos and CArde- 
nas.
On April 27* CArdenas met with two friends to 
formulate ideas on Cuba to be presented to L6pez Mateos. 
One question was whether the Cuban government wanted to 
end the conflict with the United States, and if so, what 
conditions were necessary to do so. In addition, CArdenas 
wanted to ask Castro which governments might be accept­
able as intermediaries, at the same time stressing that 
there would be no intervention in the internal affairs 
of Cuba. CArdenas believed he and his two friends could 
go to Cuba as a private commission to present the ideas 
to Castro. LApez Mateos stressed his concern of the dan­
gers involved if CArdenas went to Cuba, especially since 
normal air service was suspended. The president also 
brought up the idea that the communists were using the
^2La Prensa. April 18, I96I, p. 3.
^Personal interview. Author with Jestfs Silva 
Herzog. L.S.U. Archives.
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name of Cfirdenas, but this accusation was denied as
64propaganda from the United States. Lopez Mateos 
nevertheless was inflexible on the matter, and C&rdenas 
was unable to present his ideas to Cuba.
Instead of going to Cuba, he expressed himself on 
the subject to the United States ambassador to Mexico, 
Thomas C. Mann, a few months after the affair had settled 
down somewhat. The conversation turned to Cuba, which, 
according to Mann, had turned completely to communism. 
C£rdenas indicated that not only was this act no danger 
to the United States, but that it was occasioned by the 
lack of friendship and aid from the United States. Mann 
replied that Cuba had insulted the United States, but 
C&rdenas retorted that this insult came only after several 
U.S. senators started talking of occupation of Cuba. On 
being asked if he thought the United States might renew 
relations with Castro, Mann answered that Cuba would have 
to cease being a satellite of the Soviet Union. Cdrdenas 
pointed out that even as a Soviet satellite, there warn no 
way Cuba could prepare itself to attack a country as large 
and powerful as the United States.^ Cardenas was only 
pointing out what was obvious, but often his manner of 
doing so caused international friction.
64 -Cdrdenas, Obras. Tomo III, pp. 2 1 2 -2 1 5 .
65Ibld.. pp. 2 3 6 -3 7 .
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This problem was partly resolved when LApez Mateos 
appointed Cardenas to a position within the government 
in Deceaber 1961. The move came at a very good time, 
as LApez Mateos appointed all the ex-presidents to posi­
tions during a time when Mexico's relationship with Cuba 
was attracting a large amount of attention in the foreign 
press.
As early as March 23. 1959* LApez Matess suggested 
that CArdenas take charge of the Commission of r£o Bal­
sas.^ Again a few months later, CArdenas was reminded 
of the offer, and he asked for time to think about it.**7 
CArdenas served during partB of three other administra­
tions » and LApez Mateos probably believed that more work 
would take CArdenas' mind off foreign affairs. The pre­
occupation of CArdenas in this area could have endanger­
ed the Mexican government.
If LApez Mateos feared this danger» it seemed to be 
a well-founded fear when he talked again with CArdenas 
in May i960 and again indicated his desire that CArdenas 
take the position in Rio Balsas. CArdenas informed the 
president that he now was a representative of the World 
Congress of Peace, and that probably he would have to 




capacity. At that time the president indicated that the
international duties of CArdenas would be no obstacle to
68his official position. The amount of time CArdenas 
applied to domestic problems in a similar position earlier 
seemed to indicate to LApez Mateos that once he was again 
working he would leave foreign relations to the president.
When CArdenas presented his plan to go to Cuba and 
try to arrange for an intermediary between that country 
and the United States. Lopes Mateos again reminded him of 
the position. Indicating even more concern to get CAr­
denas interested in domestic affairs, the president even 
suggested he take over as head of the PRI, a position 
CArdenas completely refused, saying he was unqualified 
for political reasons. Finally. CArdenas himself sug­
gested that if all ex-presidents were put into secondary 
positions, he would agree to serve on the Commission of 
Rfo Balsas or any other position. He even offered to talk
with several of the ex-presidents himself, although LApez
6qMateos made no committment at the time. After this in­
terview. CArdenas admitted privately that the main reason 
he had delayed in accepting a position with the government 
was his feeling of conflict with LApez Mateos over the 




prison* CArdenas believed L<Spez Mateos was misinformed 
over the issue ,7° and he continued to fight until the 
end of Ldpez Mateos' term to have the men released*
The issue over the political prisoners was not the 
only conflict between the two men. Although CArdenas 
could not comp&ain too much in January 1962 when at the 
Punte del Este conference in Uruguay the Mexican delegate 
abstained from the voting which expelled Cuba from the 
QAS,7* the abstention did not necessarily mean that CAr- 
denas was convinced the Mexican government was doing 
everything possible to support the sovereignty of Cuba.
CArdenas preferred that Mexico take positive action 
to show the United States that it could not intervene in 
the affairs of other nations. He became involved in the 
National Liberation Movement which grew out of the first 
Latin American Conference for National Sovereignty, Eco­
nomic Emancipation and Peace. CArdenas informed L6pes 
Mateos that this movement was not a political party, but 
had grown out of that conference with movements being
7°Ibid.. p. 222.
^Department of State, American Foreign Policvi 
Current Documents. 1962 (Washington, D.C.i Government 
Printing Office, 1966), p. 330. Also see OAS Documents, 
1962, OSA/Ser. G/lII/C-sa-33(l) and Uni6n Panamericana, 
Tr&W o toteJaiMrjjgiag de ^ ig tfn c ja  regXprog&i apnea- clones. Tomo II. 1960-1964 (Washington. D.C.iUni6n Pan- 
americana, 1964), p. 67.
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in each country* LApez Mateos was assured that the aove­
aent was acting strictly within the constitution• and was 
in no way against the present adainistration.72 The 
aoveaent (the MIN) was fighting for the ideals of the 
Mexican Revolution according to CArdenas in the areas of 
politics, culture, economy and justice. Nevertheless, 
the government harrassed the MLN, and Cardenas recog­
nised a personal antipathy for the aoveaent in the presi­
dent.^ Undoubtedly, Cardenas hiaself would have felt 
a certain antipathy during his own presidency toward 
any international aoveaent* s trying to tell hia how to 
handle his foreign affairs.
Neither did CArdenas care for the way the govern-, 
aent handled the Kennedy visit in late June 1962. Presi­
dent Kennedy received an extremely warm welcoae froa the 
Mexican people, and la Prensa indicated that the reaction 
was an indication of the true feelings of Mexico toward 
the United States.7** But CArdenas accused the govem- 
aent of taking special pains to aake sure nothing happen­
ed to spoil the visit. He stated that "cosaunistB" and 
”anti-iaperialists" were rounded up and put in jail, only 
to be released after President Kennedy returned to the
72CArdenas, Obraa. Tomo III, p. 255.
73Ibid.. pp. 2W-46.
Editorial, La Prensa. June 30, 1962, p. 8.
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United States.^ There is no doubt that the Mexican
government could have rounded up a number of trouble­
makers before the visit, but Cardenas had become so emo­
tionally involved in the struggle against the United 
States that he might well have overlooked that perhaps 
the majority of the Mexican people did support the Ken­
nedy administration*
Cardenas released more invective against Kennedy 
when in October 1962 the United States' president declar­
ed a blockade of Cuba. According to Cdrdenas, this was 
an act which indicated U.S. lack of consideration for the 
sovereignty of other countries, in addition to being an 
illegal act.^ Almost immediately, however, the other 
States belonging to the OAS supported U.S. action in 
Cuba.
Mexico supported the OAS action also as the member
states called for the dismantling of all offensive mis-
77siles placed in Cuba.' Mexican concern at giving the 
United States carte blance to act against Cuba forced the 
Mexican delegate to abstain on some parts of the resolu­
tion in spite of overall Mexican support. The government




OAS, Annual Report-of— the Secretary General to the 
Council of the Organisation. 1962 (Washington. D.C.iPan 
American Union, 1962), pp. 3-̂ .
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of l£pez Mateoa further incensed the Left in Mexico when 
this action was followed by a public release of a letter 
sent by the president to both Cuba and the United States, 
expressing concern over the situation. In his letter to 
Cuba, he put Mexico on the side of the United States by 
declaring that his government must condemn the establish­
ment of such destructive weapons on Cuban territory
To be true to his own doctrine, Cardenas could not 
justify Cuban action on this issue either, in spite of his 
differences with L6pez Mateos. He again emphasized that 
the United States* boycott of Cuba could have destroyed 
that country economically had not Castro been able to find 
an alternative.^ But Cardenas, once again exhibiting a 
nationalistic spirit, indicated that neither the United 
States nor the Soviet Union could control the destiny of 
the world. He said that both nations would better serve
mankind if they would withdraw all their bases frsm all
80foreign territories. When he stated that the people of
Latin America wanted neither the United States nor the
Soviet Union to intervene in affairs of the Latin American 
81countries, he was without a doubt expressing the true
Excelsior. October 30, 1962* pp. 1, 15,
^Cirdenas, Idaario politico, pp. 286-89.
80Cardenas, Obras. Tomo III, pp. 290-91.
^*La Prensa. April 19, 1961, p. 16.
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sentiments of the vast majority of not only Mexicans* but 
all Latin Americans.
His outspoken complaints about the intervention from 
the United States in the Cuban crisis were the last real 
statements on foreign policy which might have been con­
sidered dangerouB to the Mexican government. He did com­
plain in 1966 when Lyndon B. Johnson scheduled a trip to 
Mexico. C&rdenas claimed that it was not an honor for 
the country to have to entertain a bad leader who used 
his country's power to meddle in the affairs of smaller 
nations. The visit for Cardenas was a political move to 
make it apparent that Mexico supported the militaristic
82actions of the United States. Xxcept for such occasion­
al remarks* however* Cardenas faded from the foreign af­
fairs scene until his death in 1970* when he was again 
eulogised as the man who gave Mexico economic independence 
from the United States and Great Britain.
82Cardenas* Obras. Tomo III* p. 5̂ 2.
CHAPTER IX
AMALXSIS OP THE CfaDENAS APHCTISTRATIOH
The Mexican people in the yeara of President 
Cardenas (193^-19^0) made great progress in 
the struggle for democratization and unifi­
cation of the national sovereignty of their homeland.1
The above quotation was not taken from the writing 
of some Mexican patriot, but from a history of Soviet 
Foreign Relations. Many Mexicans would agree with the 
sentiment of the statement, but the source might lead to 
the impression that President CArdenas was a friend of the 
Soviet Union, An excerpt from Pravda in 19^0, however, 
might better illustrate the thinking of the Soviets dur­
ing the CArdenas years. Denouncing the influence of the 
United States on CArdenas, the article said that declara­
tions made by the Mexican president indicated that he was
about to embark on an offensive against the Popular Front
2parties of Mexico.
By the time of this article, CArdenas had served
^khtamzian, Istoriia, p. 365.
Excelsior (quoted from Pravda). Feb. 23, 19̂ 0, p.l.
270
271
practically his entire term. Thus* he had already expro­
priated the oil properties* demonstrating to the United 
States just how little influence its power had on his 
policies. In reviewing the objectives and accopplishments 
of his regime, those expropriations rank as one of the 
most important. C&rdenas had difficulties with the two 
major countries involved* but since that time Mexico has 
made greater economic progress than previously. There is 
no way to state definitively that the expropriation end­
ed Mexico's economic problems and started the country on 
the road to progress. In fact* for a time, the oil in­
dustry was a political and economic liability. Yet* 
since then, no foreign companies have tried to avoid Mexi­
can law by appealing directly to their own governments.
If Cardenas accomplished nothing else during his adminis­
tration, the effective enforcement of this portion of his 
policy could have qualified him as an economic liberator 
of Mexico. Because CMrdenas, both during his administra­
tion and in later years* was so concerned with this idea 
of economic independence* he undoubtedly would have been 
happy to be remembered in this manner.
While the oil component of his economic policy was 
the most dramatic because of the countries and amount of 
money involved, Cirdenas did not limit himself just to 
that aspect. Still in the economic sphere, Cdrdenas' 
decree establishing Mexican territorial waters at nine
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nautical miles also indicated freedom from the influence 
of the United States, and liberation from the inhibiting 
fear of that powerful neighbor, a new policy for 20th 
century Mexican leaders.
When the United States Treasury policy on silver 
purchases changed, C£rdenas did not attempt to follow a 
similar policy of retaliation. From all indications, it 
appeared that the United States was tying the silver is­
sue to the oil debate and telling Mexico tacitly that 
if Cardenas wanted the Treasury to continue buying silver, 
he would have to be reasonable over the oil issue. But 
CArdenas didn't attempt to retaliate in a like manner.
The United States was still very interested in settling 
agrarian claims, but CArdenas. informed his subordinates 
that they should not tie the silver issue to that of the 
agrarian claims (see chapter VI above).
In retrospect, one must also credit the United 
States with a good deal of patience with Mexico during 
the CArdenas years. At the 7th International Conference 
of American States at Montevideo, Uruguay, in 1933, Secre­
tary of State Hull had agreed to absolute non-intervention 
on the part of the United States in both internal and ex­
ternal affairs of other countries.*̂  The United States 
in general followed this policy in dealing with Mexico,
^Bailey, A Diplomatic History, p. 737.
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and allowed Cardenas to pursue his policy of nationalisa­
tion.
Perhaps it was just this knowledge that the United 
States would not force Mexico into doing something 
against her will that gave Cardenas the courage to start 
Msxico on the road to economic independence. Ramdn Beteta 
indicated that his government acknowledged the fact that 
the United States probably could force Mexico into doing 
anything, even to the point of returning the oil proper­
ties. But he also pointed out at the same time that this 
act would mean the overthrow of Cardenas, political and
Jleconomic chaos, and the end of the Good Neighbor policy. 
Fortunately for both countries, the United States did not 
attempt to use force to aid the oil companies, and the 
lack of coercion gave CArdenas a chance to prove that his 
policies were best for Mexico.
In further refuting the idea that Cardenas was un­
duly influenced by outside forces, one need look only at 
the case of the Spanish civil war. Not only did CArdenas 
follow a policy completely independent from the United 
State8, but his government along of all the Latin American 
republics supported the Spanish Republican government.
LChief, Division of the American Republics, U.S. 
State Department, memorandum of conversation with RamAn 
Beteta, June 19, 1939# Doc. 812.6363/3862, RO 59.
27^
In the case of Spain* Ctfrdenas first used flexible Mexi­
can foreign policy to determine that aid to the Loyal­
ists was not considered as a form of intervention* then 
used the Sstrad Doctrine in reverse to refuse to grant 
Franco's government recognition. Cardenas might have 
been accused of a lot of things* but no one could say 
that he blindly followed anyone else's policy.
The major accusation against the C£rdenas regime 
would seem to be that it was "radical*" if not complete­
ly communistic. But in analysing his administration* one 
must keep in mind that the United States and the Soviet 
Union were not yet allies during the Cdrdenas years. The 
two nations had resumed diplomatic relations in 1933* but 
this act did not make them friends. Although the Carde­
nas years came before the McCarthy purges of the 1950's* 
there was still animosity and lack of understanding in 
the United States toward the Soviet Union. Therefore* 
when some journalist accused Cdrdenas' administration of 
being "communistic*" chances were in many cases he really 
wasn't even sure of the meaning of the word. The idea 
seemed to be to brand anyone as communist who did not 
believe exactly the same things as the United States gov­
ernment and big business combined. Thus* when Cardenas 
dared to oppose big business* his regime automatically 
received the label of "radical."
When Cardenas was forced to turn to countries such
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as Germany, Italy and Japan for oil markets because the 
democratic nations refused to buy the Mexican product, 
his regime then became fascist to those who had to put 
a label on his politics. In 1935# the United States had 
agreed to grant most-favored-nation status to the Soviet 
Union, provided the Soviets purchase $30,000,000 worth 
of goods in 1935*̂  No one was trying to label the United 
States as being communistic because of this commercial 
agreement, yet Mexico was fascist because she was selling 
oil to the only countries which would buy it.
The labels on the Cardenas administration continued 
to fluctuate according to the political bent of the ac­
cuser and the period of time. When Mexico sold products 
to the fascist countries, Cardenas was a fascist leading 
Mexico into a period of reaction. When he was aiding the 
Spanish Republicans or the labor groups within Mexico, 
or just allowing the CPM to operate without harrassment, 
he was a communist.
But even in 1937 the communists in Mexico were ad­
mitting that the Cfrdenas government was not really even 
sociali8tio, and that there was no dictatorship of the 
proletariat. The democratic and anti-imperialistic poli­
cy of Ctfrdenas did, however, give them hope that the Mexi­
can Revolution could be turned into a socialist one.
^gRUS. Soviet Union. 1933-39. p. 197.
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Nevertheless, Hem£n Laborde stated at the time that the 
CFM could not be considered as Cardenistas, but as com­
munists in the service of the World Revolution.^ That 
he could say this publicly indicates the amount of free­
dom the CfM had under Cdrdenas. The only purges of com­
munists under his regime were the purges initiated by 
the communists themselves. These purges were usually a 
result of disagreements over Soviet foreign policy, but 
Cdrdenas seemed to recognize that the limited membership 
of the CFM need not be taken seriously by his government.
The CFM itself seemed to recognize that Cdrdenas 
was not taking the communists within Mexico very serious­
ly, and by 1940 the party had all but given up hope of 
bringing a socialist revolution about through the Carde­
nas government. By July of that year, communist-led lab­
or groups were in open revolt against the regime, and the 
CFM was calling for increased agitation in opposition to 
moderate government policies. Details of secret CFM 
meetings revealed that the communists were to try to stall 
Mexico's cooperation with other Latin American governments 
and to precipitate a civil war in Mexico. Supposedly this 
last objective was for the purpose of bring about U.S. 
intervention in Mexico, thus limiting American aid to
^Victor Alba, Historla del movimiento obrero en 
America latina (Mexico* Libreros Mexicanos Unidos, 1964),
p. 212.
2?7
Great Britain.7 Needless to sayf if the CPM did think 
itself capable of engaging in such an ambitious task, the 
chances for success were minimal. More than likely, the 
Soviet policy might have called for the party to attempt 
disrupting activities* but even the Soviets must have 
known that the small membership had little chance to 
accomplish such goals.
CKrdenas also tried to make sure that neither the 
Soviets nor any other communist groups tried to enter 
Mexico to help the party carry out objectives formulated 
outside the republic. As early as 1936 the Cfrdenas 
government had prohibited the entrance into the country
oof groups of militants* such as communists. There prob­
ably was no immediate effect on the CFM and the main con­
cern should have been with those already in the country.
The press would have preferred a crackdown on all 
CFM activity* but at that early date Cardenas still be­
lieved that internal groups constituted no danger to Mexi­
co. Cardenas always seemed to believe that internal 
groups* no matter how opposed to his regime they might be, 
could be handled and tolerated. On the other hand* ex­
ternal groups always seemed to represent potential danger.
7Betty Kirk, Covering the Mexican Front (Normani 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1942), pp. 89-90.
®g*££lsifl£, January 28, 1936, p. 1.
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This danger did not keep Cardenas from opening the doors 
of Mexico to political exiles* however.
Within just a few months of his election* Cardenas 
was already being accused of having communist-inspired 
policies* although up to that point he certainly had 
done nothing compared with what was to come in the next 
few years. But Cfrdenas felt compelled to dispel this 
notion* and declared in a speech that his policies were 
not communist-inspired* nor was he himself a communist.
He stated that he believed that in the case of labor* 
the strike was a necessary weapon in the fight for social 
justice* but he gave his full guarantee for the rights of 
private enterprise at the same time.9 Cardenas later was 
accused of allowing syndicalism to develop to such an ex­
tent that the functioning of his own government was in 
peril because he allowed government workers to strike 
If Cfrdenas had been the communist-type dictator his op­
ponents accused him of being* he would not have allowed 
this situation to develop to the possible detriment of the 
state. He also would have hesitated to give private en­
terprise the guarantees of protection* a promise he kept. 
In fact* although Cardenas favored labor in his policies* 
he made labor see that he would not allow labor groups
9Ibid., April 13, 1935. Sect. II, p. 2.
10P£rez-Verdia, C&rdenas apoatol. p. 70.
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wantonly to destroy the Mexican economy at the expense 
of private enterprise. Cardenas made it clear that his 
Labor Doctrine delivered at Monterrey indicated that the 
State would serve as arbiter in disputes between labor 
and management, but that neither segment would be favor­
ed to the extent that the nation would be in jeopardy.11 
Cardenas was sometimes accused of breaking this pledge, 
but in light of how the Mexican economy was actually giv­
en a boost under Cardenas, this accusation holds little 
value.
In another pledge that many people claimed Cardenas
broke, he assured the nation that communist agitators
12would not succeed in influencing his regime. Not only
was he accused of allowing the communists to influence
his policy, but of opening up the national treasury to
13further communist propaganda. J Part of the basis of 
such arguments was the fact that the CPM had direct rela­
tions with the COmintem, and in turn was allowed freedom 
of expression under Cardenas. The false premise which 
followed was that C&rdenas must have been influenced by 
the Comintern and the Soviet Union.
It is not hard to imagine that the CFM had direct
11C<rdenas, Ideario politico, pp. 189-90.
12Excelsior, February 8, 1939* p. 1.
^Correa, B1 balance del Cardenismo. p. 5̂ 0,
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contact with the Comintern, especially since the party 
openly admitted it. But the idea that Cardenas used 
the national treasury to aid communist propaganda does 
not seem to be very logical in the face of two facts.
First, the financial problems brought on by the oil ex­
propriations and the demands of the United States and 
Great Britain for payment of the revolutionary debt 
created a situation whereby the government would have 
been hard-pressed to come up with additional funds to 
support activities which would have made the problems 
with democratic governments even more difficult. Carde­
nas had enough troubles with foreign newsmen accusing his 
government of being communistic without allowing wide­
spread communist propaganda to add fuel to the fire.
A second consideration was that such propaganda 
activities as were carried on by the CFM were always in 
financial danger. An example of this was the financial 
plight of La Vos, the official Communist party organ 
which had an extremely short publishing history because 
of the lack of funds.
Yet a third consideration for rejecting the idea that 
the government supported the propaganda activities of the 
CFM is found in the very poverty of the country which 
CArdenas was governing. His treasury was almost empty, 
but he recognised the poverty that existed in Mexico and 
attempted to correct the problem.
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More than twenty years after he left office, he 
showed he was still concerned about the problem of pov­
erty in his country. In a speech before a group of high 
school graduates, C&rdenas reminded the Mexican people 
that in spite of the economic progress made by the country 
and the political maturity to which Mexico had grown, 
there could be no pride in these accomplishments while 
a large segment of the Mexican population still lived
I kin ignorance and poverty.
Not long after Cirdenas had taken office, he had 
expressed his concern about the same problems, especial­
ly the ignorance and poverty of the country. In talk­
ing with U.S. ambassador Josephus Daniels, C&rdenas in­
dicated that he felt the three most serious problems of 
Mexico in order were educational, economic and relig­
ious.1  ̂ Probably no one would have argued with him over 
these problems, although others might have re-arranged 
the order. But the problem arose in the way Cardenas 
attacked each issue.
The religious issue was more a result of the 1917 
constitution than of any new legislation by Cardenas, 
but there is no doubt that he did use the anti-clerical 
clauses in the constitution to further some of his goals.
^Cffrdenas, Ideario politico, p. 250.
1^FRUS, 1936, Vol. V, p. 716.
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His acts attracted the attention of the clergy in the 
United StateSt thus leading to more bad publicity for 
his government. Again false premises were drawn( the 
conclusion being that since his government had proved 
to be anti-religioust then it must be communistic.
The economic portion of that three-part plan to 
face Mexico's problems has already been discussed in de­
tail in referring to the oil expropriations. Although 
this act hurt the economy for a time, it led to increas­
ed revenues that went into the Mexican Treasury instead 
of into the bank accounts of the companies.
But it was the third problem and the attempt to 
solve it that probably received the most domestic criti­
cism. Even more than his labor policies, the education­
al system drew the most criticism. Apparently, most of 
the opposition was related to the religious question as 
CArdenas further took education out of the hands of the 
church, an issue long debated in Mexico. In making a 
speech before the legislature of the State of Guerrero, 
CArdenas defended his educational reforms. In emphasis­
ing emphatically that his was not a communistic govern­
ment, CArdenas defended scientific socialism and the 
sooialist form of education as being non-dogmatic, with 
the only objective being the exposition of modem know­
ledge. It would also, according to CArdenas, orient 
future generations of Mexicans toward a more social life
283
with social justice as a cornerstone of interaction among 
people,1**
Others saw the educational reforms differently* and 
one writer describes them as being designed by Cardenas 
to transform Mexico into a leftist country.1? Those who 
believed this felt that the new socialist education was 
not only anti-religious and militant* but definitely com­
munistic, There seemed to be a sufficient number of 
Mexicans who felt this way* because almost immediately 
after Cardenas left office the amendment which his govern­
ment had passed allowing for the change in the education­
al system was repealed and Mexico's flirtation with 
socialist education was ended.
The school system might have been socialist-oriented* 
but a number of American writers who have taken an inter­
est in the Cardenas years have decided that his was not 
a communist regime. Robert Alexander* who has written 
on communism in Latin America* points out that at times 
democratic leaders have utilised the communists in their 
programs. He says that Cardenas was one of those leaders* 
and that he allowed communists to occupy high positions 
not only in the government, but in the labor unions too.
But Alexander goes on to point out that the communists
1^Excelsior. Pebruary 21* 19̂ 0, p. 8.
1?Alvear Acevedo, Ldtsaro C&rdenas, p. 111,
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lost almost all they had gained under Cdrdenas during
18the next administration.
Particular emphasis should be placed on Alexander's 
use of the word "allowed" when speaking of the positions 
communists occupied in the Cdrdenas government. When he 
speaks of the losses of the communists in the following 
administration! the truth inherent In the emphasis he 
places on Cardenas' allowing communists to occupy posi­
tions in his government is implied. Had the communists 
been able to entrench themselves firmly during his term 
of office (and to do this would have required his sup­
port), they might not have lost so heavily during the 
next administration.
There would be no sense in denying that probably 
some of Cdrdenas' top advisers were communists, at least 
in the Mexican sense of the word. But Cardenas had set 
up the government party so that each one of the four sect­
ors would support the other in elections. And since 
traditionally in Mexico the party candidate for presi­
dent is elected, there easily could have been an oppor­
tunity for a "communist" president had the party so desir­
ed. It is more logical that Cdrdenas picked his top ad­
visers, not so much in regard to their political leanings, 
but in what they could do for his administration. In so
18Alexander, Communism in Latin America, p. 15*
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doing, Cardenas exhibited the same political agility
that he did in favoring labor, but keeping the support
of private enterprise also.
Even the U.S. ambassador to Mexico under C&rdenas,
Josephus Daniels, admitted the socialist nature of the
Cdrdenas regime, but added that, although he knew there
were communists in Mexico just as in any country, he did
not believe that Mexico had become communistic under Cir- 
19denas. A Mexican writer on the other hand, who actual­
ly would accuse Cardenas of communism, says that the Cdr- 
denas administration was not a communist one only because 
it failed in the attempt. He claims that Cardenas and his
administrators attempted to force Mexicans to become corn- 
20munists. As was often the case with such accusations,
it was based largely on Cdrdenas' policy of taking away 
church authority in education, and thus should be viewed 
as being biased on that account rather than actual politi­
cal ideology.
In analysing the attitude of Cardenas and his poli­
cies, it is hard to accept this idea of a failure to ac­
complish communist goals. Certainly Cardenas had enough 
support to accomplish almost any goal he set. His various 
policies which he carried through but which met with
^^Excelsior. February 15, 1936, p. 1.
20Alvear Acevedo, Ldzaro CArdenas, pp. 277-78.
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criticism bear out this ability. Even his educational 
program, although opposed, became a reality during his 
time in office, and it was not until he left office 
that anyone dared change it.
In further denying the idea that CArdenas wanted 
to have a communistic government but failed, one need on­
ly look at Mexican relations with the Soviet Union. When 
CArdenas took office, diplomatic relations with the Sov­
iet Union had bemn broken for five years. Although there
21was communication through trade between the two nations, 
the communists and all those supporters who wrote CArdenas 
asking him to renew relations could never convince him of 
the necessity or the desirability of such action. He was 
willing to discuss renewal, but not on the terms of the 
Soviet Union. Had CArdenas desired a communist regime in 
Mexico, he could have renewed relations and asked the 
Soviets for aid his country desperately needed.
Perhaps even more importantly, CArdenas* attitude 
toward political refugees should be considered. He allow­
ed refugees of widely-varying ideologies to enter Mexico. 
Among these emigrAs were the political refugees from the 
Spanish civil war. In spite of a few isolated charges to 
the contrary, CArdenas never set any political standard 
for the refugees to meet.
21HSRB. 1934/35-1935/36. Tomo X. pp. 38?, 43?.
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At least part of the reasoning behind the accusa­
tions that Cardenas and his government were communist 
was that Mexico and the Soviet Union both supplied aid 
to the Republican govemnent in Spain during the civil 
war there. But the Soviet Union was allied with Great 
Britain and the United States during World War II without 
anyone's accusing those two nations of being connunistic.
One of the best reasons of all for accepting the 
Cardenas government as being completely independent and 
out of the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union is the 
case of the most famous of all the exiles to Mexico, Leon 
Trotsky. Extremely important in analysing Cardenas is the 
admission of Trotsky against the violent opposition of 
almost all communist, and many non-communist, groups in 
Mexico. Neither was he intimidated by protests from the 
Soviet Union.
Labor was among the groups protesting the asylum 
given to Trotsky, yet Cardenas managed to placate the 
workers and stand firm on his decision at the same time. 
There was no actual dictatorship of the proletariat und­
er Cardenas, and although he favored labor in many dis­
putes, most notably that with the oil companies, he was
22not interested in a state controlled by one class, and
v _  f2?°S®rt l0—bardo Toledano (Chapel HilliUniversity of North 
Carolina Press, 1966), p. 13̂ .
288
he made sure that labor did not come to dominate his 
administration. He fulfilled his promises to private 
enterprise to grant it full protection of his government 
whenever it met legitimate labor demands. By looking at 
the major statutes and laws passed during his time of of­
fice , one can see that Cardenas was interested in the 
nation, not just one sector.
Some of those major statutes werei the Law of 
Nationalization of Property and the Regulatory Law of 
1935* the decree establishing territorial limits of Mexi­
can waters in 19351 the Law of Expropriation in 19361 and 
the decree declaring that the oil companies' properties 
had been expropriated in 1938. In addition to these, 
one should not forget that Cardenas gave away more land 
to the Mexican peasant than any president before him. Be­
cause of these laws and actions which ultimately proved 
to be of benefit to workers, farmers and the rest of the 
nation, Cardenas became a very popular president. He was 
so popular that had he believed in totalitarian-style 
communism, he probably could have remained in office in 
spite of the no re-election clause in the constitution.
Not only did Cdrdenas feel that to remain in office 
would negate popular sentiment and the ideals of the Mexi­
can Revolution, but he even asked his congress to cancel 
the normal presidential extraordinary powers because he 
felt they endangered democracy and threatened the Republic
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with dictatorship.2-̂
Whan the tine came to step downf CArdenas did not 
even support his old friend Francisco Mugica for the 
nomination* although it is possible that he might hare 
selected Mtfgica as his own personal choice. The Mexican 
press pointed out that many members of the Left were sup­
porting Mugica in the early days of the campaign* and
2kwere hoping to win Cardenas to their side. That he 
did not give his support, and instead supported the party 
candidate* should be evidence that CArdenas did not seek 
to perpetuate communism or socialism* but the party of 
the Mexican Revolution.
Although involved in foreign affairs throughout 
his period of president and in years later also* Carde­
nas probably would have liked to have been remembered 
for his domestic labor and his nationalistic spirit* 
which directly affected Mexico's economic independence.
He often chastised those who liked to meddle in the af­
fairs of other countries. In 1965* just a few years before 
his death, he took issue with something Richard M. Nixon 
stated about Mexico's position regarding the Dominican 
Republic. Nixon stated that Mexico should take a more 
active part in situations within Latin America such as
2^Kirk, Covering the Mexican Front* p. k2• 
2i|jExcelsior, January 30, 19̂ 0, p. 3.
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In the case of the Dominican Republic. Cardenas wanted 
to know who gave Nixon the authority to give advice on 
natters strictly Mexican. J
The man who had stood up to the United States and 
Great Britain in the case of the oil expropriations* had 
refused to renew relations with the Soviet Union except 
on his own terns, had given asylun to a man such as 
Trotsky, had aided the Spanish Republicans when no one 
else in Latin America would, and had denounced both the 
United States and the Soviet Union for intervention in 
Cuba, always kept in mind one principle, that of non­
intervention of one government into the affairs of another.
CArdenas summed up his own life principles in a 
speech to the first national congress of the CTM in 1938* 
"respect of life, individual guarantees, political lib­
erty, cancellation of privileges, and a better distribu-
26tion of the public wealth." No matter what labels 
others pinned on him throughout life, he remained faith­
ful to these principles and to the basis principles of 
the traditional Mexican foreign policy.
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